Commentary

Volume Sixty-six, Number Three, September 1978

WHY BAKKE WON'T END REVERSE DISCRIMINATION

William J. Bennett & Terry Eastland

Nathan Glazer

THE MESSAGE OF PROPOSITION 13

Seymour Martin Lipset & Earl Raab

The Anxious American Jew Ruth R. Wisse

What the CIA Knows About Russia Lev Navrozov

Son of "Gen Ed" Kenneth S. Lynn

Africa for the Africans? W. Scott Thompson

FICTION: Family Affairs Pearl K. Bell

BOOKS: Roger Starr / Julius Weinberg / C. David Heymann / Sidney Hook / Stephen A. Schuker

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L&M Lights	7	0.6
Lark	17	1.1
Marlboro	17	1.0
Marlboro Lights	12	0.8
Marlboro Menthol	14	0.8
Merit	8	0.6
Merit Menthol	8	0.6
Multifilter	13	0.8
Newport	18	1.3
Parliament	9	0.6
Raleigh	16	1.0
Real	9	0.7
Real Menthol	8	0.6
Salem	16	1.1
Salem Lights	10	0.8
Vantage	11	0.8
Vantage Menthol	11	0.8
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

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Commentary

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COMMENTARY is published monthly by the American Jewish Committee—Single copy is $2.50, $24 a year; 3 years $64; 5 years $96—Add $4.00 per year for all foreign, including Canada and Latin America—Second class postage paid at New York, N.Y. and at additional mailing offices.

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Letters from Readers

Peace in the Middle East?

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

I read with great interest the four articles in the July issue entitled "Is Peace Still Possible in the Middle East?" ["The Role of the United States" by Robert W. Tucker; "The View from Tel Aviv" by Walter Laqueur; "The Egyptian Presence" by Bernard Lewis; "A Skeptical View" by Steven J. Rosen] and would like to offer the following comments.

Walter Laqueur uses the word "painful" to describe the foreign policy of the Begin government. An anti-Begin columnist like Anthony Lewis, seeing the word "painful," understands it to signal harsh denunciations of Prime Minister Begin's negotiating stance vis-à-vis the Arab world in general and Egypt in particular. But in view of Mr. Laqueur's "limited-autonomy" solution to the West Bank problem (a solution that is not inconsistent with the Begin plan) and the balanced perspective that Mr. Laqueur applies to Begin in his article, one begins to feel that the source of the pain he mentions lies outside the Begin cabinet, beyond Israel. The real source of the pain arises from what Steven J. Rosen terms "the more strident elements of the Arab camp, who regard not just the 1967 territories but also the lines of 1949 as reflecting nothing more than conquests by Jewish armies."

Mr. Rosen's observation is, sadly, confirmed by a resolution of last April's Islamic conference which refers to "the Arab territories occupied in 1948 and 1967. . . ." Another resolution of this conference, . . . calling for a Palestine stamp issue, refers . . . to May 15, 1948—the day Arab armies attacked Israel—as "the day on which Palestine was usurped by Zionism. . . ." This conference was held in Dakar, Senegal, from April 24 to 28, and the texts of the resolutions are available at the UN, yet our leading newspapers, which seem bent on maintaining the moderate-Sadat/inflexible-Begin line handed down from the White House and the State Department, ignored this evidence of Arab immoderation.

Another document available at the UN, also ignored by our leading newspapers, contains the text of the communiqué issued at last May's Havana meeting of the Nonaligned Coordinating Bureau. The economic section of the communiqué is faithful to the 1975 General Assembly resolution invidiously equating Zionism with racism by urging that the elimination of "zionism" *(sic), inter alia,* be one of the new elements in the New International Economic Order. The political section of the communiqué reflected the PLO position in the Middle East conflict and included a request for a Security Council call for an arms embargo against Israel.

This request became a draft resolution introduced by Iraq at the special General Assembly session on disarmament, and the 32 cosponsors included Egypt and Saudi Arabia—fresh from getting arms commitments from the United States by linking these commitments with those previously extended to Israel. Again, none of our leading newspapers noticed this piece of flim-flammery practiced by Cairo and Riyadh. The disarmament session referred the draft to the next General Assembly which, no doubt, will adopt it, thus providing the William Quandts and Andrew Youngs in the Carter administration with the justification for advising President Carter to cut off all further arms shipments to Israel.

Mr. Laqueur in his article refers to a report that no one in Washington "really expects" total Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza, though, to his credit, he is skeptical about the implications of this report. Yet the White House Middle East expert, William Quandt, is on record as telling a Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee, July 19, 1976: ". . . in return for Arab commitments to peace, Israel *will have to withdraw* in agreed stages *from all territory occupied since 1967*, except for mutually agreed-upon modifications" (emphasis added).

Is it any wonder that the administration . . . has been leaning hard on Israel? The Arabists have made the jump from Foggy Bottom to the White House, where they are now assiduously seeking to implement the terms laid down by President Sadat as early as 1970, disregarding, of course, the fact that *every* Israeli government since that of Prime Minister Eshkol has ruled

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

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

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

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HILTON INTERNATIONAL

out a return to the 1967 lines. (And we ought not be surprised that the State Department should have difficulty in terming the PLO a terrorist organization. For Mr. Quandt, the PLO personnel who attack civilians are "commandos," not terrorists or common criminals.) . . .

Thirty years ago, Philip C. Jessup, as acting U.S. representative at the United Nations, sent Secretary of State Marshall a "top secret" telegram that said the "proclamation of Israel . . . might be described as an extra-legal act. . . ." Those who now determine our Middle East policy share this antipathy . . . to Israeli independence. It is time, if peace is to come to the Middle East, that we explore ways to save the Carter administration from this bias, in spite of itself.

DAVID R. ZUKERMAN
Bronx, New York

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

As one of thirteen college presidents, all members of an educational mission of the American Association of State Colleges and Universities, I had the opportunity between March 21 and March 31 to examine higher education in Egypt. I believe that my experiences on that visit are relevant to the articles in the July issue, "Is Peace Still Possible in the Middle East?" As guests of the Egyptian government, our charge was to study and evaluate higher education and to identify ways and means of establishing educational interchanges. During our visit, we were told by representatives of every level of the educational hierarchy how much more Egypt could and would do in education if only Israel were less intransigent and Egypt could be allowed to live in peace. . . .

During the course of our visit we had an interview with President Anwar Sadat. The Egyptian president made a deep impression on members of the delegation, a delegation largely predisposed to be favorably inclined to President Sadat's initiatives. I too was impressed by President Sadat's humility, sincerity, and concern for his people. I was amazed also how lightly guarded he appeared to be: we were not searched, cameras were not taken from us, picture-taking was allowed during the interview. There was little obvious heavy-handed police or military presence evident. I must also say that the

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

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Egyptians we met—shopkeepers, taxi drivers, university students, and professors—were all uniformly pleasant, open, and there was no apparent surliness or sullenness and no military swagger or aggressiveness.

The first exchange in the interview with President Sadat was as follows:

> QUESTION: Do you continue to be optimistic that peace will really come to the Middle East? Is it possible?
>
> ANSWER (Sadat): Well, let me give you an account that we can achieve peace in the area here provided that the new facts that have appeared after my visit to Jerusalem. This conception can reach a peace agreement. It is this: what happens now is that we are speaking two different languages. In Egypt here we have gotten rid of hatred. Immediately after my visit to Jerusalem my people came out to greet me. They were sincere until this moment. We have no complexes, no bitterness. We had our revenge in the October War. We are a civilized people. The other language we are hearing is from the Israelis. They are still warring.

. . . Following the Sadat visit we were invited to a sumptuous luncheon at the Sheraton Hotel in Cairo with the presidents of three Egyptian universities. . . . It was a pleasant luncheon until my colleague asked rather diffidently and guardedly of the Egyptian university presidents, "Don't you think Israel is entitled to some guarantee of security in addition to Sadat's word or even a treaty?"

The question had hardly been uttered when the Egyptian university presidents responded collectively and emotionally. Far from following up on President Sadat's view that "we have gotten rid of hatred," the Egyptian presidents responded in stridently anti-Semitic tones. For one thing, they said that it was well known that Israel is governed by Polish Jews and that Polish Jews were not really Jews at all. During the course of the outburst which, like a flash fire, engulfed the entire table, the Egyptian university presidents went on to indicate in no uncertain terms that Israel had no right to exist in the area at all. As one, the university presidents went back to 1948 and denied Israel's basic legitimacy. . . . The tenor and tone of the outburst were clearly inconsistent with the message President

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She Failed... To Join The Union.

On March 11, 1978, Anne Parks, a Detroit educator for over 40 years, was fired.

She hadn't neglected her education—she had a master's degree and a Ph.D.

She hadn't neglected her students—she stayed in Detroit city schools while many of her colleagues fled to the suburbs.

But after four decades of dedicated and unblemished service, Anne Parks was fired by the Detroit Board of Education—for refusing to join the teachers' union or pay the equivalent of union dues.

"I'm not against unions or organizations," Dr. Parks says, "but I don't think any person should be forced to join one."

The devoted educator has not given up. With the help of the National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation, she has appealed her dismissal.

The appeal is based on a related case involving fellow Michigan educator Kathryn Jackson. Last February, Jackson won a Michigan State Tenure Commission ruling which stated, "Non-payment of 'agency shop' fees or dues does not meet the standards of reasonable and just cause for discharge. . . ."

The Jackson precedent could put Anne Parks back in her Cody High School office and among the young students she has served so long and so well.

"How can a teacher teach all facets of an issue," asks Dr. Parks, "when he believes he is beholden to the union for his salary and other benefits? Teachers are responsible to the public, not to union officials."

Anne Parks and Kathryn Jackson are fortunate. They found legal help. But how many others like them haven't?

The National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation is helping everyone it can—currently in more than 80 cases involving academic and political freedom, protection from union violence, and other fundamental rights.

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Sadat had delivered scarcely two hours earlier. . . .

If those opinion-molders and educational leaders had not yet accepted the new language Sadat had spoken of, is it not legitimate and only fair for Menachem Begin and the Israeli leadership to wonder about how deep the Egyptian commitment to peace really is and what happens to the fabric of peace after Sadat fades from the scene?

GERALD LEINWAND
President, Oregon College
of Education
Monmouth, Oregon

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

The four articles on the prospects of a Middle East peace make it obvious that the present Israeli-Egyptian stand-off, or stalemate, is really the best possible situation for Israel, and that Israel should try to maintain it for as long as possible, regardless of threats from Sadat or pressure from the United States. It provides Israel with the best militarily defensive position it has ever had. It keeps PLO elements out of the West Bank and Gaza. It keeps Israel free of the turmoil and bloodshed that now prevails in Lebanon. And it permits Jordan to enjoy a peaceful, prosperous equilibrium without a PLO presence. . . .

Egypt has nothing further to gain by trying to oust Israel from the rest of Sinai. If Egypt attacks Israel, it will only wreck whatever recovery it has made since the 1973 war. The present status quo or stalemate is preferable to the dangerous disequilibrium that would follow an Israeli withdrawal from Sinai, the West Bank, and Gaza. Naturally, the status quo cannot be maintained forever, but it should be maintained as long as the alternatives are worse. . . .

SAMUEL L. BLUMENFELD
Boston, Massachusetts

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Hooray for the July issue of COMMENTARY! Hooray for Senators Ribicoff and Javits! Hooray for that group of intellectuals who spoke publicly a few months ago for all of us who deplore the party line enunciated by those self-appointed "Jewish spokesmen" who have for some time been getting the headlines in the press.

I remember the days when all of us—Zionists and non-Zionists alike—agreed that, as Ben-Gurion put it, the Irgun and the other right-wing extremists, who quoted Scripture when it served their purpose, were and would be a disaster for the Jewish community, in Israel and elsewhere.

Let us recall, as do many Israelis today, that the Jews are a small people, however courageous they may be; that they prosper only when they do not try to imitate the Nations; that territory and fragile settlements and attacks on their few friends in this generally hostile world are not the secret of their miraculous survival.

More parochially, here in America, let us be realistically aware that if any political leader, no matter how reluctantly, can assert, or have others assert for him, that the Jews will vote against him as a bloc because of their opposition to his stand on a foreign-policy issue of interest primarily to themselves, he will gain four votes for each vote so lost. . . .

ALAN M. STROOCK
New York City

Quotas & Race

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

The powerful, realistic, yet simple message conveyed in Thomas Sowell's article, "Are Quotas Good for Blacks?" [June], should be magnified many times over. New York *Times, Wall Street Journal, Time,* Barbara Walters, *et al.:* Where are you?

ROGER S. PONDEL
Woodland Hills, California

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Thomas Sowell's superb indictment of affirmative action in quest of equal results is a masterpiece of American social criticism. It seems, therefore, almost presumptuous to attempt any addition, but if one unmentioned ill evolving from these misguided, albeit well-intentioned, programs may be appended, it is the plight of the young minority professionals who would have made it through university and postgraduate study without any compensatory advantage, and who must then compete in the open market with the undeserved stigma of being thought less qualified in their chosen fields.

The spectacle of these young people, discriminated against by means thought to help them, ought to be enough to make theoreticians and planners understand that their quest for equal results destroys rather than enhances equal opportunities.

FREDERIC WILE
New York City

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Although I agree with most of what Thomas Sowell says in "Are Quotas Good for Blacks?," I noticed some omissions which might make his argument seem one-sided to those not already persuaded. For instance, Mr. Sowell mentions only differences in family size as a reason for lower average ages among some ethnic groups, leaving out lower life expectancy. To the extent that the latter can be attributed to lower economic standing, his argument would, I think, have to be that quotas are an indirect and inefficient way of reducing inequality—supposing that he considers such reduction desirable.

But Mr. Sowell also comes off sounding, perhaps unintentionally, rather complacent about the advantages the rich are able to give their children in early education, and (by implication) about their corollary, the disadvantages of the poor. Not that I think any society has done away with this disparity of opportunity, or that it can be entirely done away with. (Communist societies merely find ways of denying in public that their rulers are also, in this respect, their rich.) But Mr. Sowell might have indicated, at least in passing, what, besides raising the general level of the economy, he thinks can or should be done to reduce inequality. Or does he think that general economic improvement is not only the most efficient, but the only, possibility? This is an arguable position (though not one I would accept), but if so it should have been made explicit.

The statement that black students at Cornell during the crisis had test scores in the top quarter of American college students, while the other Cornell students ranked in the top 1 per cent, makes Mr. Sowell's point impressively, but the implied reliance on standardized tests needs to be qualified by the recognition that black students, on the average, seem to do somewhat better than their test scores would predict—i.e., the tests *are* culturally biased, but not by that much. And of course any good admissions officer hopes to be able to spot the rare student (rare in any ethnic group) whose performance turns

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

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out to be *much* better than his test scores would predict. . . .

MICHAEL WIGODSKY
Department of Classics
Stanford University
Stanford, California

Obsessions

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

As a novelist who some years ago suffered from the lash of Meyer Levin's "obsession"—his belief that he not only owned Anne Frank but also all proprietary rights to novels relating to Israel—I am scarcely objective in my views. Yet I cannot in simple decency permit Pearl K. Bell's essay ["Meyer Levin's 'Obsessions,'" Fiction, June] to stand without comment.

In the world of the American novelist, where one has to look with persistent ardor to find more than a handful who "reach" for greatness and even fewer who "grasp" it, Mrs. Bell's put-down of Levin's ambition suggests that she considers it a little like original sin. Despite Levin's inflated view of his labors, other important critics believe he has achieved some of his goals.

In *In Search* Levin has written a meaningful and significant portrait of the American Jewish intellectual. Yet all Mrs. Bell finds in it to quote is a silly boastful line. It seems to me to be a bleak absurdity for a critic to use a novel's length or an author's partiality toward one or more of his characters as a standard of judgment. This goes beyond the requirements of critical sensibility.

I do not think that Levin is the great American novelist he dreamed of becoming, yet despite his "obsession," as hurtful to him as to others, he was and is a serious and consequential writer.

Levin's art may be faulty, but he was as much a pioneer in his chosen field as James T. Farrell, Henry Roth, and Daniel Fuchs. He deserves a more rounded analysis than Mrs. Bell's condescension and irrelevance.

MICHAEL BLANKFORT
Los Angeles, California

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

After a perfunctory nod toward Meyer Levin as historian, Pearl K. Bell proceeds to tear down Meyer Levin as writer. . . . By attempting to discredit *The Harvest,* Mrs. Bell does a disservice to a generation which knows little—but should know more—of the times of which Levin writes. For it is not enough to discuss Levin's works only as literature. What we have in *The Settlers* and *The Harvest* is a huge mural of . . . the brief period of fifty years in which the Jews of the world underwent, as a people, the greatest and most revolutionary change in all the 1,900 years of their dispersion. There is not one of us who has not been touched by the events, the aspirations, and the mores so poignantly recorded by Levin. One must read both books as the sweep of history in our day, forming and reforming the character of the Jewish people. And, yes, as family history, but not family in the sense Mrs. Bell uses the term. Levin has written the history of the American, the European, and the Israeli families of the house of Israel.

As for the literary quality of *The Harvest,* Mrs. Bell's comments lead me to wonder which generation she belongs to. As for myself, I am of Levin's generation and can testify that the "sentimentality" Mrs. Bell finds objectionable was common in —was indeed the hallmark of—the period in which the book is set. Moreover, the characters who shaped the Zionist movement and founded the state of Israel were, in fact, larger than life, and Levin's portraits of them are accurate, despite Mrs. Bell's objections. . . . An artist does not hesitate to use the spirit of the times in which his work is set—no matter how distasteful that spirit may be to the critics of the time in which his book appears.

ISAAC IMBER
New York City

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Pearl K. Bell includes *Men of Good Will* in her list of different European literary works that chronicle the history of various families and which may be understood as a microcosm of society. The author of this work, however,

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is not Romain Rolland, as she indicates, but Jules Romains. Another such 20th-century literary chronicle that might have been included is *La Chronique des Pasquier* by Georges Duhamel.

SIDNEY D. BRAUN
Department of French
Graduate Center, CUNY
New York City

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Whether one believes in Meyer Levin's theory of a "conspiracy" or not, the fact is that his books are hardly ever reviewed and he cannot get on any major TV or radio show in New York. Pearl K. Bell asks the question: "Is Meyer Levin the first-rank writer he believes himself to be?" For the sake of argument, let us assume he is not. There are, nevertheless, dozens of other writers who are not first-rank and yet are lavishly reviewed, interviewed, and promoted. Thus Levin's problem is not that he is less than first-rank.

Levin's temptation to consider himself a "first-rank writer" must be well-nigh irresistible, especially after having received the following comments. Albert Einstein wrote about *In Search* (from which Mrs. Bell quotes): "In this book, the Jewish problem and fate [have] been grasped in all [their] full depth." Thomas Mann said about the same book that it is "a human document of the highest order." Norman Mailer said: "Levin is one of the two or three best American writers working in the realistic tradition." Hemingway called Levin's *Citizens* (which Mrs. Bell finds "rambling"), a "fine American novel—one of the best I ever read." The New York *Herald Tribune* ranked Levin's best-selling *Compulsion* with Dreiser's *An American Tragedy*. And the Los Angeles *Times* called *The Settlers* "Tolstoyan in scope," and "the *War and Peace* of all books ever written about Israel." For Mrs. Bell all this may be no recommendation, because of what she calls "the eclipse of this genre from literary fashion." Which would make Levin an unfashionable novelist, an accusation he can live with, especially if one considers what the current fashion is producing.

It cannot be the purpose of a reader's letter to prove that Levin "is the first-rank writer he believes himself to be." But he certainly is not the non-person his detractors try to make him. "Paranoiacs have enemies, too," said Delmore Schwartz. And Levin's "obsessions" are certainly not only of his own making.

Let us examine the cavalier attitude with which Mrs. Bell deals with the review of *The Harvest* in the New York *Times Book Review*: "Webster Schott *facetiously* suggested that Levin had whipped up a novel about Palestine to capitalize on the altered political situation in the Middle East after Sadat's flight to Jerusalem. What might have been brushed aside *as a feeble joke* led Levin to charge . . ." (emphasis added). I wonder what novelist would have the sense of humor to consider Schott's suggestion about a 700-page novel "facetious" or a "feeble joke." The *Times Book Review* is not after all the *Harvard Lampoon*. Was Levin so mistaken when he claimed that this outrageous nonsense set the tone for a hatchet-job which Schott proceeded to perform?

One wonders what job Mrs. Bell has set out to perform, beginning, as she does, by describing an address Meyer Levin delivered last spring to a "regrettably small audience" at the Harvard-Radcliffe Zionist Alliance. She knows Levin's work quite well, and seems to have dedicated to this author much more time than one would expect a critic to lavish on a *minor* writer. Thus she remembers from the thirty-year-old *In Search* Levin's claim that *The Old Bunch* can be safely considered "the outstanding Jewish novel of its generation." Mrs. Bell comments: "Not so safely, since that generation included Henry Roth's extraordinary revenant, *Call It Sleep*, and Daniel Fuchs's affectionate, ironic comedies of Brooklyn." And to prove the latter point she quotes a paragraph from one of Fuchs's stories. This *tour de force* falls flat because, read out of context, these lines do not sound as formidable as Mrs. Bell believes them to be.

But even if Mrs. Bell is right, what does she prove? That *The Old Bunch* was not *the* outstanding novel of its generation, but third after Roth's and Fuchs's? She does not deny *The Old Bunch*'s merits; she calls it a "raucous, disorderly, winning account . . ." that "pulses with a frisky youthful confidence that anything can happen and anything goes." Her criticism is that "the book's charm is diminished by its inordinate length." But not everyone considered this a drawback; as she herself admits, Levin's book *sold*, whereas the work of Roth and Fuchs "appeared to sink without a trace." We all know that *Call It Sleep* was a "revenant," and to judge from Mrs. Bell's words, Fuchs's unnamed "comedies" were revenants also. But the belated success of both works does not contradict Levin's claim. *The Old Bunch* was considered outstanding in *its* generation; the others, later.

Mrs. Bell also discusses . . . Levin's *bête noire*, the Broadway production of *The Diary of Anne Frank*. It is easy for an outsider to pontificate that this play "sucked him into a paranoid swamp of protests, petitions, lawsuits, and derision." Mrs. Bell does not mention that, paranoid or not, Levin *won* that lawsuit. The jury accepted his claim that the Hacketts had plagiarized his version. Levin did not face the "crass imperatives" of show business, but the crass clout of Broadway's cash register and the battery of lawyers that Otto Frank, Kermit Bloomgarden, *et al.* were able to afford and who managed to set the jury sentence aside—on a technicality: there had been "insufficient expert testimony" to help the jury decide exactly how much Levin was owed.

In this connection, Mrs. Bell should ponder whether Francis Goodrich and Albert Hackett (the "Hacketts") are first-rank writers. They knew their craft in converting the book into a play, but they lacked Levin's Jewish sensitivity and ideology.

The Levin version could not be performed due to an interdiction by Otto Frank. It was seen, bootlegged, for six weeks in Israel, until it was stopped there, too. Here is how it was reviewed by Israel's not notoriously generous critics: "In contrast to the much less dramatic version which was approved by Mr. Frank . . . Mr. Levin's version is populated with living human beings instead of facsimilies" (*Maariv*). "On the whole a more honest dramatization than the slickly professional one we have seen before" (Jerusalem *Post*). "Infinitely superior to the Hackett version which put aiming for a hit above faithfulness to the source" (*Hatzofeh*). Elie Wiesel had this to say about Levin's play: "It is what it should be: an outcry. Many years ago I saw a Broadway production on the same subject—good entertainment."

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CITIVIEWS

CITIVIEWS is distributed quarterly to Citicorp investors. It contains viewpoints on timely public issues. We believe the following may be of interest to you...

Is Capitalism Kaput?

The word "capital" goes back to the Latin *caput,* meaning "head." Unfortunately, it is pronounced like a modern German word, *kaput,* which refers to something that is broken and doesn't work anymore. Many people, not all of whom speak German, seem to believe that this accurately describes the condition of modern capitalism, nor do all of them find this prospect displeasing.

Capitalism has never been good at winning popularity contests. It has always had more practitioners than friends. One reason for this is that it is the least theoretical of all modern economic systems. Or, to put it differently, it is a system where the practice comes first and the theory comes second. Theories of capitalism are mostly descriptive: Given the chance, people tend to behave in certain ways, and capitalist theories consist mainly of attempts to analyze the results. This is in sharp contrast to the various theories of socialism, all of which undertake in one degree or another to describe how people ought to behave—and then set out to create an economic system that will oblige them to do it.

When Marx and Engels published the *Communist Manifesto* in 1848, they used a considerable portion of their rather short document to warn the world against the blandishments of (1) reactionary socialism, (2) feudal socialism, (3) petty-bourgeois socialism, (4) German or "true" socialism, (5) conservative or bourgeois socialism, and (6) critical or Utopian socialism.

Socialism had not yet been established in any country; yet there were already at least six false forms of it for Marx and Engels to warn us against. Can anyone name six false forms of capitalism?

Capitalism began, not with a manifesto or flag, but as a series of economic and social pressures stretched over a long period. The interconnection of these events was perceived only long after the fact, and few if any of them were popular at the time. Their combined effect was revolutionary, and like all revolutions received a poor welcome from those securely situated in the old society.

Marx and Engels, writing at the inception of communism, gave capitalism great credit for its revolutionary role in history. One passage in their *Manifesto* is especially worth examining:

The bourgeoisie, wherever it has got the upper hand, has put an end to all feudal, patriarchal, idyllic relations. It has pitilessly torn asunder the motley feudal ties that bound man to his "natural superiors" and has left remaining no other nexus between man and man than naked self-interest, than callous "cash payment." It has drowned the most heavenly ecstasies of religious fervor, of chivalrous enthusiasm, of philistine sentimentalism, in the icy water of egotistical calculation. It has resolved personal worth into exchange value, and in place of the numberless indefeasible chartered freedoms, has set up that single, unconscionable freedom—Free Trade.

Since the authors of this statement clearly disapprove of the "motley feudal ties" that capitalism rent asunder, why does not capitalism emerge a hero? The clue is in that one word, *unconscionable,* which means "unrestrained by conscience." Why is Free Trade unconscionable? Because it is, by definition, free—and free means unrestrained. We are in the presence of a tautology, the absurdity of which can be shown by simply calling it Unrestrained Trade instead of Free Trade; thus capitalism is guilty of engaging in unrestrained Unrestrained Trade.

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This confusion lies at the heart of the conflict between contemporary economic philosophies. If trade in the sense of commercial activity is never to be totally free, then under what restraints should it be compelled to operate, and who shall impose these restraints and by what authority? If conscience is to be one of the restraints, then the question becomes: whose conscience? The answers that society, knowingly or unknowingly, decides to accept today determine the economic system under which it lives tomorrow. This is a continuous struggle among human beings: All that varies from time to time is the intensity and form of the debate.

Two hundred years ago, Jeremy Bentham and his disciples were struggling to establish the principle of utilitarianism as the only proper guide for a statesman's conscience. For all practical purposes, the Benthamites have long since won their argument; all shades of political opinion now accept—at least publicly—the proposition that the only legitimate goal of public policy is the greatest good for the greatest number of people. What was once a controversial social and political movement has now become virtually axiomatic and is simply not discussed.

This very lack of discussion, however, tends to obscure some fundamental questions. Capital, after all, is nothing but the accumulated savings from labor performed in the past—a point on which Adam Smith and Karl Marx could easily agree. So what we are continually asking is: What is to be done with those accumulated savings, how—and whether—they will be replenished once consumed, and who shall designate the decision-makers?

One solution to that problem is an institution called the marketplace. It first appeared as the *agora* in Greek communities around 700 B.C. In contrast to the towns of ancient Mesopotamia, which had no formal marketplaces, the agora was the recognized center of the Greek cities, and it can be persuasively argued that the agora was the dynamic behind the seventh century upsurge of the Aegean peoples that led to classical civilization. As one historian puts it, "With a fistful of coins and an eye for the main chance, the individual had arrived in history."

It is doubtful that any marketplace has ever been completely free. The whole body of regulation by which modern societies set limits to the free play of economic self-interest implies the acceptance, either deliberate or unconscious, of moral standards by reference to which certain kinds of economic conduct are pronounced illegitimate. But even the most ardent believer in the proposition that free competition is "unconscionable" might still harbor doubt about whose conscience, exactly, is to supplant the unconscionable—unless, of course, he has become firmly convinced the conscience should be his own.

In the latter event he still has the problem of persuading the rest of us, which really amounts to moving the action from the marketplace to the political arena. The commonweal is sometimes enhanced by this maneuver, and sometimes diminished. History abundantly demonstrates, however, that people tend to pursue their own self-interest as determinedly in one arena as they do in the other, and that wherever they are free to make their opinions felt politically, some form of marketplace survives.

And where it does not, something has been lost far more precious than a theory or system of economics. It is not capitalism that is kaput, but freedom.

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Mrs. Bell is right on one point: all Levin's "epic longings and his passionate dedication to Israel" do not make him an Israeli writer. Neither did *The Sun Also Rises* make Hemingway a Spanish writer. Israelis such as Yoram Kaniuk and A. B. Yehoshua may be more authentic, but I doubt whether all Israeli novelists put together have sold in English as many copies as Levin's *The Settlers* did in hardcover and paperback. This does not make *The Settlers* superior to those Israeli novels. But it indicates that there is also room for the novelist who knows less about the Israeli psyche, but more about the American reader. . . . Whether Levin is a first-rank writer or not, he honestly believes himself to be one, and has been encouraged to do so by some of the first-rank minds of our time.

BENNO WEISER VARON
Brookline, Massachusetts

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

In culturally backward Israel, it has taken several months for the May issue to reach me, but may I still declare my profound appreciation and my total agreement with the criticism therein of my writings. I now see that such malicious reactionaries as Norman Mailer, Thomas Mann, and other Jewish capitalists, Communists, and Zionists who praised *The Old Bunch, In Search,* and *The Settlers,* as well as other of my books that will now deservedly sink into oblivion, were part of a vicious world Zionist conspiracy to subvert literary taste and thereby keep humanity enslaved. I realize that for a writer to permit emotion to enter his work, rather than to censor it by the intellect, is criminal. Sentiment is the tool of colonialism! It is an unmitigated evil, the historic weapon of exploiters, old-fashioned novelists, and slave masters from Moses to Count Tolstoy.

Too late, I see that it is good to emulate James Joyce and bad to be influenced by John Dos Passos. Worse—influenced by conspiratorial reactionary movements, such as Socialist Zionism, I wrote of Jews who were activated by idealism rather than by Jewish greed. For many deluded readers the harm is done, but let me urge them to seek reeducation. To prevent further evil, I declare that all I have written should perish, let my name be erased from eternity, as Irving Howe and other properly educated persons have already begun to do! Those whose libraries are contaminated with books by Meyer Levin should burn them.

As for myself, I shall of course cease writing, so as to avoid, even now that I see the light, the production by racial habit of more Jewish propaganda. I can only regret that I was not shown my faults years ago, so that the pollution of literature by my writings could have been avoided.

COMMENTARY's perfectly educated reviewer made not one error in giving examples of approved authors, such as Daniel Fuchs and Henry Roth. Ah, if I too had only stopped writing before I could err! It is all the more incriminating, in view of my faults today, that forty years ago I knew the Truth, and could write an introduction to the reviving edition of Henry Roth's *Call It Sleep.* Indeed, in early years, I could even write for COMMENTARY. Thankfully, the watchfulness of the subsequent COMMENTARY editor, and the ascendance to power of pure intellect, has now exposed the evil, subversive sentimentality of my cunning writings.

I ask only that others, particularly members of my family (incurable Jewish sentiment), should not be blamed for my errors. I acted alone.

MEYER LEVIN
Herzlia on Sea, Israel

PEARL K. BELL writes:

Both Michael Blankfort and Isaac Imber feel that I have grossly underrated Meyer Levin's achievements as a novelist, to which I must reply that I think they are wrong, for reasons I discussed at length in my article. Since we are dealing with novels, not with politics or didactic history, I sought to show that Levin's rendering of the Israeli experience in his two-volume saga was sentimental and shallow. Mr. Imber's invocation of the "sweep of history" and the "larger-than-life" quality of the early Zionist leaders does not prove the contrary. Indeed, Mr. Imber, far from denying that Levin's Israeli novels are sentimental, tries to justify this with his odd claim that "the period in which the book is set" was sentimental and therefore Levin was simply being true to "the spirit of the times" in writing about the Chaimovitch family as he did. Above all, Mr. Imber believes that it is not "enough" to discuss Levin's books as literature. Yet it is clear that Mr. Imber and I define sentimentality in irreconcilable ways. What may seem "sentimental" in the exaggerated rhetoric and celebratory, idealistic fervor of particular people in a historical period is in no way the same as a novelist's portrayal of these people. A novelist is being sentimental when, as I believe Meyer Levin does in *The Settlers* and *The Harvest,* he simplifies and neatens human behavior and motives to suit a simplistic view of history, and settles for categorical assertions about the depth and intensity of his characters' feelings when those feelings, and the experiences out of which they arise, have not been dramatically realized in their complexity. If one reads the memoirs of the Israeli pioneers, such as Golda Meir, one sees how they reacted exactly against the trite sentimentality about *shtetl* life, and stressed the need to be realistic and tough-minded about their world.

In claiming that I have denigrated Levin's ambition, Mr. Blankfort is guilty of careless reading. It was not Levin's inflated view of his intentions for the Israeli saga that concerned me primarily, but the work itself; not what Levin tells us over and again about his purposes and plans, but the novels he actually wrote. (The sin, if Mr. Blankfort insists on the word, proves to be not very original.) More generally, in his sweeping defense of Levin's literary status, Mr. Blankfort fails to note the differences of comment and judgment I made about the various books Levin has written in the course of a long career. I did not say or imply that the significance of Levin's autobiographical *In Search* boiled down to his one "silly boastful line" that *The Old Bunch* was the best novel of his American Jewish generation. That one boastful line is neither incidental nor irrelevant, but the overblown climax of many paragraphs in the same vein; it represents with perfect fairness the tone and substance of Levin's *kvetchy* self-importance. I made it plain why I think *The Old Bunch* the best of Levin's novels, yet Mr. Blankfort seems to have come away with the impression that I was being merely condescending to all his fiction. One may honor a pioneer, but it is what he finally achieves that is the measure of a writer's accomplishment.

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I thank Sidney D. Braun for correcting my error. In my free association I had gone from Jules Romains to Romain Rolland, and now make my apologies to the noblest Romains of them all.

Benno Weiser Varon's letter is dispiriting. Instead of addressing himself to the substance of my discussion, he quotes other reviews; raises issues, such as book sales, which have no bearing upon my judgments; and attributes opinions to me that are nowhere to be found in my essay. It is a jumble of misreading and irrelevancy. I did not say that Levin's Israeli saga is inadequate as literature *because* it harks back to a genre now out of fashion; I do not consider modishness a criterion of literary (or any other) worth. I did not rank Levin, Roth, and Fuchs in a critical "Consumers Union Report" on American Jewish novelists of the 30's, but Levin's appropriation of the gold-star "outstanding" struck me as demonstrably self-serving and careless. Unlike Mr. Varon, I do not put great stock in the encomiums that the mighty bestow on lesser mortals. After years of reading uninspired superlatives by the great and near-great on the jackets of countless undeserving novels, I have come to suspect that these one-liners are tossed off by the Manns and Mailers more in the spirit of *noblesse oblige* than of genuine enthusiasm.

As for Levin's "obsession" about the Anne Frank play—the word is his, not mine—I do not know where Mr. Varon got the odd notion that I think the Hacketts are "first-rank writers," or the odder one that I doubt Levin's claim he was ill-used, in part for political reasons, by those responsible for banishing his play from the boards. But as Levin himself admits in *The Obsession,* his rage about the injustice has poisoned his response to everyone who does not unequivocally assent to his own evaluation of his work. In fact, his view of himself as the victim of a conspiracy of silence is by now so absolute that he will not even acknowledge any evidence to the contrary. It is interesting that Levin in his talk at Harvard (and Mr. Varon in his letter) failed to mention the unusually long and very respectful interview with Levin, by Frederic Morton, which the *Times Book Review* published along with Webster Schott's unfavorable review of *The Harvest.*

Emanuel Schary "A Remembrance To Bialik"



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Soviet-American Exchanges

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

We would like to correct an oversimplified impression of Citizen Exchange Corps given in Paul Hollander's review of *The Giants: Russia and America* by Richard J. Barnet [Books in Review, May]. CEC does not believe that " . . . the problems between the two countries [the Soviet Union and the United States] would be practically eliminated" by means of contacts among individuals. We encourage Americans to meet with Soviet citizens so that both may speak their minds on issues important to them. Problems between our countries will not be "eliminated," as Mr. Hollander suggests, but we believe that direct contact will help to uncover areas of similarity and put differences in perspective.

CEC's aim in providing opportunities for American citizens to deal directly with Soviet counterparts is to inform both about each other's lives and professional concerns. Since the USSR is a significant factor on the international scene, we believe that it is important for as many Americans as possible to get some first-hand information on Soviet life and on that society's economic and political organization. Also, since citizens in a democracy are asked to help shape foreign policy, we feel that it is a civic obligation to be well-informed about world affairs.

CEC offers Americans more than "good food, drinks, and talk" with Soviet individuals, Mr. Hollander's interpretation of our "philosophy" notwithstanding. Participants in the visits we organize to the USSR go to offices, homes, schools, and other places where Russians live, work, and play. They hear lectures by Soviet professionals on topics of interest to the professional focus of the particular CEC group. Of even greater importance is CEC's emphasis on giving participants a chance to ask questions and engage in discussions.

There are indeed informal get-togethers, parties, and the like, and these offer still more opportunities to understand significant aspects of life in the Soviet Union. CEC wishes it were possible to eliminate world problems by means of some quick and easy formula, but realizes that the resolution of such problems depends on a great many more factors than individual contacts. Still, persistent misunderstanding between these two dynamic world powers undeniably constitutes a danger to us all. CEC proceeds on the belief that person-to-person communication may, in the long run, help to reduce this danger through informed dialogue enhanced by the human dimension of a multitude of individual contacts.

C. GRANT PENDILL, JR.
President, Citizen Exchange Corps
New York City

PAUL HOLLANDER writes:

I have always regarded the Citizen Exchange Corps as a well-meaning and idealistic organization handicapped by certain illusions, the key one being that the Soviet approach to the exchanges is in any way comparable to its own. Mr. Pendill, in his comments on my review, reaffirms this opinion.

The basic problem of these exchanges, apparently overlooked by Mr. Pendill (and generally unacknowledged in the philosophy of the CEC), is that visiting Americans do *not* "deal directly with [their] Soviet counterparts" except perhaps in the most superficial or formal sense. American schoolteachers and coin collectors may indeed meet Soviet schoolteachers and coin collectors. But a crucial difference remains: Americans are self-selected and their Soviet "counterparts" are not. Both groups are atypical but in completely different ways. The Americans are atypical because of their unusual interest in Soviet society and the initiative they have taken to gratify it. The Soviet citizens are atypical because they have been selected to exemplify Soviet civic virtue and to convey whatever the Soviet authorities wish to convey about Soviet life. Unauthorized interest in things American would be the last thing that would enable Soviet citizens to be selected by their government for these exchanges. I suspect that another difference between the

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

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two groups may lie in the well-developed critical conscience of Americans about their own society, which is not matched by similar dispositions in their Soviet "counterparts."

As far as "first-hand information on Soviet life" and "informed dialogue" with Soviet citizens are concerned, I believe that modest expectations are in order. Certainly the organized parts of the exchanges try to insure that Americans will learn primarily what the Soviet authorities want them to learn about Soviet life. Perhaps there is some value in this. But the important thing is not to confuse these lopsided and limited exchanges with more spontaneous, unofficial contacts and communications between private citizens on both sides, and not to assume that the asymmetrical interaction between self-selected Americans and officially primed and selected Soviet citizens will make a significant contribution to understanding.

There is by now a mountain of evidence (going back to the 1930's as far as the Soviet setting is concerned) to show that visiting a country and talking to some of its citizens are often compatible with learning little about it. Accessible "first-hand experience" can be both trivial and misleading: "being on the spot" may mean being on a very small spot indeed.

Vietnam

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARTY:

Carl Gershman's conclusion in "After the Dominoes Fell" [May] deserves a ringing affirmation: benign indifference to the spread of Marxist-Leninist regimes must be opposed for moral as well as political reasons.

For these same moral and political reasons, I believe, those who share such concerns must affirm our absolute commitment to the forces of democracy and our intransigent opposition to dictatorships of the Left and Right, wherever they occur. No matter how much worse Vietnam's Communists were, we must not lose sight of the fact that countless non-Communist political opponents of the Saigon regime were imprisoned, terrorized, tortured, and killed even as they beseeched Americans for recognition and support on the basis of our common commitment to democracy. The regime we supported—based on Mafia-style corruption and Gestapo-style repression—could not sustain sufficient support from its officers, soldiers, and citizens, or from its allies in the democracies.

Today, Saigon-style, U.S.-supported police states bludgeon people and bodies politic from South Korea to Taiwan to the Philippines to Iran. New hope stirs in those countries, encouraged by the human-rights statements of the Carter administration. People continue to struggle for human rights and democracy, opposing present rightist tyrannies and the threat of future leftist tyrannies, just as "Third Force" democrats once did in Vietnam. But neither the administration nor the American public as yet affirms our common cause with other "Third Force" democrats in the Third World—and in Eastern Europe, for that matter—who oppose tyrannies on the basis of such pluralist democratic advocacy as free speech, free press, and free elections. Let us not stop at recognizing and opposing the worst enemies of democracy—let us also acknowledge and aid our friends.

THEODORE JACQUENEY
Worldview
New York City

CARL GERSHMAN writes:

I am pleased, of course, that Theodore Jacqueney applauds my conclusion. I only wish that he understood it better. It was not my intention to exonerate the authoritarian Saigon government of human-rights violations, but only to point out how much more repressive the present totalitarian Communist government is. The distinction has political as well as moral significance, since many opponents of the war argued that the Communists would be no more repressive than Thieu, and some said they would be a great deal less so. Facile phrases such as "intransigent opposition to dictatorships of the Left and Right" and "Gestapo-style repression" tend to blur this distinction, which is now tragically evident even to those "Third Force" opponents of Thieu who sympathized with the anti-war movement in this country. The former oppositionist Nguyen Cong Hoan, following his escape by boat from Vietnam, said that "Before 1975, the South Vietnamese did not realize the meaning of the war and the value of freedom." But now, he concluded, they feel "that they lost a precious thing."

It should be possible—indeed, it is essential—to observe a single standard on human rights without losing moral or political perspective. The Saigon government was reprehensible. But surely this did not justify abandoning the people of South Vietnam to Communist totalitarianism, any more than it is now a reason for maintaining an attitude of indifference toward the consequences of the Communist military victory.

Russian Tradition

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

In his review of *The Political, Social, and Religious Thought of Russian Samizdat* [Books in Review, April], Abraham Brumberg states that "with a few notable exceptions" the anthology "belongs to that venerable Russian tradition of discursive writing that is short on observable data and rigorous analysis and long on absolutist formulations and passionate rhetoric." When did this "venerable Russian tradition" begin? Where did it exist? In old Russia? Whom does Mr. Brumberg mean? . . .

Of course, there was a lot of mediocre literature, scholarship, and theology in old Russia. But is not the proportion of mediocrity even higher in the enormous cultural output of the West today? . . .

The anthology in question contains articles written by "Soviet dissidents"—in the Western journalistic sense of that term. It should be kept in mind, however, that the "dissident" Solzhenitsyn (to take the stock Western example, whom Mr. Brumberg cites to illustrate gloomy intolerance) did not come to fame as Chekhov, Einstein, or Beverly Sills did—as a result of a free competition and association with his peers. The "dissidents" came to be known in the West as a result of Soviet persecution, which (in Moscow) was applied with sufficient caution for the victims to stay alive, and was sufficiently prolonged for the Western mass media to sensationalize them. Some of the "dissidents" represent amazing human heroism, but it does not follow that any of them represents Russian culture, intellect, or talent at its best—or even at its good, solid average—especially considering the fact that "Russian" means a hundred or so different nations. . . .

No "venerable Russian tradi-

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tion" or any other socio-historical generalization concerning "Russian" rationality or psychology can be deduced from such a culturally accidental collection of culturally random writings. Unfortunately, this is precisely what many American specialists on Russia do. . . .

LEV NAVROZOV

New York City

ABRAHAM BRUMBERG writes:

Surely anyone who has read the works of Russian philosophers and political thinkers, from Piotr Chaadaev through Vissarion Belinsky to Vladimir Solovev, will recognize my description of their style as "discursive" and "short on observable data and rigorous analysis" as not altogether off the mark. Furthermore, to say that Russian writers traditionally write in this vein is not to brand them as "mediocre"; hence the comparison with the incidence of mediocre writings in the West is irrelevant. And why does Mr. Navrozov put quotation marks around the word "dissidents"? I happen to think that Solzhenitsyn was a genuine if not necessarily typical dissident; I admire his courage and his powerful talent, even though I take strong exception to his political views; and I do not think—as Mr. Navrozov seems to suggest—that he and others were the pawns of a KGB game designed to make their suffering a subject for sensationalist treatment by "Western media." As for other "socio-historical generalizations," I fail to find them in my review. If Mr. Navrozov has a quarrel with many (unnamed) "American specialists on Russia," he should direct his remarks to them.

Auschwitz

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

I find David S. Wyman's article, "Why Auschwitz Was Never Bombed" [May], quite correct and the result of very thorough research. Something more might have been said about the attitude of the State Department and the British government. It was my feeling at the time that it was they who stood behind the War Department and largely inspired its negative stand. But possibly these influences were exercised in the course of oral conversations and could not be traced in the written material available to Mr. Wyman.

BENJAMIN AKZIN

Jerusalem, Israel

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

David S. Wyman's "Why Auschwitz Was Never Bombed" is a significant contribution to Holocaust studies. Mr. Wyman refutes English and American assertions that the bombing of Auschwitz would have presented "undeniable technical difficulties" and proves that the annihilation plants could have been destroyed without too much difficulty. I witnessed the December 1944 bombing in which the SS hospital barracks at Birkenau, about a mile from the crematoria, was hit. At that time I was a member of the prisoner-maintenance squad at Auschwitz, and the SS man who guarded us was killed in the raid.

But the essence of the problem remains: *why* weren't the killing installations bombed? The answer, in my opinion, is to be found in the social and political sphere, especially in the wavering reactions of the representatives of some Jewish organizations and their insufficient activity in convincing the Allied governments to declare bombing the death factories at Auschwitz a war priority. . . .

ERICH KULKA

Yad Vashem
Jerusalem, Israel

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

"That the terrible plight of the Jews did not merit any active response remains a source of wonder, and a lesson, even today." So ends David S. Wyman's exposé of United States government indifference to the fate of Jews in Auschwitz. His final words—"even today"—are especially cogent because the more things change, the more they remain the same.

I submit that for the past thirty years the U.S. government has been indifferent to the ever-looming destruction of Israel. It may be difficult for American Jews, as Americans, to perceive this callousnous on the part of their own government; it is easier for other Jews to see it. Relentlessly, determinedly, inflexibly, the State Department has sought, after every Israeli victory (remember the dismay among State Department spokesmen after the Six-Day War?), to return Israel to Square 1 and so give the Arabs another chance at politicide. . . . This policy makes it inevitable that the Arabs will eventually win, and then the U.S. government will express shock and dismay, list all that it had done for Israel, and heave a sigh of relief; it will be so much easier to win the Arab world away from Russia without the Israeli complication. . . .

S. LEVIN

Johannesburg, South Africa

DAVID S. WYMAN writes:

As Benjamin Akzin surmised, I found no documentation indicating that either the State Department or the British government was involved in the War Department's refusal to look seriously into the bombing requests. I did learn, as I noted in my article, that the British government opposed any inclusion of Allied military forces in rescue efforts. My forthcoming book on America's response to the Holocaust will deal at length with the State Department's role and to some extent with Great Britain's role in the failure to rescue Jews during World War II. As Mr. Akzin implies, the policies of both were abysmal.

Erich Kulka raises the complex question of *why* the killing installations weren't bombed. On one level, the answer is that the War Department had determined, long before the bombing requests came, that it would have as little as possible to do with rescuing Jews and other refugees. This policy appears to have taken shape in 1943, when the invasion of Italy opened clear opportunities for rescue. It solidified in late January 1944, as sketched in my article. But Mr. Kulka is quite right in looking at the question from another perspective; namely, why wasn't sufficient pressure put on the Roosevelt administration to force it to order the bombing? This is part of a broader question: why weren't public pressures strong enough to force the Roosevelt government to institute a timely, large-scale rescue campaign? (The War Refugee Board was established only in January 1944 and was restricted in its scope and activities.) The leadership in building pressures for rescue would presumably have come from the Jewish organizations. They did supply leadership, but Mr. Kulka is correct that their actions were too often "wavering" and "insufficient." Most of the groups did not assign top priority to rescue. Worse, the history of American Jewish organizations during the Holocaust years is one of disunity, frequent infighting, and at times obstruction of one another's efforts. Despite this, Jewish organizations did provide some direction and Jewish

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popular pressure did grow, though not as quickly or as strongly as it might have.

Unfortunately, Jewish activity for rescue kindled very little response in non-Jewish Americans. For the most part, America's Christian leaders turned away from the issue. Lacking leadership from their churches and their government, most American non-Jews knew little of the Holocaust and cared little. The press never featured the extermination story, and many people who did hear of it dismissed it as atrocity propaganda. In addition, the high level of American anti-Semitism at that time harmed the chances for the development of concern for the trapped Jews of Europe. Thus, a broad current of American public pressure for action to save the Jews was not forthcoming.

Stalinism

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Although it may be somewhat late, I would like to comment on the symposium, "Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy" [April].

My first point concerns the style of Eugene D. Genovese's contribution. It is a remarkable illustration of the intransigence of Old Left intellectual debate. Mr. Genovese does not address the issue, he asserts ideological belief as fact. He contemptuously infers that most people hold certain false beliefs concerning democracy, capitalism, etc., which he then demolishes. The manner is exactly that which Jean-François Revel and others rightly call Stalinist. . . . For example: Mr. Genovese coquettishly pretends astonishment and confusion at the naiveté of the questions asked by the editors. By this technique he succeeds both in ridiculing the notion that capitalism and democracy are linked and in dodging the issue. . . . He then blithely claims that "most capitalist countries have been undemocratic"—a completely unsubstantiated and propagandistic assertion. Of course, one *could* argue such a view, but if one is presenting it seriously, and not as a debating trick, one should provide examples. (What we are actually dealing with here, of course, is the Leninist notion of the implicit badness of democracy and capitalism—Mr. Genovese cannot, it seems, help using the terms "democracy" and "capitalism" in their ideological, Marxist sense.)



"Those who do not remember the past are condemned to re-live it." This warning by a great philosopher has particular pertinence today. Ominously, senseless hatred springs up here and there like a poisonous weed ...too-lightly ignored, too-soon forgotten in the hasty rounds of our daily lives.

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

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After this, he slips in fascism in a way that makes it seem an almost inevitable outgrowth of capitalism, although he does not come right out and *state* this neo-Marxist bit of nonsense (after all, Communism, too, is an outgrowth of capitalism); the mention of fascism here serves a blatantly emotional-rhetorical purpose.

Mr. Genovese also presents us with the following sentence: "Who today doubts that the strongest suit capitalism has going for it is precisely the negative example of the socialist dictatorships?" Undeniably, the total failure of socialism anywhere to further people's freedom and "life-chances" is a strong argument against it, but surely Mr. Genovese must know as well as anyone that the liberal tradition does not rest solely on the denigration of totalitarianism. . . .

Sentences beginning with phrases like "who today doubts" or "as is well known" . . . are representative of a fundamentally repressive and arrogant outlook—they are representative of "ideology" in the sense recently defined by Alain Besançon in his remarkable work, *L'Origines Intellectuelles du Léninisme*. Ideology is conviction that does not realize that it is conviction. The ideologue in his own view possesses truth. And, of course, the enemies of truth must be combatted with all the means at one's disposal, including ridicule. The "who-doubts" form implies clearly the idiocy of doubting the proposition that follows; in this way, Mr. Genovese has neatly avoided having to deal with the impressive array of thinkers, from Tocqueville to Paul Johnson and Raymond Aron, whose belief in liberal capitalism has nothing at all to do with the need to attack socialism. . . .

Mr. Genovese's statement that "capitalism as a world-system is palpably bankrupt" also belongs to the same class of unargued assertion. Of course, capitalism is bankrupt if one is a doctrinaire socialist, but hardly otherwise. . . .

It is also propagandistic to claim, as Mr. Genovese does toward the end of his contribution, that "the Left is purging itself of its most dangerous illusions." That is what hopeful leftists have wanted to believe ever since Eduard Bernstein and Rosa Luxemburg. It remains a claim, however, as long as the Western Communist parties retain their totalitarian structure, and liberals are justifiably wary of accepting such claims at face value. (Why are we always asked to believe in socialist promises, but never allowed to judge socialist behavior?) By now, we would like to see action, not theoretical breast-beating in the Italian Communist party or, for that matter, among socialist academics. . . .

It is not the liberals who are wallowing in the 1930's; I much fear that it is Mr. Genovese, who with his tired rhetoric and supercilious bombast is reintroducing a manner and a style which one would have thought impossible in 1978.

The second (and minor) point I would like to raise is in connection with Sweden. Several contributors mention Sweden as an example of democratic-socialist economics. I have lived in Scandinavia most of my life and tend to agree with the interpretation of Roland Huntford (in *The New Totalitarians*), that Sweden (unlike Denmark) is no longer a democratic society—if it ever was one. The reasons are historical, and this lack of democracy is not only the result of the economic system introduced in this century. Rather, that system was introduced and flourished partly because Swedes have always distrusted individualism and diversity. Sweden is a slick, perfectionistic, and smoothly running society, but that is because identity and perfection are valued higher than diversity with its concomitant blemishes. The power of bureaucracy and of internalized consensus is immense, among the small class of managers as well as in the population at large. It is true that the appearance of freedom in the restricted field of a commercial society remains in Sweden, but the absolute belief in equality of results, the total failure to appreciate excellence or the value of excellence . . ., the suspicion of the unusual, and the hypercritical attitude of the young—hypercritical, that is, of "imperialism" and "capitalism," never of the Swedish system itself or of socialism—all these aspects of Swedish society should be a warning to those who use it as an example of social democracy. But this is not to say that social democracy *per se* leads to this sort of "soft" totalitarianism—the reasons, as I noted, are more historically specific.

DAVID GRESS-WRIGHT
Copenhagen, Denmark

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Business and the rational mind, Part V

Innovative self-destruction•Engines of change•An alternative to planned chaos

Capitalism—or democratic capitalism, or a system of free choice, or whatever you choose to call the U.S. economic system—is perhaps the most dynamic paradox around.

Like democracy, it is the worst system except for all the other systems mankind has tried.

Like mankind itself, it spends a lot of time on the ropes, but it always bounces back.

Because of the mixed economy that has resulted from government intervention, our system has been called "capitalism in an oxygen tent." But reports of its death are greatly exaggerated.

It survives by a process of innovative self-destruction. Which is to say, democratic capitalism compulsively develops new and better ways of doing things. Thus it makes obsolete the very practices that strengthened it in an earlier time.

This process is, by its very nature, endless. In a free society, mankind's entrepreneurial spirit tells him he has to improve on existing products and processes and procedures if he is to create a competitive edge for himself, or even just to meet competition. Thus is relentless improvement built into the system.

This perpetual change is one of the main reasons that what we loosely call capitalism is so hard to define. It is also the main reason that what passes for capitalism in some countries is such a far cry from the dynamic democratic capitalism to which we Americans are accustomed—imperfect but always trying to correct its imperfections. And always learning from experience, even when it learns the hard way.

The stern discipline that compels productive innovation is the requirement that a privately owned business earn a profit—i.e., that it meet a need and meet it efficiently enough to have something left over to meet tomorrow's needs. The system polices itself pretty well, overall; private businesses that cannot achieve the requisite efficiency usually go under.

In a state-controlled economy, you have just the opposite. Not being required to earn a profit, government businesses have little interest in holding down costs. They tend to develop a single objective: status quo and self-preservation at all costs. Those costs become increasingly higher as such organizations strive toward political, rather than economic, objectives.

Thus an essential difference between government and private businesses is the difference between rigidity and creativity. Economic systems run by government tend, by their doctrinal nature, to be static, because any departure from dogma is labeled heresy. This produces a static situation, but static socialism is still socialism.

Static capitalism, on the other hand, would be a contradiction in terms. Capitalism cheerfully occupies itself with a continuing confession of error as it labors to outdate yesterday's improvements. It tends to question the validity of all revealed wisdom that locks itself into any tight doctrine not supported by experience and common sense. It operates on the old Army doctrine that if you're comfortable, you're out of position.

Democratic capitalism is a form of institutionalized self-interest in which most large corporations have to serve a very large mass market if they are to survive and prosper. This makes them democrats of the marketplace, in contrast to those who seem to fear the decisions free people will make if left to their own devices.

Those who argue for a dominant role for government in our economy maintain that an economy that is not centrally planned and heavily regulated is necessarily chaotic. They don't seem to grasp that our system is a continuing revolution, and revolutions are almost invariably untidy. The bureaucrat's impulse is to try to neaten things up, which seldom serves the consumer's interest.

Capitalism, with all its imperfections and its driving ebullience, admittedly spends much of its life in an untidy state of cliff-hanging crisis—just as mankind always has. But indices used to measure the state of the U.S. economy indicate that the fabulous invalid has survived another bout of illness and, with proper nourishment and the right amount of constructive neglect, will pull through again. Which should be good news for all of us, especially for those still struggling to work their way out of poverty.

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Why Bakke Won't End Reverse Discrimination: 1

William J. Bennett and Terry Eastland

THE long-awaited decision in the *Bakke* case was greeted by a variety of responses, which fell into several categories. There were those altogether dismayed, believing that the Supreme Court had impeded, if not halted, minority progress. "Bakke—We Lost" blurted the headline in the *Amsterdam News*. Peter Cohn, co-counsel for the regional office of the NAACP in Washington, D.C., said: "I think this is a very sad day in the United States. The *Bakke* decision represents a step back in time." Tyrone Brooks, national field director for the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, said: "I'm very disappointed. . . . [The ruling] means that the incentive to carry out affirmative action will be killed." Tom Wicker of the New York *Times* commented: "The validity and potential of affirmative-action programs may have been seriously, if not fatally, undermined." José Medina of La Raza said *Bakke* was a very disappointing decision because in it the Court declared that "the Fourteenth Amendment is no longer for the protection of identifiable minorities but an amendment for the protection of the rights of society as a whole." Jesse Jackson called the decision a "devastating blow to our civil-rights struggle" and urged "massive street demonstrations" to "educate Americans as to our displeasure." Pennsylvania law professor Ralph Smith said that the Court's judgment could be used to attack affirmative action and that was something "a society that purports to cherish domestic tranquility ought to avoid." Congressman Ron Dellums regarded *Bakke* as a "racist decision by the Nixon court"; he called on "all people of good will" to denounce it. Kenneth Tollett of Howard University said the decision was "a hammer in the solar plexus." Even Justice Thurgood Marshall, referring in his dissenting opinion to the Reconstruction era, said that, since then, we have come "full circle" with *Bakke*. Julian Bond thought the decision worse even than did Justice Marshall: "It has reinforced," he said, "the 200-year old racial and sexual quota system."

Many people, however, found good, some even a great deal of good, in the *Bakke* decision, and these fell roughly into three groups. One group was comprised of various spokesmen who, unlike Jesse Jackson, saw the decision as benefiting minority groups. For example, Vernon Jordan, president of the National Urban League, interpreted the decision as a "green light to go forward with acceptable affirmative-action programs." Arthur Fleming, chairman of the United States Civil Rights Commission, was "heartened by the way the Supreme Court gave unequivocal support to affirmative action." Attorney General Griffin Bell, who noted that President Carter was "pleased by the decision," called it a "great victory for affirmative action," and said that "the whole country ought to be pleased." Al Perez, associate counsel for the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund, commented: "The decision was a minority victory. The Davis admissions system is not constructed like most other systems. Most other programs would meet the constitutional standard that the *Bakke* decision imposes." Joseph Rauh of the American Civil Liberties Union said: "The important thing . . . is that the racists who wanted to turn back the clock on minority progress have received a stunning blow. The Supreme Court's decision that race is a proper factor in admissions decisions is the legal concrete on which further affirmative-action progress can be made. The Supreme Court struck a blow for remedying past wrongs and providing a more equal society." And Gene Boyer of the National Organization for Women said: "Employers and universities who choose to interpret *Bakke* as a license to remain male and pale are in for a rude awakening."

A second group was comprised of those attempting to put the decision in perspective—mostly legal scholars and journalists. They considered the decision positive. A. E. (Dick) Howard of the Virginia Law School labeled the decision a "Solomonic compromise"; Lawrence Tribe of the Harvard Law School called it an "act of statecraft"; Charles Alan Wright of the University of Texas Law School said it was a "very civilized ruling"; and

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Benno Schmidt of the Columbia Law School commented that it was "just about right." The Washington *Post* echoed Howard's praise of the decision as a "sound compromise" in which "everybody won," and which therefore had a "soothing effect." The New York *Times,* in an uncharacteristic endorsement of the Bible, also compared the decision to Solomon's judicial pronouncement and urged its readers to dedicate themselves to the "higher law" in which, the *Times* said, the decision was grounded. Roscoe Drummond of the *Christian Science Monitor* commented: "The decision was precise, constructive, and compassionate."

The third group was made up of those people whose job it is to administer or supervise affirmative-action programs—those in government, and those in the institutions of higher learning, who are most directly affected by the *Bakke* decision. Many saw the decision as having little practical effect on what they do, and of this they were glad. Eleanor Holmes Norton of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission said: "My reading of the decision is that we are not compelled to do anything differently from the way we've done things in the past, and we are not going to." Jack Peltason, president of the American Council on Education, said: "It left the options open. The overwhelming number of affirmative-action programs now in place will meet the standards outlined by the Court." Dr. John Cooper, president of the Association of American Medical Colleges, said: "[The decision] should stimulate efforts to increase the admissions of underrepresented minorities." Clark Kerr, chairman of the Carnegie Council on Policy Studies in Higher Education, commented: "The Supreme Court has supported a continuation of affirmative-action programs in higher education and diversity in college and university student bodies. This is good for higher education and the nation and allows efforts to increase social justice." John Kemeny, president of Dartmouth College, remarked: "Absolutely no way will our [admissions] program be affected." David Saxon, president of the University of California, the petitioner in the case, who lost, nevertheless said that *Bakke* was a "great victory for the university." "Any ruling," he continued, "that introduces restriction on the use of race is going to make it more difficult, but not very much more difficult." Many who saw in the Court's decision an invitation to proceed as before quoted approvingly from Justice Blackmun's dissenting opinion: "In order to get beyond racism, we must first take account of race."

Amid all these reactions were a few voices speaking in praise of that part of the decision that ruled out racial quotas. Arnold Forster, general counsel of the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, said: "We view the Court's decision as a significant victory in the effort to halt the use of quotas and their equivalent in admissions to colleges and graduate schools." The *Wall Street Journal* pointed to the "clear core" of the *Bakke* decision—that "the Court majority ruled unmistakably that California's Davis Medical School was wrong in using a racially-based quota system." The Court thereby "limited the extent to which those seeking equality of results can sweep aside the basic rules of a liberal society."

Those taking this position, however, were not free of worry. Forster also said: "In our view, it would, as a practical matter, seem difficult to allow race to be used as one factor in admissions without that factor eventually becoming the determining factor." And the *Wall Street Journal* was quick to point out that the Court's decision left room for "discretionary mischief."

Such concerns and worries dominated the reactions of a few commentators who were gloomy but not in the way Jackson, Dellums, and Tollett were gloomy. Thus Professor John Kaplan of the Stanford Law School: "In a sense the *Bakke* people have lost. There are five votes on the Supreme Court saying that while you can't have quotas you can manipulate admissions standards to get a desired level of minorities." Alan Dershowitz of the Harvard Law School, who, on hearing reports of the decision, characterized it as "an act of judicial statesmanship," later wondered whether the Court's decision might not foster programs where "more turns on race alone than it did at Davis." "The *Bakke* decision," he remarked, "reflects the ultimate triumph of ambiguity and discretion over clarity and candor." Robert Bork of the Yale Law School called the law in the decision "unstable." "It doesn't tell us how race counts. . . ," he said. "We're told that we can count race somewhat, but not too much. That's going to be difficult to apply." Sociologist David Riesman worried that what "we are facing now is full employment for lawyers, as the rising sense of entitlement among groups and individuals takes hold with more bitterness at all levels," and psychologist Joseph Adelson noted that "the ambiguity of the decision is an incentive to duplicity." Said Adelson: "It appears that the atmosphere of evasion and hypocrisy at the university is likely to continue." George F. Will, writing in *Newsweek*, said that with *Bakke* the Court now "may not seriously impede the bureaucratic drive to transform the core concept of American justice from 'equal opportunity for individuals' to 'statistical parity for government-approved groups.'" Retired United States Senator Sam Ervin said, simply: "The decision sounds like intellectual clap-trap to me. I think the only rational decision is that you can't discriminate against anybody on account of his race."

The *Bakke* decision was, in fact, two decisions—two 5-4 decisions. On the one hand, the Supreme Court invalidated the

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special-admissions program at the University of California Medical School at Davis whereby 16 seats in each entering class (out of 100) were reserved for minority students, and ordered Allan Bakke, a white man, who, the Court said, had been discriminated against by virtue of the Davis program, admitted to the school. On the other hand, the Supreme Court reversed that part of the California Supreme Court decision maintaining that any consideration of race in the admissions process at Davis is constitutionally impermissible.

Justice Lewis Powell occupied the interesting position of being the only Justice in the two 5-4 majorities. He joined with Justice Stevens, who also wrote for Justices Rehnquist, Stewart, and Burger, in declaring the admissions program at Davis invalid and ordering Bakke admitted. For these four, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was the ground for the decision; for Powell, however, the ground was the Fourteenth Amendment. So the legal justification for *this* decision was mixed: four Justices deciding on statutory ground, one on constitutional ground. As for the other majority, it was comprised of Justice Powell and his brothers in dissent, Justices Brennan, Blackmun, Marshall, and White, each of whom wrote separate opinions. The four dissenters, who rejected the view that Title VI proscribes such use of race as was made at Davis, held that the Fourteenth Amendment permits race to be the *decisive* consideration in a university admissions program. As Justice Powell held in his opinion that race may be only *a* consideration in an admissions program, the five together are agreed to the extent Powell articulates.

However interesting the other Justices' opinions are, and however fragile or unstable the Powell opinion is, it will remain the judgment of the Court until another decision is rendered. And that later decision will treat the Powell opinion as its point of departure. For this reason, the Powell opinion must be examined. Furthermore, by examining the Powell opinion, the various reactions to *Bakke* can be usefully assessed.

Justice Powell begins his opinion with a discussion of Title VI. He finds that it incorporates and relies on constitutional standards, and so he turns to a consideration of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. He says: "Its language is explicit: 'No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.' " Justice Powell says of this that "the guarantee of equal protection cannot mean one thing when applied to one individual and something else when applied to a person of another color." Justice Powell points out that during the past thirty years the Supreme Court has been called on to assure "to all persons 'the protection of equal laws.' " He then offers the Court's teaching: "Over the years this Court consistently repudiated 'distinctions' between citizens solely because of their 'ancestry' as being odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality." Justice Powell therefore rejects the University of California's request that the Court "adopt for the first time a more restrictive view . . . and hold that discrimination . . . cannot be suspect if its purpose can be characterized as 'benign.' " "The clock of our liberties . . . cannot be turned back to 1868," he writes, and "it is far too late to argue that the guarantee of equal protection to *all persons* permits the recognition of special wards entitled to a degree of protection greater than that accorded others." He quotes from Alexander M. Bickel's posthumous work, *The Morality of Consent*:

> The lesson of the great decisions of the Supreme Court and the lesson of contemporary history have been the same at least for a generation: discrimination on the basis of race is illegal, immoral, and unconstitutional, inherently wrong, and destructive of democratic society. . . .

Justice Powell goes on to say that what some would characterize as a "white majority" is itself a collection of minorities most of which can lay claim "to a history of prior discrimination at the hands of the state and private individuals." "There is no principled basis," he concludes, "for deciding which groups would merit 'heightened judicial solicitude' and which would not."

At this point, a footnote appears and, looking down, the reader finds: "As I am in agreement with the view that race may be taken into account as a factor in an admissions program, I agree . . . that the portion of the judgment that would proscribe all consideration of race must be reversed." These words in small print are startling. It is said that decisions of the Supreme Court often resemble the movement of a vast ocean liner imperceptibly changing course. But here the ocean liner steered by Justice Powell turns 180 degrees. How does he manage to do this?

He does it with the idea of "diversity" in higher education. He finds the goal of attaining a diverse student body a matter of academic freedom and a compelling and constitutionally protected end. By selecting a "diverse student body," Justice Powell writes, a university may create an atmosphere of "speculation, expression, and creation."

Justice Powell thus ratifies the University of California's argument that diversity is a goal of paramount importance in the fulfillment of its mission. He warns, however, that this end does not justify any means: "Although a university must have wide discretion in making the sensitive judgments as to who should be admitted, constitutional limitations protecting individual rights may not be disregarded." While "it may be as-

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sumed that the reservation of a specified number of seats in each class for individuals" from preferred ethnic groups would contribute to the "attainment of considerable ethnic diversity," such an approach "misconceives the nature of the state interest that would justify consideration of race or ethnic background." The state's interest is not "in simple ethnic diversity" but in a "diversity that . . . encompasses a far broader array of qualifications and characteristics." Racial and ethnic origin is but a "single" element among these. It is, however, an "important element," and it "may be deemed a 'plus' in a particular applicant's file."

How is race to be a "single though important element"? To begin with, a university must "adhere to a policy of individual comparisons" as opposed to a method that results in a systematic exclusion of certain groups. In such an individualized, case-by-case process, "the file," as Justice Powell explains, "of a particular black applicant may be examined for his potential contribution to diversity without the factor of race being decisive when compared, for example, with that of an applicant identified as an Italian American if the latter is thought to exhibit qualities more likely to promote beneficial educational pluralism." Race, then, "is simply one element—to be weighed fairly against other elements—in the selection process." But how are we to know when such a procedure is actually being followed? "A court would not assume that a university, professing to employ a facially non-discriminatory admissions policy, would operate it as a cover for the functional equivalent of a quota system. In short, good faith would be presumed in the absence of a showing to the contrary."

Justice Powell points to the Harvard College admissions program as "an illuminating example" of such good faith and a sensitive appreciation of the role of diversity. The Harvard program considers race a factor in some admissions decisions and, in its own self-description, found in an appendix to the Powell opinion, says that the race of an applicant may "tip the balance in his favor just as geographic origin or life spent on a farm may tip the balance in other candidates' cases." Harvard also says that such a tipping of the balance occurs only among those thousands of applicants who are "admissible academically." Justice Powell approvingly cites the flexibility of this program, noting that it does not insulate "the individual from comparison with all other candidates for the available seats."

Justice Powell concludes by finding another difference between the Davis admissions program and that of Harvard College. "Petitioner's program will be viewed as inherently unfair by the public generally, as well as by applicants for admission at the state university." He quotes Justice Frankfurter in "another connection": "Justice must satisfy the appearance of justice." It is the Harvard program, in Justice Powell's view, that satisfies the appearance of justice.

ANALYSIS of the Powell opinion may usefully begin with his last point. In *Offut* v. *United States*, Justice Frankfurter did say that justice must satisfy the appearance of justice; but he also said it was but one "ingredient" among others. And among those others, the most important, of course, is that justice *be* done. It is not enough, then, that an admissions process *appear* fairer than another; it must *be* fair. But this is not the case with Harvard's program.

For that program, while it may satisfy the appearance of justice, is not just. It is not concerned with individuals as individuals, but individuals in the aggregate as defined by race and ethnicity. Moreover, it concentrates on numbers. In trying, says Harvard, to provide

> a truly heterogeneous environment that reflects the rich diversity of the United States, [diversity] cannot be provided without some attention to numbers . . . 10 or 20 black students could not begin to bring to their classmates and to each other the variety of points of view, backgrounds, and experiences of blacks in the United States. Their small numbers might also create a sense of isolation among the black students themselves and thus make it more difficult for them to develop and achieve their potential. Consequently, when making its decisions, the Committee on Admissions is aware that there is some relationship between numbers and achieving the benefits to be derived from a diverse student body, and between numbers and providing a reasonable environment for those students admitted.

In other words, numbers matter at Harvard.

Confronted with the question of whether the reservation of 16 slots for minority applicants at the Davis Medical School amounts to a "quota or goal," Justice Powell, early on in his opinion, says: "This semantic distinction is beside the point: The special-admissions program is undeniably a classification based on race and ethnic background." So it may be said of Harvard College, that whether or not its "numbers" amount to "quotas," "goals," "targets," numerical equivalents, or what-not, the semantic issue is beside the point. For the point is that there is an admissions program at Harvard College that is not called a special-admissions program but is a special-admissions program nonetheless. For the past five years, as has been reported in the Washington *Post*, the number of minority students in the entering freshman classes at Harvard College has varied "only a hair." Can this be merely coincidence? Justice Blackmun was right to be skeptical. "I am not convinced, as Mr. Justice Powell seems to be," Justice Blackmun wrote in his opinion, "that the difference between the Davis program and the one employed by Harvard is very profound or constitu-

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tionally significant. The line between the two is a thin and indistinct one."

Justice Powell's selection of Harvard College's admissions procedures as a model for the nation fails not only because it is not just, but also because it is the wrong kind of model. Allan Bakke, one should remember, applied for admission to a professional, not an undergraduate, school. The claims—gratuitous, conjured, or otherwise—that one may make about the need for "diversity" or "ethnic diversity" in the context of an undergraduate college do not carry over to the context of professional schools, where for obvious reasons much greater weight must be placed on academic qualifications. Alan Dershowitz has pointed out that Justice Powell's "use of the admissions program of a liberal-arts college as a model for medical-school admissions demonstrates the wisdom of keeping judges as far away as possible from the substance of university admissions programs."

Had Justice Powell wanted to hold up a more exact model, he could have chosen one of Harvard's professional schools. And what would he have found there? Well, Harvard, of course, is Harvard, and the likelihood is that minority applicants to its professional schools are better qualified academically than minority applicants to the schools at most other universities. Still, even Harvard must choose from the available pool of applicants, and, as many of those who filed *amicus* briefs in *Bakke*—on *both* sides—agreed, within that pool there simply is no "balance" or "equilibrium" between black applicants and white applicants.

Thus, the Association of American Medical Colleges, which supported the University of California and opposed Bakke, said in its brief that the academic qualifications of minority applicants to medical schools "pale in comparison with the much higher academic qualifications of the very large and highly competitive pools of white applicants." The Association of American Law Schools said in its brief that "the ineradicable fact" is that as a group, minority applicants to law schools "achieve dramatically lower LSAT [Law School Admissions Test] scores and GPA [Grade Point Average] than whites." The AALS brief produced the relevant figures: "Twenty per cent of the white and unidentified applicants, but only 1 per cent of blacks and 4 per cent of Chicanos received both an LSAT score of 600 and above and a GPA of 3.25 or higher. . . . If the combined LSAT-GPA levels are set at 500 and 2.75 respectively, 60 per cent of the white and unidentified candidates would be included but only 11 per cent of the blacks and 23 per cent of the Chicanos." Such disparities, said the AALS brief, exist at all LSAT and GPA levels.

At Harvard—perhaps—the admissions test scores of minority students may be among the highest of the entire minority applicant pool. But what about schools of lesser prestige? Here it is instructive to consider the difference in admissions test scores between Bakke and those students specially admitted to Davis, an institution of average quality, in the two years Bakke unsuccessfully applied. The difference was not 5 or 10, or even 15 or 20 percentiles (out of 100), on the Medical College Admissions Test, but *55* percentiles in 1973 and *60* percentiles in 1974. That is, on the four parts of the test, Bakke averaged in the 90th percentile and was rejected; those specially *admitted* in 1973 averaged in the 35th percentile, those in 1974 not quite in the 30th.

The problem for other universities, once Harvard and a few other prestigious institutions take the very best of the black applicants, is to find qualified black applicants for admission to their programs. The fact is that there are not enough students at very high score levels to make up even half of the minority group admitted to *one* of the nation's prestigious institutions. The result, of course, is that even Harvard must give substantial "pluses" to many of the minority applicants it admits; the other institutions must give monumental ones to a majority of theirs.

THESE are unhappy facts, but facts nonetheless. And if not much noted before, they should in the interest of good faith be noted now, not only by jurists but also by the media, which have demonstrated scant curiosity in ferreting out the truth regarding the academic performance of minority students. Only recently William Raspberry, the syndicated columnist, praising the Court's decision in *Bakke*, constructed this situation: "Suppose a black applicant to Harvard Law School, a product of the inner-city slum who attended substandard public schools and graduated from a mediocre black college with scores of 650 on his Law School Admissions Test—can anyone suppose such a person is the mere equal of a white applicant, who having graduated from Groton or Columbia College also scores 650 on his LSAT? The Harvard plan permits admissions screeners to give special weight to the black youngster's special achievement." Now, who would quarrel with an admissions officer's "tipping" the scales in the black youngster's favor? Who indeed is opposed to this kind of "affirmative action"? Unfortunately, the situation Raspberry constructs, though charming, is extremely rare. For all practical purposes, it is fiction. No rough equality in terms of non-racial factors prevails among white and black applicants such that black applicants in any substantial numbers may be favored and thereby gain admission through only a slight "tipping" on their behalf. Indeed, it is precisely because there is no such rough equality that supporters of programs such as those at both Davis and Harvard want race itself to be given, not mere

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"tipping" weight, but very substantial weight in the admissions process.

Justice Powell's recommendation of the Harvard College program may have a "soothing effect," but that program bears no relation to the realities of admission to professional schools and the process he describes is one which no serious student of the case, on either side, can accept as accurate. "Nothing will have changed if the Harvard way becomes the nation's way," the New York *Times* solemnly and approvingly commented. Nothing, that is, except a hold on reality.

Justice Powell did have a hold on reality and on the truth, but then he lost it. He had the truth when he said that the Fourteenth Amendment itself was framed in universal terms, without reference to color, ethnic origin, or condition of prior servitude; when he said that "over the years this Court consistently repudiated 'distinctions' between citizens solely because of their 'ancestry' as being odious to a free people whose institutions are founded on the doctrine of equality"; and when he said that "the guarantee of equal protection cannot mean one thing when applied to one individual and something else when applied to a person of another color." Had he listened to his own words, had he gone on from there, and had the Court gone with him, to rule out race as any kind of "plus" factor for the admission of students to colleges and graduate institutions, it would have ruled correctly on the question of whether race may be a factor in an admissions program.

In so ruling, the Court would not have foreclosed an admissions committee from considering personal attributes such as one's having overcome poverty, sickness, parental abuse, or racial discrimination. These can, and should be, taken into account. But what cannot be, and should not be, countenanced is thinking in blood.

We are left with an endorsement of a special-admissions program (Harvard's) that will indeed produce much the same result as the invalidated Davis program, together with an encouragement to duplicity.

It is clear, then, that those who think they have "lost" in *Bakke*, that the incentive to carry out affirmative action "will be killed," and that affirmative action has been "seriously if not fatally undermined," are wrong, while those who interpret the decision as a "green light to go forward with affirmative action" are quite right. As we have seen, most other special-admissions programs would meet the constitutional standards recommended by the *Bakke* decision; Al Perez is right.

As for those who see the decision as a "Solomonic compromise," a "very civilized ruling," "just about right," a "sound compromise," and an "act of statecraft," the charitable explanation is that they are reading into rather than reading the decision. There is in their comments, furthermore, a curious view of the judicial function. To say, as the Washington *Post* does, that the decision contains "something for everyone" and that it will have a "soothing effect" on the nation is to suggest that the task of the Supreme Court is one of domestic diplomacy. But the Supreme Court does not have this function; its job is to assay what is just and right according to the Constitution and the laws of the land. If, in the school-prayer cases, in the reapportionment cases, and in the original school-desegregation cases, the Supreme Court had offered "something for everyone," would it have been praised?

Those who, like Roscoe Drummond, think that the Court's decision was "precise, constructive, and compassionate," are wrong on all counts. The decision was not legally precise, nor was it constructive in the sense of showing institutions of higher education what they responsibly can do. And, perhaps worst of all, the decision was not at all compassionate. Thomas Sowell has said that it is the opposite of compassion to mismatch students with institutions that have standards too severe for them; this is to patronize, to condescend, and to do them harm.

Those government officials like Eleanor Holmes Norton who see nothing in the decision that would force a change in the way things have been done in the past are right. And Jack Peltason, Clark Kerr, John Cooper, and David Saxon are all right in seeing victory for the universities, and business as usual. Most universities indeed can say, with Dartmouth's John Kemeny, that "absolutely nothing in our program will change." The Court has echoed what Harvard has spoken, the route for academe is clear, and good faith will be assumed.

Those like Arnold Forster and the editors of the *Wall Street Journal* are right to applaud the outlawing of an explicit and racially-based quota system. And they are right as well to worry about the room the Court has left, as the *Journal* said, for "discretionary mischief." Given that only ten or twelve institutions run special-admissions policies like Davis's, however, these commentators might well have muted their applause and heightened their anxieties. The two decisions in *Bakke* do not have equivalent impact.

John Kaplan of Stanford seems to have been exactly right in saying that now "you can manipulate admissions standards to get a desired level of minorities." Robert Bork is right to call the law of the decision "unstable," but perhaps he underestimates how clear it is that race will be given much weight. Alan Dershowitz is right to point to the decision's deficiencies of candor and clarity. David Riesman is right in fearing a rising sense of entitlements among groups and individuals, with more bitterness at all levels. (Indeed, Ralph Perotta, executive director of the National Italian

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American Foundation, noting that *Bakke* will allow groups not traditionally thought of as disadvantaged to get protection, is urging Joseph Califano at the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare to revise the guidelines for the Civil Rights Act so that they take into account Powell's view of the significance of "diversity"; Perotta is no doubt mindful of Powell's special mention of Italian Americans.) Joseph Adelson, arguing that the ambiguity of the decision is an incentive to duplicity, is clearly right. George Will is right in his assessment that *Bakke* will not impede the drive to transform the concept of American justice from "equal opportunity" to "statistical parity."

Above all, finally, Sam Ervin is right when he says that the decision "sounds like intellectual clap-trap. . . . I think the only rational decision is that you can't discriminate against anybody on account of his race."

WHAT does the future hold? Is there any hope that Congress might intrude to ameliorate the situation by laying down clearer standards on the use or non-use of race in a university admissions policy? The answer is that it is unlikely. True, an amendment to this year's HEW-Labor appropriations bill that would forbid universities receiving federal funding from employing "any ratio, quota, or other numerical requirement related to race, creed, color, national origin, or sex" has passed the House. But even if it should pass the Senate (a similar measure failed there last year), the amendment would not reach the problem raised now by the *Bakke* decision—namely, that of using race as a critical factor in an admissions policy without implicit recourse to numbers.

But is there other language that might be able to deal with this problem? There is—and it can be found in Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: "No person in the United States shall on the ground of race, color, or national origin be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance." It can also be found in the Fourteenth Amendment: "No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Shall Congress now be urged to append to the language of Title VI language to the effect that "no person" means "not any one, black or white, or any other color"? And shall the Fourteenth Amendment now be altered by constitutional amendment so as to add that "the equal protection of the laws means *really* equal protection of the laws and not unequal protection of the laws, and not greater protection for one group than for another"? Would any of this help? The words are already there. And so is the sense of the words. And yet they are distorted or disregarded or violated, and invitations to do so are offered and accepted by bureaucracies and courts.

Principles, like civil liberties—to recall another phrase of Justice Frankfurter's—draw at best only limited strength from constitutional guarantees. Traditions and the honoring of principles must be in the bones of a people. And in honoring principles there are some invitations—even invitations from the nation's highest court—that ought to be refused by a people dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal.

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Why Bakke Won't End Reverse Discrimination: 2

Nathan Glazer

IF THE long opinion written by Justice Powell in the *Bakke* case were truly "the judgment of the Court," then I believe there would be grounds for satisfaction among those of us concerned to protect individual rights and to constrain the growing tendency of government and private institutions alike to act on the basis of a person's race and ethnicity. But how can we have any great confidence in the staying power of an opinion written by a single Justice, and requiring, to become the judgment of the Court, four Justices to uphold the first of its two key parts, and four other Justices to uphold the second? To make matters worse, the four Justices who uphold Bakke's right of admission stand on much narrower ground than the four who would have denied him admission, and who wish to go much further than Justice Powell in legitimating the use of race and ethnic criteria. And to make matters still worse, all the nine Justices agree that deference is due to existing legislation, and the executive and administrative action that implements it —action which has already saddled us with many requirements to take race and ethnicity into account.

These, it seems to me, are the troubling problems that remain even after Justice Powell's opinion—an opinion that I would find consistent with the Constitution, with the broad and sound range of sentiment among the American people—both black and white—as to the kind of society they want, and with the common sense that should guide us in dealing with racial and ethnic diversity.

In reviewing the California Supreme Court's decision in the *Bakke* case, Justice Powell upheld that part of its judgment declaring the admissions program of the University of California Medical School at Davis to be unlawful. One group of four Justices—Burger, Stewart, Rehnquist, and Stevens—concurred in this, but did not subscribe to Justice Powell's reasoning. On the other hand, Justice Powell reversed the California Supreme Court's ruling that race cannot be given "any consideration" in the admissions process. Another group of four—Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun—concurred in this, but again their reasoning was very different from Justice Powell's. What weight therefore Justice Powell's opinion, standing as it does on this razor's edge, will have in the future, when similar and related cases must be decided, is uncertain.

Justice Powell begins with a review of the facts in the case. Neutral and straightforward though this account is, it nevertheless raises two questions, which unfortunately play no part in the opinion but have to be taken into account in a broader examination of the problem of the judicial role in our educational institutions, and the adequacy of those institutions themselves.

First, the admissions process of the University of California Medical School at Davis has been subjected to an examination so searching that in itself it seems—to a non-legal mind—to constitute an excessive degree of interference in the operations of what should be an independent and autonomous institution. Undoubtedly educational institutions, and particularly those that take money in one form or another from the federal government (as almost all do), are not entitled to as much protection as we grant religious institutions, or purely private social institutions, or the family. Yet having personally been involved in admissions processes in different departments in two universities, I am made uneasy when a complex enterprise involving many factors must be dissected, explicated, and justified to a court. We live in a society in which all action, it seems, must be laid fully bare, legally defended. But with what effect on what should be subtle and balanced judgments?

I do not think government is improved when everything is done in the expectation that correspondence and conversations and notes will be subjected by hostile persons to strict and unsympathetic scrutiny. This undoubtedly leads to the practice of "defensive" government, in which actions that should have been taken are not, actions that should not be taken are, in which action is delayed, and in which the costs of action pile up. Similarly, we see the spread of "defensive" medicine to protect against possible malpractice suits. And now we must expect "defensive" admissions and appointments in higher education in anticipation of government intrusion and private liti-

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gation. In every field these developments drive out valuable people who will not subject themselves to unfair inquiry, attack, and litigation. I do not have a solution to this problem, and neither does the Supreme Court. Nevertheless I cannot let pass without comment the grotesquely expanded scale of the processes of determining publicly what is fair, and their effect on our institutions and our lives.

In the case of admissions, to be sure, there is an alternative that would obviate such effects: an exclusive reliance on examinations, numbers, scores. This is how it was done when I entered New York's City College in 1940—no interview, no judgment of my past contributions in high school, or of my future contribution to society; in short, to reverse Melbourne, no damn nonsense about anything but merit, as defined by grades. It is not a bad system: we see it in operation in many countries for the distribution of scarce places in institutions of higher education. And yet undoubtedly we gain something in this country from the fact that every school and every graduate department has its *own* admissions procedures in which other factors are considered in addition to grades and scores. Can this diversity and the benefits it provides survive rigorous and repeated judicial examination?

If the first question raised by Justice Powell's review of the facts of the *Bakke* case asks why the procedures of autonomous institutions should be subjected to such searching examination, the second question concerns the soundness of the criteria used by autonomous institutions. Here is what the Supreme Court tells us about the percentile scores on the Medical College Admissions Test (MCAT) of Bakke and the two groups of regular and special admittees in 1973 and 1974:

1973	*Verbal*	*Quantitative*	*Science*	*Gen. Inform.*
Bakke	96	94	97	72
Average of Reg. Admit	81	76	83	69
Average of Spec. Admit.	46	24	35	33
1974				
Bakke	96	94	97	82
Average of Reg. Admit.	69	67	82	72
Average of Spec. Admit.	34	30	37	18

One may put aside the verbal and general-information parts of the MCAT as perhaps not directly relevant to medical practice. But the enormous gap between the regular and special admittees in their quantitative and science scores certainly casts serious doubt on whether the special admittees could actually succeed in getting through medical school, and if they did, what their success could possibly mean.

My two concerns are of course in contradiction: I want the courts to keep out of this kind of business, but I want the institutions to act responsibly as educational institutions. (In an earlier case this year, a student at the University of Missouri-Kansas City Medical School was dismissed shortly before she was due to graduate, and the judgment of the Court was to allow the dismissal to stand. I approved the Court's deference to an autonomous educational institution, but at the same time I was bothered by the possibility of unfairness to the student in question.) But in any event, neither the issue of educational autonomy nor the issue of responsibility played any part in the *Bakke* opinions.

PART II of Justice Powell's argument considers whether the provisions of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 are applicable: "No person in the United States, shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance." Is the Civil Rights Act more restrictive in the way it looks upon the use of racial classifications than the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment ("No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws")? Examining the legislative history, Justice Powell concludes that "Title VI must be held to proscribe only those racial classifications that would violate the Equal Protection Clause. . . ."

Therefore, he engages, in Part II, in a lengthy analysis of the question of whether the Equal Protection Clause protects only blacks or whether it protects everyone. Clearly this is a crucial point, affecting our judgment of the degree to which remedial action for blacks (or other minorities that we consider equivalent to them under the Fourteenth Amendment) may be permitted to harm individuals in other groups. Justice Powell says, first, that even the University of California admits that decisions based on race or ethnic origin do raise questions under the Fourteenth Amendment, and that, on the other side, even Bakke did not argue that "all racial or ethnic classifications are *per se* invalid." Interestingly enough, of the four cases that Justice Powell cites to shore up the position that government may under some circumstances take account of race, two came out of the deportation of Japanese Americans from California in World War II and a third is the recent case unsuccessfully brought by the Hasidim of Williamsburg in Brooklyn against an action designed by the New York State legislature to increase the voting power of blacks and which reduced their own voting power. This is not a promising group of cases on which to ground a constitutional right to make racial and ethnic distinction.

Be that as it may, Justice Powell goes on to say

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that the use of racial and ethnic categories does require "strict scrutiny by courts." White males are protected by the Constitution, just as blacks are. We cannot set up a "two-class" view of the Fourteenth Amendment, in which persons in some groups are deserving of less protection than others. In the decades after the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, Justice Powell writes, "the United States had become a nation of minorities. Each had to struggle—and to some extent struggles still—to overcome the prejudices not of a monolithic majority, but of a 'majority' composed of various minority groups. . . . As the nation filled with the stock of many lands, the reach of the Clause was gradually extended to all ethnic groups seeking protection against discrimination." Justice Powell refers to cases protecting Celtic Irishmen, Chinese, Austrian resident aliens, Japanese, Mexican Americans. "The guarantees of equal protection, the Court said in *Yick Wo* [1886], 'are universal in their application to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, or color, or of nationality. . . .' "

Justice Powell takes a strong line in this section of his opinion. He rejects the argument of the University of California that "discrimination against members of the white 'majority' cannot be suspect if its purpose can be characterized as 'benign.' " And he attacks directly the view of the second group of four (Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun) that only if there is a "stigma" on a group is it covered by the Equal Protection Clause:

> The Equal Protection Clause is not framed in terms of "stigma." . . . The word has no clearly defined constitutional meaning. It reflects a subjective judgment that is standardless. *All* state-imposed classifications that rearrange burdens and benefits on the basis of race are likely to be viewed with deep resentment by the individual burdened. The denial to innocent persons of equal rights and opportunities may outrage those so deprived and therefore may be perceived as invidious. These individuals are likely to find little comfort in the notion that the deprivation they are asked to endure is merely the price of membership in the dominant majority and that its imposition is inspired by the supposedly benign purpose of aiding others. One should not lightly dismiss the inherent unfairness of, and the perception of mistreatment that accompanies, a system of allocating benefits and privileges on the basis of skin color and ethnic origin.

IN ATTACKING the "two-class" theory of the Fourteenth Amendment, Justice Powell takes up a more sophisticated and complex position on the ethnic character of the United States than I have seen before in any opinion of the Supreme Court:

> . . . The difficulties entailed in varying the level of judicial review according to a perceived "preferred" status of a particular racial and ethnic minority are intractable. The concepts of "majority" and "minority" necessarily reflect temporary arrangements and political judgments. As observed above, the white "majority" itself is composed of various minority groups, most of which can lay claim to a history of prior discrimination at the hands of the state and private individuals. Not all of these groups can receive preferential treatment and corresponding judicial tolerance of distinctions drawn in terms of race and nationality, for then the only "majority" left would be a new minority of White Anglo-Saxon Protestants. There is no principled basis for deciding which groups would merit "heightened judicial solicitude" and which would not. Courts would be asked to evaluate the extent of prejudice and consequent harm suffered by various minority groups. Those whose societal injury is thought to exceed some arbitrary level of tolerability would be entitled to preferential classifications. . . . As these preferences began to have their desired effect, and the consequences of past discrimination were undone, new judicial rankings would be necessary. The kind of variable sociological and political analysis necessary to produce such rankings simply does not lie within the judicial competence—even if they otherwise were politically feasible and socially desirable.

And Justice Powell goes on to quote at length Justice Douglas's ringing dissent in *DeFunis* against the use of racial and ethnic categories.

It is of particular importance, I believe, that Justice Powell has attacked the theory that only stigmatized groups, groups thought inferior, deserve the protection of the Constitution. This theory—recently put forth by Ronald Dworkin in an article on the *Bakke* case, and also embraced by the second group of four—is remarkably dangerous in a world in which economically and educationally successful minorities have met, in many countries, the fiercest discrimination, going as far as the confiscation of their property and the loss of their lives. Are we to believe that discrimination against such minorities—Jews, for example, or Chinese—is lawful under our Constitution? Have these groups overcome their historic "stigma" just by becoming prosperous? And are minorities alone in bearing a stigma? In many of our colleges and universities in the past decade, not a few whites may well have felt burdened by a "stigma," and it may have affected them in not inconsequential ways. One can recognize that there is a considerable range in the stigmas borne by various groups, and yet still applaud Justice Powell's contention that all racial and ethnic discrimination is deserving of "strict scrutiny."

HAVING concluded that the Constitution protects all individuals from discrimination on grounds of race and ethnicity, Justice Powell examines the arguments that might justify, even under "strict scrutiny," the Davis ad-

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mission program. The language of the Court as to what might justify a "suspect classification"—race—is that "a state must show that its use of the classification is 'necessary . . . to the accomplishment' of its purpose or the safeguarding of its interest." This language, from earlier cases, is not very helpful, but it is all there is. With its guidance Justice Powell considers four arguments for the use of racial classifications in medical admissions.

The first is "to reduce the historic deficit of traditionally disfavored minorities in medical schools and the medical profession." While this may seem an adequate basis for racial classification to some, Justice Powell dismisses it out of hand. The second is to counter the effects of past discrimination. He rejects this too. The state certainly has an interest in overcoming the effects of past discrimination, but in order to use racial classification to do this, there must be "judicial, legislative, or administrative findings of constitutional or statutory violations." There are none in this case. The third is to increase the number of physicians in underserved communities. Justice Powell here supports the view of the Supreme Court of California that race is no index of where a physician will serve. Finally, there is the argument that racial classification is necessary to attain a diverse student body. This to Justice Powell is a legitimate objective of academic freedom, which apparently is protected in our well-interpreted Constitution under the First Amendment.

But racial classification of the rigid sort practiced by the Davis Medical School, he says, is not the only road to a diverse student body. The state interest involved is not simply in a racially or ethnically diverse student body: "The diversity that furthers a compelling state interest encompasses a far broader array of qualifications and characteristics of which racial or ethnic origin is but a single though important element. [Davis's] special-admissions program, focused *solely* on ethnic diversity, would hinder rather than further attainment of genuine diversity." Justice Powell then goes on to commend the Harvard College admissions program, in which factors like geographical distribution and academic interests are taken into account in choosing students, as well as race.

The troubling problem of the competence of judicial intervention into educational programs is illustrated by the fact that a *college* admissions program—which inevitably must concern itself with such questions as whether there are enough students to fill the labs, the orchestra, and the athletic teams—is used by Justice Powell as an example of the kind of admissions program that might guide a highly selective professional school. Without going into the questions that might be raised by this distinction, Justice Powell commends the looser Harvard College approach as against the more rigid Davis Medical School quota. He recognizes—as the Brennan group argues—that this is only a more subtle and sophisticated way of taking race into account. But there is a key difference to him between making race *the* factor and "an admission program where race and ethnic background is simply one element—to be weighed fairly against other elements—in the selection process."

The Stevens four, who joined with Powell to make possible Bakke's admission, had no need for such refined analysis. To them, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, banning discrimination on grounds of race in governmentally supported programs, was sufficient. It was unnecessary to go into the Constitution, or into issues of when and how race could be used.

It is the distinction, made by Justice Powell alone, between the legitimate and illegitimate use of race in admissions, that dismays those who hoped that the *Bakke* decision might give a decisive answer to the problem of affirmative discrimination. If race may be "a" factor, may it not covertly be "the" factor? Will not the Davis approach in other guises—e.g., the commended Harvard approach—in effect creep back into the admissions process? Will not a rigid statistical standard, not announced in so many words and numbers, boldly, but held covertly in the minds of an admissions committee, prevail?

CONCERNED as I am to erect a wall against the use of racial and ethnic categories by government and public institutions, I am nevertheless content with Justice Powell's position. The argument that it only drives the Davis type of program underground would remain even if Justice Powell had upheld the California Supreme Court in its denial of any role to race or ethnicity. The fact is that in any system that goes beyond test scores and grades it is impossible for racial and ethnic considerations not to play a role in admissions, whatever the Supreme Court may say. These considerations played a role before the rise of statistically based affirmative action, at a time when it was still illegal in many places even to seek information as to race and ethnic background. Colleges and professional schools sought diversity, or sought for members of given minority groups. This was not the only criterion, of course, but it was often a factor in making up a class.

And, indeed, how could it not be? If one took as relevant to the composition of a class geographical representation, representation from small undergraduate schools and large ones, a range of interests in the sub-parts of the field, how could one totally rule out racial and ethnic background in a country in which these are dominant social forces? To exclude constitutionally any consideration of these factors would inevitably lead to their being considered covertly.

There are two arguments for the position taken

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by the Supreme Court of California that considerations of race and ethnicity must be totally excluded. One is the constitutional and statutory argument: this is what the Constitution says we must do; this is what the law, as passed by Congress, says we must do. It is the position I myself would like to hold. Certainly it is the way I read the Constitution, and the way I read the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Unfortunately it is not the way a majority of the Supreme Court reads the Constitution, at least for the moment.

But even more damaging to this position, it is not the way the Congress is willing to read its own legislation. Congress had the opportunity, in 1972, when revising sections of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, to make it absolutely clear that the original legislation meant what it said when it prohibited racial preferences because of a statistical "imbalance" in employment. Congress refused to take this opportunity. Since Justice Powell leans heavily on statutes, on the intention of Congress—as do the Stevens four which supported him on Bakke's right to admission—it is particularly damaging to the future stability of their position that Congress has been pusillanimous in asserting that it would not stand for racial and ethnic tests in federally funded programs. Quite the contrary, as the Brennan four point out, Congress has mandated them in at least one important program. In 1977, it required that 10 per cent of grants for local public-works projects should be spent for "minority business enterprises," defined as businesses 50 per cent of which are owned by "Negroes, Spanish-speaking, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos, and Aleuts."

The Brennan four write of this act of Congress (a challenge to which, incidentally, the Supreme Court refused to review a few days after the *Bakke* decision):

> What is most significant about the congressional consideration of this measure is that although the use of a racial quota or "set-aside" by a recipient of federal funds would constitute a direct violation of Title VI if that statute were read to prohibit race-conscious action, no mention was made during the debates in either the House or the Senate of even the possibility that the quota provisions for minority contractors might in any way conflict with or modify Title VI. It is inconceivable that such a purported conflict would have escaped congressional attention through inadvertent failure to recognize the relevance of Title VI.

Even worse, in another section of the public-works act with its minority set-aside there is a provision barring discrimination on the basis of sex which provides that it should be enforced "through agency provisions and rules similar to those already established, with respect to racial and other discrimination under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964."

That Congress in 1977 passed this ill-advised legislation does not tell us what congressional intent in 1964 was. But if this intent must be reaffirmed by new congressional action, in the face of administrative determination to impose racial and ethnic goals and quotas, and in order to guide wavering courts who will give deference to congressional statute, then can we expect such reaffirmation from a Congress capable of passing a bill prescribing racial quotas?

To doubt the viability of the strict line taken by the California Supreme Court is, I realize, tantamount to saying that we are unlikely to get anything better than Justice Powell's position in the fight against these new benign Nuremberg laws either from the Supreme Court or from Congress. I would hope that the continued exploration and demonstration of the evils of reverse Nurembergism would eventually persuade Congress and the courts—as, according to all the survey data, they have persuaded a huge majority of the American people—that we want no governmentally imposed racial and ethnic classifications, and that state judgment, and the judgment of institutions that carry a state interest, must be based on individual, not racial and ethnic, grounds. Thus, an exploration of how the 10 percent set-aside has been administered—the fact that businessmen have to show their minority credentials to be "accredited," that corruption and deception are fostered, that waste is encouraged, that successful minority businesses are not in fact made this way, and that those which are set up by protected government contracts will be blown away in any light wind—might dissuade Congress from trying to deal any further with ethnic and racial problems by means of such crude requirements.

THERE is a second, more substantial argument in favor of the Supreme Court of California's total prohibition on the use of race. If we want a society in which individuals are treated as individuals by public bodies, and as far as possible in private life, without regard to race and ethnicity, then we cannot get there by allowing or prescribing public action in the opposite direction, even on a temporary basis. These measures will not be temporary, as the Brennan four hope, since those who profit from racial and ethnic distinction will not easily give up their benefits. And there will always be some statistic to point to that will justify continued preferential treatment.

The difficulty of determining a standard for ending affirmative discrimination is well illustrated in a section of the Brennan opinion which points out that the Davis 16 per-cent quota is lower than the proportion of blacks and Chicanos in California (22 per cent). The Brennan opinion did not bother to look into the distribution of these groups by age (how many are in the 22-26 year range which typically encompasses medical school?), or by percentage of college graduates, or

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by percentage of college graduates with minimal science and math, all of which might demonstrate, in direct opposition to the Brennan group's reasoning, that the 16 per-cent quota is much too high, and leads to the admission of students with the lamentably low scores that Justice Powell reported.

The statistical standard also leaves in silence the fate of groups, like the Japanese and Chinese, who are simultaneously "overrepresented" in relation to their proportion of the state population, and are eligible for quota admission. Thus, Asians, 4 per cent of the population of California, were 9.5 per cent of those admitted under the regular program to Davis in 1971, 13 per cent in 1972, and 15.5 per cent in 1973, and yet were eligible under the special-admissions program (just as "Orientals" are included in the 10 per-cent set-aside). If "proportionateness" is the standard, even a rough proportionateness, then groups like the Jews, drawn to medicine, adept at science and math, motivated to become doctors, will suffer, while others less suited by training or motivation will become doctors because quotas make it easier for them.

Despite these and other powerful substantive arguments against "any consideration" of race and ethnicity, I believe we must accept Justice Powell's position. In a multi-ethnic society, while we would not want government to prescribe the degree of such considerations by imposing quotas and goals, we would want individuals and institutions to take these factors into account voluntarily and by their own lights. In a typical example, we would not want government to require a balanced ticket, but we would want the good sense of political leaders to operate so that all groups get political representation. In other fields, we all accept programs with the same objective. Our various work programs address themselves not only to the poor and the unemployed, but to blacks, Mexican Americans, Puerto Ricans. Our various minority recruiting, tutoring, and assistance programs address themselves not only to those outside the normal channels of recruitment and the underprepared as such but to specific racial and ethnic groups.

By not drawing a "fence around the law," Justice Powell left open many difficult decisions. How will institutions and individuals differentiate between race as "the" factor and race as "a" factor? He recognizes this problem and quotes Justice Frankfurter: "A boundary line is none the worse for being narrow." Alas, the problem is more difficult than mere narrowness. Thus, critics of Justice Powell's distinction assert it will encourage litigation. It will. But the only decision that would have discouraged litigation is one which simply accepted racial quotas. Ruling out race entirely would not have discouraged litigation, for many would have claimed—and I am sure justly—that it had been a factor.

Justice Powell ends with a plea that is surprising—that we have more trust in the good faith of institutions: ". . . a court would not assume that a university, professing to employ a facially nondiscriminatory admissions policy, would operate it as a cover for the functional equivalent of a quota system. In short, good faith would be presumed in the absence of a showing to the contrary in the manner permitted by our cases." And here he refers to a case in which the Supreme Court has accepted the good faith of a suburban community in denying permission to build a low-income housing project (*Arlington Heights* v. *Metropolitan Development Corp.*), and a case in which a test that selected low proportions of blacks for the police force was accepted as legal (*Washington* v. *Davis*). Whether we can hope for trust in "good faith" in a society in which so many people do not believe in the good faith of government, so many government administrators do not believe in the good faith of our educational institutions and businessmen, and so many patients do not believe in the good faith of doctors, is doubtful. Litigation there will be. Still, the distinction Justice Powell draws is a fair one, and if litigation is needed to refine it further, so be it.

YET ONE looks forward with some trepidation to *how* the Court will refine it. Four members would accept quotas, with no safeguards. The four who voted to admit Bakke were not overly articulate in developing their position. But all three parties—Justice Powell, who wrote for himself alone, the Stevens group, and the Brennan group—told us clearly that congressional statutes, and executive and administrative findings and regulations, would receive their deference and play a major role in how they interpreted the legality of quotas and goals. Is this not the key signal that the Court has given us? Those of us who oppose rigid goals and quotas as a travesty of what America is supposed to be and wishes to be have nothing to hope for from the Carter administration and its bureaucratic appointees. But there is still the Congress, still responsive to public opinion, and capable of being troubled by the use of racial and ethnic categories to govern state action.

It is there, in the Congress, that we should seek for a sharper and clearer statement, spelled out so that administrators and courts will have no alternative but to follow it, that no American may be discriminated against on grounds of race and ethnicity.

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The Message of Proposition 13

Seymour Martin Lipset and Earl Raab

THE Jarvis-Gann Constitutional Amendment, limiting property taxes in California, has touched off speculation about a conservative backlash and the ascendance of a New Right in America. But analysis suggests that the trend exemplified by the "taxpayers' revolt" confounds the traditional political designations.

In 1946, according to Gallup, Americans who wanted taxes cut outnumbered those who did not by only four percentage points (48-44). By 1963, the gap was 44 percentage points (63-19). In 1969, 54 per cent of Americans told the Harris survey that they had "reached the breaking point" with respect to the amount of taxes they paid; that figure was up to 66 per cent by 1978.

Those who are unhappy use a simple consumer's measure: in so many words, only 23 per cent of the people queried by the Harris poll in 1971 thought they were getting their "money's worth from tax dollars." In this sentiment no more than two or three percentage points separated whites from blacks, Democrats from Republicans, or one income group from another. All felt put upon. In that same year, about 7 out of 10 told Harris that the time was coming when they "would sympathize with a taxpayers' revolt," involving a refusal to pay taxes—again with little difference in view related to whether they were white or black, and whether their income was around $5,000 or over $15,000.

The pressure has increased along with inflation. About one out of three Americans ranked inflation as their chief worry in 1977; in 1978, two out of three Americans did so. The "money's worth" was diminishing rapidly. In response, public officials uniformly promised tax reduction, but they did not deliver. Then the California property tax provided the dramatic breakthrough. California real-estate inflation had been brutal, often triple-digit over a few years' span. It was common for people who had bought a modest home for $20,000 to find themselves paying taxes ten years later on a home assessed at $90,000. No one was surprised to learn that the home of a Los Angeles man had been reappraised to $60,000 in 1977, and reappraised again in 1978 to $104,000, with a jump in taxes from a little over $2,000 to a little over $3,500. It became a hardship for many people to live in their own homes, and obviously there was no point in selling for the profit to buy other inflated houses at proportionally higher interest rates.

While these and other taxes were rising so much faster than income, the number of state and city employees was also increasing faster than the population. In the period 1970-75, the number of state and local employees rose by 21 per cent, while the state's population grew by only 6 per cent.

But the tipping point in the California situation was a sizable tax-generated surplus that public officials in Sacramento continued to sit on despite the growing tax lament from the public. Inflation pushes many taxpayers into higher brackets in all graduated-income-tax systems as their dollar earnings (although not their real earnings) go up. Under the Reagan administration, the California income tax had been made even more progressive than before, producing a visible and well-publicized $5.7 billion surplus by 1978. This was available for distribution, or to serve as the basis of a tax cut. But instead of proposing such remedies, Reagan's successor, Governor Jerry Brown, apparently preferred to hoard the surplus in order, according to some, to use it to advantage in his reelection year. As State Treasurer Jesse Unruh has pointed out, this enormous surplus constituted a standing public invitation to Proposition 13, the Jarvis-Gann Amendment. For this reason, Unruh has called Brown "the father of Proposition 13," although the Governor opposed the measure—with somewhat waning vigor as the polls showed increasing support for it. The polls were accurate: Proposition 13—which rolled back property taxes to 1 per cent of market value as of 1975, prohibited local taxes

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from rising more than 2 per cent a year, and put other checks on tax-raising—passed by nearly a two-to-one margin.

But while the surplus may have been idiosyncratic to California, it was, even for Californians, only the final straw. They were obviously using the occasion to express themselves on the matter of tax burdens in general. And indeed, this is how their vote was taken, by politicians in California and everywhere else, as well as by the American public. After the California vote, a New York *Times*/CBS News poll found that the whole country was jubilant. Again by a two-to-one margin (51-24), Americans said that they supported a similar measure for their own jurisdictions.

But if California's Proposition 13 was the messenger, what really was the message? To what extent do the taxpayers just want to keep their money, as against seeking their money's worth? What services are they willing to give up? What do they expect from government?

One stream of opinion on the subject was articulated by Senator George McGovern when he said that Californians had acted on a "degrading hedonism that tells them to ask what they can take from the needy." He also saw "undertones of racism" in Proposition 13. According to others who share this view, Proposition 13 is an expression of "mean-spiritedness" and the harbinger of the conservative and/or racist backlash which has allegedly been around the corner for the past dozen years.

There is no doubt that self-interest (which, however, is not necessarily the same thing as mean-spiritedness) was a factor in the Proposition 13 vote. A Los Angeles *Times*/CBS News election-day poll of those who voted revealed that 72 per cent of homeowners (who stood to gain) had opted for the measure as against 47 per cent of the renters (who had nothing to gain), while only 44 per cent of those with public employees in their family said they had backed the measure, as compared to 65 per cent of the total population.

What is noteworthy, however, is how many voters with an apparent interest in the defeat of Proposition 13 nevertheless went for it: 44 per cent of families of public employees, 47 per cent of renters, and 42 per cent of blacks. In these categories, the majority who voted opposed Proposition 13; but in every *economic* category, it was the other way around. Thus the measure was supported by 55 per cent of those with incomes under $8,000; 66 per cent of those in the $8-15,000 bracket; 67 per cent of those in the $15-25,000 class; and 61 per cent of those with incomes above $25,000.

A similarly mixed picture appears when we look at the vote in terms of ideological categories. As might have been expected, 82 per cent of self-designated "conservatives" voted for the measure. Yet here too what is noteworthy is the large number of self-described "moderates" (63 per cent) and "liberals" (45 per cent) who voted for it.

Clearly, then, the victory of Proposition 13 represents something more complex than a triumph of selfishness and/or old-line conservatism. In trying to understand what that something is, we might begin by noting that the evidence from a variety of opinion surveys reveals that a growing number of Americans, when asked to describe themselves politically, say that they are conservatives. In 1964, according to the New York *Times*/CBS poll, the ratio of self-described conservatives to self-described liberals was fairly even (32-27); today, the gap has widened considerably (42-23).

But what do people mean when they call themselves conservatives? Evidently it has to do with distaste for a growing, interfering, and cumbersome government. Thus in 1964, according to the Gallup poll, Americans were almost evenly split (42-39) on the issue of whether "the government has gone too far in regulating business and interfering with the free-enterprise system." By 1978, when the New York *Times*/CBS poll repeated the question, Americans had come to agree with the statement by a margin of 58-31 per cent. Not surprisingly, self-described conservatives now endorse this statement overwhelmingly (67-26); what is surprising is the fact that even "liberals" divide in favor of it by 45-35 per cent.

The percentage of people who think that "government is spending too much" has also risen steadily since 1973. But "too much" is a famous term of relativity. It may be considered too much with respect to the income of the citizenry; but it may also be considered too much with respect to the quality of the product. This is the "money's-worth" question. And the overwhelming tide of opinion, especially "conservative" opinion, identifies this government deficiency as "waste." In 1958, only 42 per cent of those polled told Gallup interviewers that "the government wastes a lot of the tax money"; by 1978, 78 per cent of Americans thought so (New York *Times*/CBS News). A vast majority of blacks also agrees with this view.

"Waste in government" was the key phrase in the Proposition 13 campaign. Mervin Field of the California poll reports that the main comment made by proponents of Proposition 13, other than "Taxes are too high," was "The time has come to cut government costs, waste, and inefficiency." Field noted that prior to election day, the California public believed that a cut of 10 per cent in tax revenues could be accomplished without any decline in state and local government services. And three-quarters of Californians in favor of the Proposition, in the Los Angeles *Times*/CBS News election-day poll, said that they did not think public services would be reduced by Proposition 13. After the California vote, a vast majority of Americans nationally (89-5 per cent) interpreted

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it as "a strong protest that people running government will have to respond by trimming a lot of waste from government spending" (Harris/ABC).

Does there begin to appear an anomaly in the position of those who supported Proposition 13? After all, it was reliably estimated that $7 billion in revenue would be lost to the state as a result of the measure. Surely two out of three Californians did not believe that paper clips and bureaucratic perquisites could account for that much fat. And indeed, three weeks after the election, a majority of the supporters of Proposition 13 told Los Angeles *Times* interviewers that they still favored the amendment, even though they now recognized that there would have to be some cuts in services. Was, then, the cry against "waste in government" merely a cover-up for "hedonistic" and "mean-spirited" impulses to cut services for the needy? The evidence indicates that the answer to this question is no, and that the cry against government is genuine.

In all surveys, the percentage of people who say that they trust or have confidence in the government has dropped steadily. In one recurrent poll (the University of Michigan's Survey Research Center) the percentage trusting the government dropped from 78 in 1964 to 33 in 1976. More and more Americans think that the people running the government "don't know what they're doing."

But more significant in refuting the interpretation of Proposition 13 as pure "hedonism" is the fact that the desire for government to intervene in beneficent ways has not diminished. The New York *Times*/CBS poll reports that in 1960 63 per cent of Americans agreed that "the government in Washington ought to see to it that everybody who wants to work has a job." This year, 74 per cent of the people in general—and 70 per cent of those who describe themselves as "conservative"—approved that mandate for government. In 1960, about 64 per cent of the people endorsed the proposal that "the government ought to help people to get doctors and hospital care at low cost." This year, 81 per cent of those interviewed by the New York *Times*/CBS poll agreed. In the fall of 1976, the University of Michigan's Survey Research Center asked a national sample whether they thought "government should spend less even if it means cutting back on health and education." Only 21 per cent favored spending less under such circumstances while 75 per cent opposed the cut. In the same year, 67 per cent of those polled by Gallup thought that government help for the elderly should be increased, while only 3 per cent said it should be reduced; 51 per cent thought that there should be more government support for health care and only 13 per cent said there should be less; 44 per cent felt there should be more government intervention on behalf of the unemployed, as compared to 19 per cent who believed there should be less. There was no significant difference between the attitudes of professional and business people and manual laborers, or among the various income classifications.

This common support of beneficent government intervention, substantiated by survey after survey, cannot be written off by saying that people are only interested in maintaining social programs of direct benefit to them. No doubt a certain amount of "there-but-for-the-grace-of-God-go-I" sentiment has always sustained liberal social programs; but the figures do not confirm the charge that it is *narrow* self-interest which motivates the well-to-do and the ideologically conservative to favor government help for the aged and the needy. Rather, Americans seem to have developed an irreversible commitment to basic government welfare programs, as they did, finally, to social security. It is now as natural to them as getting up in the morning.

There seems to be one nagging exception to this generalization which itself throws light on the attitudinal sets in the country. The word "welfare" constantly draws antipathy from the American public. When asked by the Los Angeles *Times*/CBS poll which services they would least like to see reduced, if services had to be reduced, 75 per cent of Californians who voted on June 6 named police protection, while only 11 per cent said welfare programs. (Actually, if this was an index of "mean-spiritedness," it did not differentiate sharply between those who had supported Proposition 13 and those who had opposed it: about 9 per cent of the former and 14 per cent of the latter listed welfare as the leading candidate for a cut.) The California (Field) poll also found 62 per cent choosing "welfare and public-assistance programs" as the prime target for a cutback, as compared to the 6-8 per cent who favored cuts in fire and police departments.

This attitude toward "welfare" is by no means new. In 1935, in one of the first surveys Gallup ever took, 60 per cent of the respondents said that the government was expending too much money for "relief" (the contemporary term for what later came to be called welfare) while only 9 per cent replied that the government was spending too little. The majority of Americans continued to show disdain for "relief" all during the Depression. But the same polls which produced these results revealed a considerable majority in favor of the government's providing jobs for the unemployed, and for requiring those on relief to accept such jobs.

This general response pattern has remained substantially unchanged over the years. In a 1970 Harris poll, Americans approved (46-34) the proposition that welfare should be abolished, and that welfare recipients be made to go to work. But the same respondents overwhelmingly supported (56-

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28) the idea that government programs should be increased to help the poor. Again, in a 1976 survey, Harris found that 62 per cent favored (and only 23 per cent opposed) "a major cutback in federal spending." However, confronted with a list of specifics, substantial majorities of the same respondents *rejected* cutbacks in spending for education, health, help for the unemployed, equal opportunity for minorities, environmental protection, and product safety. It was only on welfare that a majority (56-35) favored a cutback.

The juxtaposition of these two answers—cut welfare, increase help for the poor—poses a puzzle which turns up again and again. Thus in 1977, the white population was evenly split (39-39) on whether welfare programs should be greatly decreased, but three-quarters of them said that the government should spend money to provide job incentives for the poor (Roper). In 1977, the American public approved by 80-13 per cent the idea that all able-bodied people should be removed from the welfare rolls, but also stated by a similar majority that the government should provide public-service jobs, with tax money, for those who could not find jobs in private industry. And by about the same margin (78-15), the American public agreed that its tax money should continue to be expended on the aged, blind, disabled, and one-parent families with children under the age of seven (Roper). There was no significant difference in the anwsers to these questions by self-styled conservatives and self-styled liberals.

The numbers may be subject to various degrees of distortion, but the answer to the puzzle is clear. Americans—especially that growing contingent of self-identified "conservative" Americans—are willing to pay taxes to assist the needy, but they are not satisfied with the way that portion of their tax money is being spent.

There are three strikes against "welfare." It still durably connotes "relief," "dole," something for nothing, economic waste. It is connected to the sometimes exaggerated, sometimes prejudiced sense of how many able-bodied people are on the rolls, or how many prefer not to work. As a program it seems to epitomize bureaucratic government at the worst: inefficient, ornately overlaid, corrupt, unfathomable, feckless.

But helping the poor by providing jobs is another matter entirely. Thus in 1972 Gallup asked: Suppose it would cost the government less money to give poor people cash payments than to have government train them, find jobs for them, and, if necessary, provide care for their children while they work? About 81 per cent responded that they would prefer the more costly program; only 9 per cent said they would favor the less expensive one.

The message, then, is: help the poor but get rid of "welfare." That "liberal" message is consistent with the nature of our new self-styled "conservative."

THIS hybrid political animal has, of course, been spotted before. In 1967, for example, Hadley Cantril and Lloyd Free found that many Americans were "ideological conservatives"—that is, anti-statist in their political beliefs—and "operational liberals," in the sense that they supported government action to create jobs. The number of such people is growing. More precisely, ideological conservatism has been growing as a partner to a continuingly dominant operational liberalism. This orientation is often described as neoconservatism, but it might just as accurately be called neoliberalism. The former designation emphasizes the belief that expansion of government services at the current welfare-state level should, in lawyer's language, be suspect—subject to proof that a real problem cannot be dealt with in another fashion. The latter term emphasizes the continuing acceptance of collective responsibility to provide for the impoverished and the disadvantaged.

But if this hybrid phenomenon is the most dynamic force in the American political culture today, it also poses a dilemma—perhaps the new American dilemma, which, like Gunnar Myrdal's old one, also encompasses a contradiction between practice and ideology, this time in the arena of government intervention. Is it finally possible to hold down the monster state while dealing with the sheer bulk of services of every kind our society seems increasingly to need?

The "tax revolt" is perched at the edge of this huge question, whose answer will probably evolve rather than be calculated. But the tax revolt raises a more practical and immediate question as well: will the politicians quickly enough recognize and accommodate to the growing neoliberal (or, if one prefers, neoconservative) mood, or will they misread it, one way or another, according to their predilections?

If characterizing the tax revolt epitomized by Proposition 13 as "mean-spiritedness," or "hedonism," or "racism" is to misread it on the one side, to interpret it as the sign of a swing to old-line conservative or right-wing Republicanism is to misread it equally on the other. For not only did California Democrats give Proposition 13 a landslide vote of support, 57 per cent to 43, but California Republicans chose the moderate Evelle Younger as their gubernatorial candidate over the more conservative Ed Davis.

Nationally, too, the same pattern is evident. The growth of tax-revolt sentiment has been accompanied by a parallel growth of identification not with the Republicans but with the Democratic party (Democrats now outnumber Republicans by 45 per cent to about 20 per cent in the polls). In practical terms, both Gallup and the New York *Times*/CBS polls estimate that the overwhelming Democratic majority in Congress will be renewed this November, even though the out-party usually

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makes a comeback in congressional contests held in non-presidential election years. In addition, the Democratic party—the party which has stood for expanding social services—has gained overwhelming control of government from the county courthouses to the state and national legislatures, and from governorships to the Presidency, during a period when the proportion of self-identified conservatives and anti-tax sentiment have been increasing steadily.

Nor are the elements of a classic right-wing extremist movement present in Proposition 13. Howard Jarvis, who has been plumping for this kind of tax measure for over ten years, suddenly found himself at the head of a parade he did not assemble. He may be a culture hero at this point, but he is not a political leader. Extra-partisan movements, whether rightist or leftist, usually make headway when they espouse a cause which is not embraced by one of the major coalition parties. Such movements have always been done in by the fact that one of the major parties, following the logic of its coalitional nature, took over their cause in a more moderate form. That seems to have happened already in California. It remains to be seen, however, if the politicians understand exactly what it is they have embraced.

The strong support of Proposition 13 by Democrats, in California and around the nation, provides the clue. As the survey data show, these Democrats have not abandoned their desire for a socially protective government. (On the contrary, most Republicans have tended to join them in that desire.) But the Democrats increasingly consider themselves "conservative" in their queasiness about the *way* government is growing and acting.

If, then, the public mood today is against enlarging the power, scope, and size of government in order to solve social problems, as advocated by George McGovern, Edward Kennedy, or the Americans for Democratic Action, it is also against returning to the laissez-faire small-government philosophy proposed by Ronald Reagan, Milton Friedman, or the American Conservative Union. Reagan, however, appears to be shifting: in a post-Proposition 13 speech he challenged his image as a "right-wing person" by pointing out that as governor he had made the California income tax more "progressive" and had increased welfare grants "by 43 per cent for the truly needy." Evidently he at least understands what analysis of the tax revolt tells us—that the predominant public mood is not "right-wing" but the neoliberal (or neoconservative) impulse to combine support of collective social responsibilities with a suspicion of growing government power.

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The Anxious American Jew

Ruth R. Wisse

THE problem of pre-Passover programming was handily solved for Jewish organizations this year by NBC's four-night television drama, *Holocaust.* Scheduled as it was to coincide with the anniversary of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising—which began on the first night of Passover in 1943—and with the week preceding Passover in 1978, the program undoubtedly provoked discussion at every *seder* in the land. Letters-to-the-Editor columns made it clear that there was no unanimity among viewers in evaluating the merits of the program, but whatever the considerations of the rest of the population, Jews, at least, were watching with two different and potentially contradictory sets of standards. Like their fellow Americans, they wanted to see if the program was any good. In addition, they had also to see if it was good for the Jews. The degree to which this second consideration outweighed the first tells us much about the anxieties of American Jews and helps to explain some of their enthusiasm for this "TV event."

The program was certainly not the "moral watershed" that Rabbi Marc H. Tanenbaum declared it to be: "Not an entertainment nor an educational experience," he said, "it is a *kiddush hashem* [a sanctification of God's Name]." What viewers more modestly saw—the Holocaust According to Television—was pretty standard fare, two interlocking domestic dramas with a point of identification for every member of the family, from the oldest to the youngest, and an unusually rich natural vein of "terror and murder: of love and triumph." The advertisements did not even have to reach beyond their normal claims.

It was heartening to see how carefully the writer and researchers had tried to marshal their facts. But as though the hubris in the choice of title had condemned them to unconditional comprehensiveness, each scene included—and indeed, some were only an excuse for—names, references, items of information: Lidice. Babi Yar. Jewish partisans. Jewish Kapos. Cultural resistance. Physical resistance. Theresienstadt. Sobibor. Einsatzgruppen. Zyklon B. Good priests. Bad priests. Compassionate German engineer. Dispassionate German chemist. This was a most balanced and *inoffensive* Holocaust, presenting as much breadth as possible without antagonizing any of the implicated interest groups.

The main characters were also selected with this neutralizing purpose in mind. They were to be neither recognizably Jewish nor German, but resembling as closely as possible stock television characters. "We felt it was dramatically important that the audience be able to recognize people whose religion is not a nationality but whose nationality was a place of birth," the author, Gerald Green, is quoted as saying. "I wanted a real German family [for the Jews], the equivalent of American Jews who think of themselves first as Americans. We didn't want to do *Fiddler on the Roof* Jews, though they were prime victims of the Holocaust. We were afraid they would vitiate what we were trying to do—appeal to a broad audience."

It seems that the Hollywood image of accidental particularism has not advanced very much since the days of *Gentleman's Agreement* when Sam Jaffe explained that otherwise undifferentiated Jews only maintained a tribal link so as not to give the anti-Semites the satisfaction of cowing them. In deference to this notion of non-ethnic, non-religious, (non-)Jews, the author—whose model of East European Jews is itself only a Hollywood cliché—delivered a deracinated Holocaust (depoliticized too, but that is another, though fully as serious, matter). One of Nazism's most potent weapons was the myth of the Aryan for the sake of whose purity it was necessary to root out all the hook-nosed, swarthy aliens. Here we are told, with no apparent irony, that in the name of commercial expediency the Jew as Aryan was the only safe choice for a "broad audience" that could not be expected to empathize with "foreigners." It was surely beside the point to complain about commercial breaks when the entire shape and substance of the program was to such a degree dictated by the race for ratings, that mass audience which had to be won at whatever sacrifice of historical or dramatic truth.

Yet despite the limitations, NBC's production struck a most responsive chord among American Jews and their representative organizations who

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gave it their approval and even gratitude. Critics who attempted, in public or private, to voice objections, were scolded for their elitist and finicky standards, and for applying a false artistic or intellectual yardstick to a generous benefit performance. Defenders of *Holocaust* were not blind to the obvious financial calculations of the network, nor even to the imperfections of the product, but their own need for the program outweighed all other considerations. One had the feeling that Jews in America were experiencing *themselves* as part of the vulnerable Diaspora, and wanted to seize an opportunity to remind others of their fragility.

For by an odd coincidence, the showing of *Holocaust* came at one of the lowest points in the political fortunes of American Jews since World War II. Sensitive about their personal status, and anxious about the fate of Jews in other parts of the world, they hoped that a dramatic reminder of their lonely martyrdom would act as a force of moral suasion, and as a catalyst for renewed support. Underlying many statements and letters of support was an expressed belief in the good that the program would do: "make sure it can't happen here," gain understanding for Zionism, sensitize the children. There were those who predicted that President Carter's proposed sale of F-15's to Saudi Arabia would be blocked by the strong sympathy for Israel that would surely be elicited by exposure to the horrors of the Holocaust.

Of course, if the home audience confused private affect with public affairs, the administration was made of sterner stuff. The President did indeed announce his backing for a Holocaust Memorial, but the arms deal passed with rather less difficulty than had been expected. As for the program, if it failed in its expressed intention of dramatizing the full truth of the Holocaust, it unexpectedly caught and exposed the growing uneasiness of affiliated contemporary Jews.

Needless to say, Jews in America do not feel themselves in any personal danger—or no more so, and for no different reasons, than the rest of the population. Even the small Nazi revival, and the much-publicized threat of a march in Skokie, Illinois, was more depressing than menacing. It is disheartening to believe that there are Americans for whom Hitler is a hero, and fascism an attractive ideology. It is also painful to consider that proof of American liberties may require granting permission to taunt the victims of enslavement and genocide. Not the march itself threatened, but the impulse to hold it, and the appearance of hatred in legally acceptable forms. One would have hoped that with the memory of its ugly history so fresh, Nazism would have been unable to make a comeback. Yet here are the swastikas out of mothballs, and revisionist history on the march, as if in literal fulfillment of the need to give the devil his due.

What raises the trivial manifestation of Nazism to frightening proportions, however, is the knowledge that a new, powerful, and ubiquitous anti-Semitism has indeed emerged in a rhetoric with much broader appeal. When the Social, Humanitarian, and Cultural Committee of the United Nations passed its resolution equating Zionism with racism, it signaled the official return of the Big Lie, all dressed in a cosmetic new vocabulary. In contrast to the few dozen Nazis of Chicago, there are 72 nations, among them some of the wealthiest and most powerful in the world, parading under this new banner, constituting as serious a threat as Hitler in his time. Making shameless use of moral language to express political opposition, the movers of this resolution no doubt intended to embarrass Israel's strongest ally, the United States, where racism is a particularly provocative term. But its strongest target was the Jews' moral claim to world sympathy and fair treatment. Since moral compunction had once moved the United Nations to recognize the legitimacy of Zionism by partitioning Palestine into Jewish and Arab parts, the United Nations had now to disclaim that decision by denouncing Zionism as its original sin. The resolution sought to transform the Arab war against the Jews into a worldwide condemnation of Zionists, who are none other than Jews; and, as the delegate from Fiji commented, to single out for stigmatization only one nationalist movement of all those composing the United Nations—the nationalist movement of the Jewish people.

There can be little doubt that this frontal attack has left its mark on American Jews. The centrality of Israel has been an article of faith for the past thirty years; throwing their financial and political support behind the young country, they have gradually involved themselves in Israel's fate far beyond their conscious intention or expectation. The Zionism-racism resolution gave negative confirmation of this interdependency. Directed as much against those who believe in Zion as against those who inhabit it, the resolution formally united the Jews even as it attempted to isolate the Jewish state. As long as Israel was attacked by name, as a geopolitical territory, Jewish citizens of other lands remained technically dissociated from the target. But the cynical attack on Zionism, drawing no distinctions between the politics of the state and its existence, put all Jews on the firing line. Those who donned "I am a Zionist" buttons and those who did not, understand equally what the historian, J. L. Talmon, eloquently argued, that "it has become impossible to maintain the distinction between anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism since Auschwitz and since 1948. . . ." The resolution was a reminder that Jews and Israelis shared a common destiny as Zionists—not only for better, but, as might also be the case, for worse.

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THE booming presence of the United Nations in New York, the city with the world's largest Jewish population, brings home to Jews its obsessive preoccupation with Israel on a daily, fairly personal basis. On the other hand, America stands quite apart from the anti-Semitic chorus. Not only did the United States lead the opposition to the General Assembly resolution of November 1975, its representative to the United Nations delivered against it a blistering attack; and of the top fifty newspapers in the country, every one denounced the resolution, the majority recognizing that this type of anti-Zionism was indeed directed against all Jews. The record of American support for Israel spoke most eloquently of all, based as it was on the strongest bond that can exist between countries, mutual respect and mutual interest. The Yiddish press used to raise the question, was America Diaspora?—meaning, could one consider America, which was for Jews not only a land of promise but of promise fulfilled, within the negative category of *exile*? After a time, the poet, H. Leivick, suggested that the persistence of the question had become its own answer.

Though this basic security of American Jews has not weakened, recent changes in American policy and in liberal opinion are beginning to put it to the test. The pressure of the administration on Israel to withdraw from the West Bank, and its sale of war planes to Saudi Arabia, one of Israel's most vocal enemies, signal a distinct change in American foreign policy. The explanations given for this change—faith in the "moderate" sector of the Arab countries, increasing dependency on oil-producing nations, desire for a stronger political entrée to Africa—indicate not a temporary shift, but a decisive tendency in a new direction that may grow ever more pronounced. Those who have taken for granted that the essential interests of Israel and the United States are so intertwined that mutual support was only a matter of procedure and degree are today faced with the prospect of a real divergence in the perceived interests of the two countries. Like children of a once companionable home, American Jews now find themselves with arguing—though by no means estranged—parents, each with a different set of needs and priorities, a different style, and an equal sense of right. Since it is impossible to choose between equal loves, children can only hope that they may never have to. But even far short of separation, such situations are unsettling, and American Jews are predictably showing the strain.

Workable as a description of anxiety, the family metaphor breaks down in any sober analysis of relations among the constituent members. However deep the attachment of most American Jews to Israel, they themselves are the products of America —natives, citizens, loyalists. Its language is their language, its press, their press. If the West Bank is offered to the PLO by important sectors of the American media, Americans will begin to wonder why Israel is so slow in taking up the cue. If Arab propaganda is subtle and successful—and with the best advertising money can buy, there is no reason it should altogether fail—Jews will be affected along with the rest of the population. Even without these influences, the cultural habits and the economic and political realities of America are so different from those of Israel that the gap between the Jewish inhabitants of both countries is bound to widen. American Jews, for example, would probably not have elected Likud and Prime Minister Begin, and it requires an effort to recognize this and to understand as well why the Israelis did. Without a reading knowledge of Hebrew, which very few American Jews possess, one cannot even at a distance follow the Israeli points of view. The range of American views are on the morning table and on the evening news, an inescapable part of the atmosphere.

And it is perceptibly the atmosphere, as much as the politics of Washington, that has changed. For once the liberal press is solidly behind (if not ahead of) the administration, both eager to have Israel turn its military victories into tactical defeats. The mood is not anti-Israel; only against Israel as it is. The traditional distinction between the earthly and the heavenly Jerusalem seems to have assumed a secular form as political analysts distinguish between actual Israel with its "intransigent" territorialists and an ideal Israel, with so much faith in the good will of its neighbors and the world that unlike every other nation on earth it will be ready to "risk" a unilateral peace. The "Peace Now" movement in Israel, the most recent embodiment of a philosophic and political point of view that has been ever-present in the Israeli spectrum, is held up as Israel's saving grace, and even misrepresented as a parallel to the anti-Vietnam war movement of the 1960's. Yet if there were a parallel, those who supported the American peace movement should be pressing the Arabs to yield voluntarily the territory that an enlightened neighbor had wrested from them by force of arms in a local war.

BUT the pressure is on the Israelis, and it is interesting to note how avidly they are being assisted in doing what is presumed to be for their own good. The New York *Times*, for example, in an imaginative act of newsmaking, gave front-page coverage to a public letter signed by 36 prominent Jews that took issue with the Israeli government's position in the current negotiations with Egypt. (The *Times* did not give even last-page coverage to a previous letter with 600 signatures backing Prime Minister Begin's stand.) Having presented the news, the *Times* then congratulated the group editorially for its "coverage."

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Yet whatever the political merits of the two positions, it surely requires greater courage for American Jews to defy the fashionable ideas of the moment than to support them. It is demonstrably easier for an American Jewish intellectual to stand out of favor with the leadership of the organized Jewish community—an elite he does not even care to join—than to be out of step with his colleagues and peers. The point here is not so much the right of the newspaper to make news in furtherance of its editorial policy, but the aim of that policy to discredit the Jewish supporters of Israel's position as unthinking followers of a dictated and misguided party line. In truth, of course, the Jews who support Israel's position are at least as reflective and politically independent and far more numerous than those who oppose it.

Indeed, if the *Times* is awarding merit badges for courage, it might more aptly consider the quixotic efforts of the *Jewish Week*, a local New York paper, that has launched a full-scale attack on the "World's Greatest Newspaper" in protest against its biased reporting and comment on the Middle East. The *Jewish Week* is not likely to wean its readers from their dependency on the New York *Times*, if only because the hollowness of some of its own analyses and the limitations of its own perspective do not offer a good enough substitute. The sustained anger of the protest does show, however, the degree to which many affiliated Jews feel their point of view to be currently "underrepresented" in American courts of opinion.

And where the Jews are concerned, that opinion can reach points of willful insensitivity. In a single recent issue, the *New York Review of Books*, whose responsiveness to fashion makes it the *Women's Wear Daily* of the American intelligentsia, ran a lengthy attack on Israel's expansionist settlers, a piece that was noteworthy for its point of view only, and a protest against the singling out of Jews as victims of the Holocaust because this deprives the event of its universal significance. It would be hard to imagine an analogous case involving any other minority: say, after the showing of *Roots*, a single issue with two articles, one reminding us that slavery is, after all, a universal phenomenon that loses its meaning for all of mankind if we too narrowly associate it with the blacks; the other holding the black nationalists of Rhodesia responsible for the slow progress toward majority rule. Or two back-to-back pieces on Ireland: one protesting a description of the potato famine as a purely Irish phenomenon when famine is so obviously a universal event; the other, a series of slanted interviews with the IRA to prove them responsible for endangering European peace.

No doubt in the actual instance the universalizing of Jewish victimization and the parochializing of Jewish culpability were only accidentally joined. But such accidents are also touchstones of current attitudes. If American Jews believed that a reminder of Jewish isolation during the Holocaust would move others to recognize Israel's isolation in the contemporary world, they should consider the opposite proposition: the political attempt to isolate Israel may express itself in a refusal to recognize the Jews' isolation in World War II, or to draw from that fact any "particularistic" conclusions.

No one could have foreseen, thirty years ago, that the state of Israel, conceived as the solution to the problem of anti-Semitism, would soon become its target. Nor could American Jews then have realized that the reborn state, this source of newfound dignity, security, and pride, would one day force upon them—in the very midst of their American freedoms—the anxieties and fears of Diaspora. For the worst of the Diaspora was not the dislocation or even the suffering—Jews have come to feel at home in innumerable environments—but the periodic experience of impotence, the inability to control or effectively influence the course of events. It is precisely this that American Jews are now feeling in their attempt to be their brothers' keepers.

Though the pro-Israel lobby is a force in American politics, and better organized than before, it is faced with a resourceful opposition of vast and still growing strength. Though affiliated Jews have been remarkably vocal in their support for Israel, their effect is easily neutralized. As in the case of the letter from the 36 intellectuals, government and media publicize those groups and individuals who oppose Israel on whatever point of policy or tactics, because it is more effective to have Jewish spokesmen for anti-Israel positions. By the same token, Jewish defenders of Israel's position can be written off as un-newsworthy since their backing is presumed to be automatic and predictable. Whatever the intentions and motives of Jews in such situations, they will find themselves serving purposes not strictly their own. This too is part of the Diaspora; when the interests of the government and its spokesmen clash with the interests of the Jews, the individual Jew is subsumed by his category, and one way or another feels the personal helplessness of group definition.

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What the CIA Knows About Russia

Lev Navrozov

It is mainly to certain American friends that I owe my interest in the CIA. Curiously enough, there is a resemblance between my friendships with a number of well-placed Americans (including CIA experts) and my friendships with a number of well-placed Russians back in Moscow. Privately, my friends both here and there share my concern over the survival of right in the face of Soviet might; publicly, however, they go along with whatever is useful to their careers at the moment. They seem to believe that there is something in the very nature of right that will somehow insure its survival without any career risk on their part.

So when I express dismay, for example, that on the sixtieth anniversary of the Soviet regime *U.S. News & World Report* could find no better experts on the subject than two of its own staffers (who hadn't laid eyes on a textbook of Russian history in the last sixty years), these American friends reassure me: "The mass media sell entertainment, not knowledge, you know. For knowledge there is the academy."

The trouble with the academy, however, is that for the last thirty years, the most influential, or at least the most visible, academic experts like Henry Kissinger, Zbigniew Brzezinski, George Kennan, and Marshall Shulman, have been demonstrating with equal zeal both sides of every proposition: that the Soviet regime seeks world conquest, and that the Soviet regime seeks world peace; that the sale of technology to the Soviet regime is suicidal, and that the sale of technology to the Soviet regime is beneficial; that arms-limitation agreements are impossible, and that arms-limitations agreements are possible; that containment leads to peace, and that containment leads to war.

But if the media cannot be counted on, and the academy cannot be counted on, whom can one count on? At this point, my American friends come up with their trump card: "You may rest assured that somewhere in the intelligence community—" The sentence breaks off, and the speaker wears an enigmatic smile, evoking hidden recesses where the analytic geniuses of the Western world—backed up by the most sophisticated computers ever devised—sit poring over field reports from the depths of the Soviet infrastructure.

I too might perhaps cling to this last sweet hope if I hadn't read in the New York *Times* back in 1974 an account of the CIA's secret testimony to Congress. According to this testimony, the CIA had calculated (on those computers, no doubt) that "Soviet defense spending" might well be as low as 6 per cent of the "Soviet gross national product," the same percentage, that is to say, which the United States allocates for defense spending.[1] My shock at the CIA's figure was comparable to what a resident of Moscow might have felt in 1941 when reading (in Joseph E. Davies's *Mission to Moscow*) that Stalin in the mid-30's "insisted upon liberalism of the Constitution even though it hazarded his power and party control."

The fact is that between 1967 and 1977, the Soviet war economy—talking, say, in terms of numbers of submarine-launched nuclear ballistic missiles—has moved from a 1:6 inferiority vis-à-vis the United States to a 3:2 superiority (considering only those weapons already deployed, and hence countable). Since the Soviet economy is much less efficient per worker than its American counterpart (indeed, Soviet agriculture is less than one-tenth as efficient), this giant leap to reverse the Soviet-American strategic arms ratio can only have been made by paying, say, a Soviet doctor a weekly salary which bought (as of 1974) one American umbrella (costing $1.90 in New York) or half of an Italian nylon raincoat (costing $2.40 in Rome). Contrary to countless books and reports of Western correspondents, who have been describing growing Soviet prosperity in the 70's as cheerfully as they described it back in the 30's, the proportion of consumption in the Soviet GNP has, even according to Soviet propaganda, been declining every year since 1929. Yet the CIA was suggesting in 1974 that the Soviet regime, allocating to civilian production only those resources which were rejected for military use, had been spending the same proportion of its GNP on military purposes as the fabulously wealthy, semi-pacifist, consumer-oriented United States of

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[1] New York *Times*, July 22, 1974, p. 2.

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the 70's, with its dizzying avalanches of seasonal sales, its mushrooming ranch-style and neo-colonial homes, its private cars, its gourmet restaurants, its European vacations, and its volunteer army which, to those who have served in the armies of both countries, calls to mind a health resort. To make such a suggestion means, quite simply, to understand *nothing* about the Soviet economy or the Soviet regime, and to close one's eyes to what even an American tourist confined within Soviet Tourlandia could easily find out provided he can do elementary arithmetic.

As it happens, American delusions about "Soviet-American friendship" have subsided somewhat since 1974. Accordingly, the CIA announced in 1976 that its annual calculations of "Soviet defense spending" had been mistaken (can't the CIA make a mistake—every year for fourteen years?) and that the previously announced figures for "Soviet defense spending" should be doubled retroactively (though they could also have been halved or quadrupled with about as much scholarly justification). This was announced, moreover, with a burst of self-gratulatory enthusiasm on the part of the then director of the CIA which was even more depressing than the annual error.

A lurid (or simply lucid) thought occurred to me very early one morning after I'd read an article the night before which suggested that there *might* be a "mole" (a Soviet agent) "burrowing up through the ranks of the CIA." I awakened to that cataleptic sobriety that comes before dawn: if the CIA or any other such expert outfit consisted entirely of Soviet agents (I thought), it would never have *dared* tell Congress or the American public in 1974 that the Soviets might well be spending the same proportion of their GNP on military purposes as the Americans were. Bona-fide spies would have been prevented from telling such a fib by the fear of being instantly unmasked as impudent Soviet "disinformation agents." Why, even the Soviet propaganda machine in its wildest effusions has never dared to assert such nonsense! Only 100 per-cent American officials with clear consciences and easy hearts could have misled country and Congress so grossly and so serenely, and then declared, as the public mood began to shift despite all their efforts, that the calculations of the preceding fourteen years had been erroneous: from now on they would be correct, and sorry for the inconvenience.

Led on by a kind of grisly fascination, I decided to make a thorough study of the CIA's annual testimony before Congress, originally presented in secret sessions and later published with certain deletions to protect sources. The first thing I saw when I came to the library for this purpose was a chart of Soviet "growth in per-capita food consumption" since 1965.[2] I could easily imagine a U.S. Senator, or even the President or Secretary of State musing as he examined this chart: "No sources—you bet. They're probably those field agents Colby keeps talking about in his testimony.[3] Amazing men, those CIA spooks. They've even managed to dig out the number of eggs that have been laid in Russia every year since 1965. Must be all those electronic devices—satellites and whatnot."

As for me, I jumped to my feet and rushed down the aisle of the library and back again. A library assistant thought I was ill as I faced her with unseeing eyes. I *was* ill. That CIA chart was based on Soviet propaganda pamphlets which we had laughed at in grade school and then never looked at again (they are available in English at the Soviet bookstore in Washington for 50 cents apiece). According to these pamphlets, Soviet hens lay a certain percentage more eggs each year—let us say, 7.8 per cent—than they laid the year before, but with one biological peculiarity. The annual 7.8 per cent increase in egg laying begins only with the advent to power of the current rulers. Under the previous rulers, it subsequently turns out, the hens of Russia had hardly laid any eggs at all.

It was now clear to me how the CIA had come to the conclusion that the proportion of "Soviet defense spending" might be as low as that of American defense spending. According to Soviet propaganda, it is the laying of eggs and other such annually growing peaceful endeavors, rather than the production of weapons, that fills the Soviet economy to overflowing. Indeed, the Soviet regime could conceal *all* the weapons it produced in the 70's if it chose to, and thereby cause the CIA to conclude that "Soviet defense spending" was close to zero. But Soviet propaganda does not wish to go that far: it wants the United States to know enough about Soviet weapons to be fearful of intervening anywhere outside its own territory, but not enough to begin working for its own survival in earnest.

Does the CIA know what it is doing? I do not wish to join in the currently fashionable game of making a scapegoat of the CIA, but I have to say that the CIA in its knowledge of Russia is on the whole no better than that of other institutions in the West which deal in one way or another with the Soviet regime.

The most obvious key to the knowledge of any foreign country is its language. Everyone has experienced or observed the fact that it is extremely difficult for a foreigner to speak and understand a new language even as well as a six-year-old

[2] *Allocations of Resources in the Soviet Union and China, 1975*, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Priorities and Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, p. 13. All such testimonies and submissions are referred to as CIA estimates, with indication of the year, e.g., CIA estimate, 1975, p. 13.

[3] CIA estimate, 1975, pp. 59-62 (Colby testimony).

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native speaks and understands it. By the time that six-year-old has developed into a reasonably intelligent and versatile person, it is the rare foreigner indeed who can match his mastery of the nuances of his native tongue. By this I mean not just that an expert on a country must know the language of that country, but that such an expert must be as gifted, reverent, subtle, sophisticated, and eager to learn from natives as a student striving after perfect and authentic mastery of a foreign language. Too many Westerners have been too slow in grasping this.

Harrison Salisbury, who for a quarter of a century exercised a kind of monopoly on Russian expertise in the New York *Times,* describes in his Pulitzer-prize-winning book, *American in Russia,* how an "elderly and distinguished" British expert taught himself Russian while shaving in the morning, and then imparted his secret to Mr. Salisbury. The renowned British expert "picked up an old piece of gray cardboard from a candy box," jotted down on it his summary of the basics of the Russian language, and handed it to Mr. Salisbury. " 'Prop that beside your mirror,' " said the expert, " 'and go over it every morning when you shave. In no time you'll have the language down.' "

Not only did Mr. Salisbury "have the language down" in no time at all (so that even thirty years later he still manages to mangle the commonest Russian words he uses occasionally in his books), but he also produced, in pocketbook form (not quite as succinct as a piece of cardboard, but almost) a compendium of what his publishers called the "eternal verities about Russia."[4] The first of these verities was the startling observation that much of Russia's present-day behavior is a conditioned reflex to a 700-year-old catastrophe—the Mongol invasion. This is tantamount to observing that much of the behavior of the English-speaking countries today is a conditioned reflex to the Norman conquest.

Given this general level of competence in the study of other cultures, it is not surprising to find the CIA in 1973 attempting to ascertain the scientific ability of the "Russians" as though these "Russians" (who comprise more than 100 nations, from Jews to Volga Germans) were some newly discovered remote tribe whose scientific ability had to be determined by an intelligence agency. In this connection, the CIA cites the names of four Russian men of science, as familiar to every Russian schoolboy as the names Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Edison are to every American, and manages to get two of them wrong. The world-famous chemist Mendeleyev (who is listed in Webster's Dictionary as the discoverer of the periodic table) becomes Mendelevich, and the 18th-century Enlightenment figure, Lomonosov, becomes Lomonosovskiy.[5] One wonders what an American would think of intelligence experts on the United States who would discover the scientific ability of Americans in 1973 by calling attention to Franklinstein and Edisoner.

Much of this ignorance is spontaneous, rooted in a long-standing unwillingness to understand that Russia is not some exotic primitive tribe but a vast, mortally dangerous, highly complex civilization, more sophisticated, advanced, and rational in some ways than the United States. Much of it, however, is the result of deliberate self-insulation by the government-academic establishment, guarding its own prerogatives, and tending to discriminate against talent or even ordinary knowledge when it comes from outsiders.

For example, there exists in the Soviet Union a secret statistical yearbook which is "produced in 400 copies and delivered through special couriers to selected officials"; the CIA has known about this yearbook at least since 1972 (thanks to recent Soviet émigrés)[6] but it has never said a word about it to Congress, for if it had, the reaction would have been immediate: "If a *genuine* statistical yearbook exists, why have you been stuffing our minds with phony statistics about egg-laying and all that? Get hold of the *genuine* yearbook. All those agents you say you have over there should be able to do it. . . ."

THIS brings us to another of the CIA's secrets. Such is the level of Western intelligence work, that the CIA has obviously been unable to "maintain a human source" within the Soviet infrastructure. In his book, *The Craft of Intelligence,* Allen Dulles mentions Oleg Penkovsky as the only case of such a source being successfully maintained by Western intelligence. However, what actually happened was that Penkovsky, a high-ranking Soviet official, volunteered to work for the West. And all the top Anglo-American craftsmen of intelligence, including Mr. Dulles himself, could think of no better way for Penkovsky to pass on intelligence data than through the wife of the Second Secretary of the British Embassy in Moscow who was, along with several other Embassy residents, an agent of British intelligence.[7] The Anglo-American intelligence experts had apparently decided that if Penkovsky met the Second Secretary of the British Embassy himself, it would be too conspicuous. But if he met the Second Secretary's *wife,* the Soviet secret police would be flummoxed.

Accordingly, the unfortunate Penkovsky met with this "unknown woman" a total of seven times before he desisted in belated horror—for those seven meetings were the same for him as having taken, on the advice of the British-American experts, seven lethal doses of arsenic. Pen-

[4] *Russia,* New York Times Byline Books, 1965.
[5] CIA estimate, 1973, p. 5.
[6] CIA estimate, 1973, p. 92.
[7] *Contact on Gorky Street* by Greville Wynne, Atheneum, 1968, p. 121. See also the proceedings of the Penkovsky trial in Moscow, *Politizdat,* 1963, p. 23 and *passim.*

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kovsky had naturally been detected right from the start, and then patiently watched for more than a year. At the trial (which took place in Moscow shortly before Dulles's book came out), he was sentenced to be shot, but was instead pushed alive into the oven of a crematorium.

Some top CIA officials still regard the "clandestine" acquisition of Khrushchev's "secret speech" of February 1956 as the CIA's only real "espionage coup." Actually, the "secret speech" had been read at meetings to about half of the Soviet adult population, for which purpose the text had been printed in hundreds of thousands of copies. Yet no Western intelligence agent was able to secure a single copy of it or even hear the speech. Finally, a copy of the version specially prepared for foreign consumption was passed to the CIA outside Russia and appeared in the New York *Times* about half a year after Khrushchev delivered the speech.

Let us, therefore, disregard the CIA's references in its congressional testimony to its agents within the Soviet infrastructure, and ask instead whether the CIA maintains any human sources inside Russia at all? Here is an illuminating exchange between Senator Proxmire, chairman of the relevant subcommittee, and a top CIA analyst testifying about Russia:

> CHAIRMAN PROXMIRE. You mentioned in your prepared statement work slowdowns as a result of the food shortages, and also vandalism and general grumbling. Would you elaborate on this somewhat and discuss whether there have been any riots over food?
>
> MR. DIAMOND. These are rumors reported in the Western press. A Paris newspaper correspondent reported that riots were observed by Westerners in Kiev and Rostov. Kiev is the Ukrainian capital and Rostov is a major industrial center in the North Caucasus. These were people who found a very low supply of basic staples as well as livestock products. They allegedly broke windows, or in the case of the free peasant market, ripped off stalls. We have no confirmation of this.[8]

In other words, the CIA does not maintain a single human source in the guise of an ordinary inhabitant or tourist in the major cities of Kiev and Rostov, capable of confirming or denying so obvious an event as a street riot. And Kiev and Rostov, let us recall, are "foreign-show" cities, more or less open to Western observers. What if the event in question had occurred outside the "foreign-show" areas, where no foreigners could have seen it? In that case, judging from the following exchange concerning China among Senator Charles Percy, George Bush, the then director of the CIA (who replaced Colby), and a Mr. Field, of the CIA's Office of Economic Research, no information whatsoever would have been forthcoming. Senator Percy begins by asking the CIA chief if it is true that there is no hunger or malnutrition in continental China since he, Senator Percy, has received reports of a "great deal of malnutrition" in Tibet. Mr. Bush then replies:

> What you have said, sir, comes as a surprise to me. Maybe some of our experts can confirm it. Is anyone prepared to do that?
>
> (No response.)
>
> I didn't travel to some of the autonomous regions, but I did travel a lot in China. We were free to move around, although you never get far off the beaten track. But certainly their own theses [are] that there is a basic level of nutrition for the entire population. Can anyone here help the Senator with that, as to whether there is malnutrition in places in China?
>
> MR. FIELD. No; I have no information on it.[9]

Now as it happens, Miriam London and Ivan D. London, of Brooklyn College in New York, have for years now been interviewing refugees from continental China and publishing their data on hunger there—the very subject about which the CIA has "no information." It appears that the CIA not only cannot penetrate closed societies—it cannot even penetrate Brooklyn College.

The conclusion of this particular piece of testimony, boldly entitled "Absence of Hunger in China," is worth reading:

> SENATOR PERCY. In other words, so far as we know, the claim that they have made that they are meeting the food problems of the country, and our own observations along that line were accurate?
>
> MR. BUSH. Yes.
>
> SENATOR PERCY. And I think they have been absolutely remarkable.[10]

IF THE CIA's claims about human sources of information within the Soviet regime are misleading, so is the impression created by the CIA and the National Security Agency as to the effectiveness of "outside" sources of intelligence data, such as surveillance by space satellite. This miracle tool is said to enable U.S. intelligence to see "even a hare scampering across a field" anywhere in Russia, but the question here is not of the proverbial hare, which may indeed be visible via satellite, but whether U.S. intelligence can, by this means, see anything the Soviet regime does not want it to see. That the silo of a Soviet fixed-site ICBM can be seen by space-satellite observation, for example, is still cited as a triumph. But what if a dummy structure were built over the site to camouflage a new ICBM? In Hamburg, for instance, during World War II, the inner basin of the Alster, measuring roughly

8 CIA estimate, 1976, p. 36.
9 CIA estimate, 1976, p. 39.
10 *Ibid.*

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500 by 450 yards, was covered up in such a way that Allied aircraft took it for terrain—and this was over thirty years ago. Since then, techniques of camouflage have advanced immeasurably, so that by the 60's methods and materials had been developed for camouflage throughout the electromagnetic spectrum from the ultraviolet to radar regions.

It is usually forgotten that it is much easier for a closed society to conceal something than for an outside observer to find it. Thus, it was reported by Jack Anderson some time ago (on the basis of a sensational leak, of course) that the National Security Agency had once monitored the "radiotelephone conversations of the Kremlin leaders." If this is so, the NSA could only have heard such highly secret communications as "Let's have jellied sturgeon for dinner today," for even twenty years ago every Soviet official of any importance had two telephones on his desk: one for ordinary calls and the other an interception-proof scrambler for secret messages. Properly coded messages cannot be deciphered unless the decipherer has agents at the enemy cryptographic center (as the Soviet regime had them in the NSA). Even if the NSA did once intercept a Soviet coded message, it is unlikely that they managed to decipher it. (Not to mention the fact that top-secret Soviet information may not be transmitted, except in emergency, but must be delivered by special courier.)

To take a specific example: could the Soviet regime conceal the construction of an aircraft carrier of the Kuril class which measures 925 by 200 feet? The question is not as silly as it sounds, judging by testimony given before Congress on July 21, 1975. On that date, General Daniel Graham, the then director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, which coordinates the intelligence operations of the Defense Department and the Armed Services, was asked by Chairman Proxmire whether the DIA had "any notion of how many additional units, how many additional aircraft carriers" the Soviet regime had under construction.[11] A DIA analyst cited a figure (deleted in the testimony) but went on to qualify the figure as "just a speculation on our part." To put it bluntly, then, the U.S. intelligence community cannot detect aircraft carriers under construction in Russia.

In the course of his testimony, General Graham made an even more startling admission to the Congress:

> As a matter of fact, one of the fundamental surprises to the whole intelligence community in the 16 years that I have been in the business is the strong effort the Soviets have made to get themselves a broad ocean navy.[12]

It should be clear from admissions like these, that "agreements" such as those negotiated in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks are *not* verifiable. Naturally, for the Soviet regime these "agreements" exist only on paper, and are regarded simply as a way to limit enemy strategic arms, at least for a while. But it is amazing that the West has already lost a decade on such crude self-deceptions—partly owing to the false impression created by U.S. intelligence as to its ability to verify Soviet compliance.

All in all, these yearly appearances of U.S. intelligence spokesmen before the Congress can best be described as annual attempts at overcoming the desperately resistive common sense of the Senators, and above all, that of Senator Proxmire, who chaired the hearings. Though uninformed by the CIA about the existence of real, as opposed to fake, Soviet statistics, the Senator is nevertheless made uneasy again and again by the CIA's use of Soviet propaganda:

> Chairman Proxmire. Do they not tend to exaggerate their growth, exaggerate their reserves, their progress and so forth, so that statistical material is likely to show larger rather than smaller gains than the actual case? . . . Are you able to take the published sources . . . and reconstruct a fairly consistent picture, [a] coherent picture of their whole economy so that it does square out roughly at least?[13]

The CIA answers confidently in the affirmative—take, for example, the published Soviet figures on steel production:

> [If] they claim to have produced 125 million tons of steel, the claim is reasonably consistent with the end use of that metal in the economy. Things roughly check out in the context.[14]

But the CIA knows nothing about the "end use of that metal" in the Soviet economy except what it has learned from Soviet propaganda. For example, the Soviet regime has been building an unprecedented number of airborne amphibious "personnel-carrying combat vehicles" (BMP's). What if the scale of this activity is such that it consumes as much steel as U.S. car production does? It is easy enough for Soviet propaganda to conceal the amounts of steel going into BMP's by simply juggling the other "statistics." Surely the CIA, which cannot confirm even street riots in the "foreign-show" cities of Russia, does not maintain field agents at each construction site to monitor how much steel, if any, is *really* put into Soviet homes or roads? "Things check out in the context," says the intelligence expert, and indeed they do—in the context of Soviet propaganda.

The example of the Soviet steel output is especially interesting, because it happens to be one of those rare cases when the real figure and the propaganda figure have so far coincided, though

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11 CIA estimate, 1975, p. 98.
12 CIA estimate, 1975, p. 99.
13 CIA estimate, 1974, p. 12.
14 *Ibid.*

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for reasons too specialized to go into here. (After all, even a dummy clock shows the correct time once every 12 hours.) In any case, the question which naturally occurs to Senator Proxmire is: "What are they doing with all that steel?"

It is a very good question, especially when one bears in mind that as of 1975, the Soviet production of steel (141 million tons) *surpassed* the steel output of the United States by 32 million tons. (After the war, it will be recalled, West Germany was not allowed to produce more than 11.1 million tons of steel "for reasons of peace and security.") When one bears in mind further that the Soviet imports of steel "continued to be high," according to the CIA 1976 estimate and that a country like Japan produces eleven times as many cars per capita as the Soviet regime, one becomes really curious. What *is* the Soviet regime doing with all that steel?

Contemplating the curve of steel production in other major countries, the Senator notices that the Soviet steel output, by contrast, is a continuous straight upward line: 65 million tons in 1960, 116 million tons in 1970, 141 million tons in 1975:

> CHAIRMAN PROXMIRE. It is such a straight line, is that reliable? Notice the fluctuations in the other lines. Why is their production so uninterruptably straight with no deviations to speak of?[15]

Anyone familiar with the basics of the Soviet economy would answer this question by pointing out that anything indispensable for the manufacture of Soviet weapons, such as steel production, really *does* go up in a straight line, but anything not strictly necessary for the manufacture of weapons, such as the laying of eggs, may not actually have moved up since 1914 at all, but is made to *seem* as though it did.

Instead, Mr. Colby gives the following two-word explanation: "Chiefly planning."[16]

Yet Senator Proxmire's common sense will not be squelched quite so easily:

> Chairman PROXMIRE. Let me interrupt again to say that is what puzzled me about your statistics. One of the first questions I asked, I wondered what in the dickens that they are doing with all that steel. A lot of it is there, but even there it seems to me they do not have automobiles like we do. They do not have the highway system we have. They do not have the housing construction or anything of that kind.
>
> If they are producing more steel, how can they use it?[17]

The CIA's experts tackle the still struggling Senator from all sides:

> MR. NOREN. They have such an investment program—
>
> CHAIRMAN PROXMIRE. More than ours in machine tools, for instance?
>
> MR. NOREN. In terms of absolute size their fixed investment approaches our[s] now.
>
> CHAIRMAN PROXMIRE. Thank you.
>
> MR. BURTON. They are also very inefficient users of steel. Their machines are very heavy compared to ours.
>
> CHAIRMAN PROXMIRE. The military weapons systems are usually heavy too.
>
> MR. BURTON. Yes.
>
> MR. PROCTOR. One remembers Khrushchev's cursing of the manufacturers as metal-eaters. He had a campaign to reduce the waste of steel, especially in the manufacture of both military and civilian hardware.
>
> CHAIRMAN PROXMIRE. Thank you.[18]

In other words, having produced, as of 1975, 32 million tons more steel than the United States did, and having also kept steel imports high, and having furthermore invested only small amounts of steel in cars, homes, or highways, the Soviet regime has allegedly been using all that extra steel just to make their machines and weapons heavier than those of the U.S.! Let us consider the following: in 1976 the Soviet T-72 tank, weighing 36 tons, was declared by the American military to be "faster, more powerful, and more heavily armed than anything in the U.S. arsenal"; but its U.S. rival, the XM-1, with a smaller main gun and a worse automatic loader, which was expected to come off the assembly line in 1979, was to weigh—53 tons! Let us suppose that some extra steel was wasted on the T-72. But how great is the waste? Is it 1 per cent, 2 per cent, 5 per cent? *And where does the rest of the steel go?*

EVEN more surprising than the CIA's credulity in the matter of impeccably peaceful Soviet "statistics" is its conformity down through the years to prevailing ideological winds.

In 1961, the CIA, like every other government agency and just about everyone else in a position of influence, was still giving the darkest possible interpretation to everything Soviet. Thus, a random sample from my files for that year includes a draft of the Soviet Communist party program of 1961, published in New York. This piece of empty pedantry, made up mainly of forty-year-old clichés, appeared, with a preface by Harrison Salisbury, under the title *Khrushchev's "Mein Kampf,"* and with the subtitle "Authentic Soviet Blueprint for World Conquest." And the *Time* magazine review of the work carried the warning: "No chapter of Hitler's *Mein Kampf* ever spelled out a dictator's goal more clearly."

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15 CIA estimate, 1975, pp. 11, 12. All tons are metric; 1 metric ton = 1.1 "regular" tons.

16 *Ibid.*

17 CIA estimate, 1975, pp. 49, 50.

18 *Ibid.*

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In the 70's, on the other hand, when the process of Soviet world conquest has become a visible global reality, both the CIA and the DIA seem desperately bent on proving, in the teeth of evidence available to any newspaper reader, that Soviet expansionism simply does not and cannot exist, not even as one among many other hypothetical motives for Soviet behavior.

Like any other newspaper reader, Senator Proxmire is puzzled by the way the Soviet rulers have been acting during the last decade. Even granting the absurd revisionist view that the Soviet arms build-up after World War II was simply a response to an American build-up, the fact is that by 1974 the United States had given up its end of the arms race. The U.S. defense budget had decreased from 10.5 per cent of the GNP in 1955 to 5.8 in 1974; American biological weapons had been scrapped, and the chemical warfare program virtually abandoned (unilaterally); all civil defense had long been discontinued (unilaterally), along with anti-ballistic-missile defense; the treasures of American (and hence German and Japanese) technology had been thrown open for the benefit of the Soviet war-economy; the covert operations of the CIA had been cut drastically; and finally, the U.S. army—except for doctors—had become all-volunteer, which meant that while the Soviet regime would continue to produce a new army of 2 to 3 million men every two years in addition to its standing army of 4.4 million, the United States would have the same 2-million-man army all the time.

Why, then, in the face of all this—Senator Proxmire naturally enough wanted to know—has the Soviet global build-up been continuing throughout the 70's just as before, if not even more intensely, and why, too, have the Soviet rulers chosen to expand at the very moment the U.S. has chosen to withdraw all over the globe?

A remarkably vivid, if altogether fantastic answer to this question was offered by General Wilson, the director of the DIA, to Senator Proxmire's subcommittee:

> I am sure you realize that the great experience for the Soviets is the great Fatherland War, as they call it. If I may indulge in hyperbole, for a moment, the Soviet citizen gets up every morning, and he has a wide vivisectional scar from his chin to his crotch, and he scratches it until it hurts. That is World War II. Then he goes off to work, and he lives with that hurt all day, with that memory of some 22 million Soviet dead, and the German armies on the Volga and down into the Caucasus, something which he hears over his radio, sees on his television and read[s] in his newspapers every day. It is ground into his consciousness.
>
> REPRESENTATIVE BROWN of Ohio. Still?
>
> GENERAL WILSON. Still, absolutely. And this psychological phenomenon, this syndrome, simply has an almost massive influence on the thinking of the average Russian citizen, and is reflected in their leadership, in what their leadership says to one another, what they write about in their military periodicals, and so on. It is very definitely a driving force in the Soviet consciousness.[19]

Unfortunately, no Senator went on record to ask General Wilson how he knows what the "Soviet citizen" feels as he "gets up every morning" or "goes off to work" or lives "all day," given the fact that in his capacity as American defense attaché, the only "Soviet citizens" who would talk with him were carefully rehearsed Soviet agents, or generals, admirals, and the like, with all conversations videotaped and subsequently analyzed by the Soviet secret police. Indeed, one cannot but wonder whether General Wilson has even actually seen, if only through a pair of binoculars from the Embassy window, a single "Soviet citizen" in his natural habitat. How then does he presume to know what takes place in the consciousness of the "average Russian citizen" or what does or does not influence his thinking? And last but not least, how in the world does General Wilson know what the Soviet "leadership says to one another"?

AMAZINGLY enough, Mr. Colby, of the CIA, went on to echo the general's fantasy, perhaps because both the DIA and the CIA had been reading the same sources (could it have been the "eternal verities" of Harrison Salisbury's *Russia*?):

> The Soviets, of course, have a national historical fixation on the problem of invasion. They have been invaded and put in very dangerous situations at least twice in the last couple of centuries.[20]

So obsessive is this Soviet defense fixation, according to Mr. Colby, that the Soviet armed forces have "something like 16,000 tanks" against the 6,000 tanks maintained by NATO. In other words, the more the democracies are outnumbered in offensive weapons by the Soviets, the better it proves the Soviet defense fixation, according to Mr. Colby. Senator Proxmire tries to keep his balance watching Mr. Colby's double somersault, but to no avail:

> MR. COLBY. They are concerned about it. I remember it as something like 16,000 tanks in their armament in the NATO guidelines area as against about 6,000 on our side.
>
> CHAIRMAN PROXMIRE. That is exactly my point. It is hard to understand why they should be so concerned.
>
> MR. COLBY. Because they went through World War II.[21]

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19 CIA estimate, 1976, p. 106.

20 CIA estimate, 1975, p. 34.

21 *Ibid.* Colby does not mention another 25,000 tanks (by the most optimistic Western estimates) in the Soviet reserve close by.

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But why has the Soviet regime been building up its navy, which now has twice as many ships as the United States—in particular twice as many nuclear-missile submarines, and three times as many attack submarines? How can the defense of Russia and Eastern Europe, the world's largest landlocked territory, benefit from Soviet naval dominance of the sea lanes to Africa, the Middle East, or Cuba? The United States and Western Europe are dependent on the natural resources of Africa and the Middle East, but the Soviet regime is not—it has all the major strategic resources it requires on the vast territory it already controls. Why then would the Soviet rulers need Africa or the Middle East for defensive purposes?

General Wilson explains all, drawing on his experiences as defense attaché in Moscow:

> The Soviet navy officers say to me with some pride: "Wilson, we have the capability to project our forces to any point in the globe that we wish."[22]

One might suppose, at least in theory, that the Soviet capability to project its forces to "any point in the globe" might convey, perhaps, a hint of danger, but no—General Wilson is quick to explain:

> This is sort of braggadocio, national pride, but this also is the Russian inferiority complex expressing itself.[23]

If one did not know that General Wilson is the head of the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, one might imagine, on the basis of his testimony, that the general is some jovial, carefree, voluble Soviet-American Friendship Club chairman, unencumbered by any knowledge of the post-1917 regime in Russia, but full of good cheer, camaraderie, and the expectation of a jolly future. Global expansion? Soviet conquest? American defense? General Wilson seems unable even to acknowledge the existence of such words or concepts where the "Russians" are concerned (good guys, those Soviet generals, especially after a couple of drinks). Why not allow them to overcome their inferiority complex, indulge their braggadocio, satisfy their national pride?

> When I ask the Soviets jestingly, what were their great naval battles in World War II, it is an embarrassing question to them. Following World War II, I think they set about [it as] a matter of national pride—there is a sense of national inferiority on the part of the Russians that drive[s] them to a lot of things—to be a leading, if not the leading, world naval power.[24]

THERE is a theory within Soviet ruling circles that the CIA which makes public appearances before Congress and the like is not actually the real CIA at all but a clever fake, designed to mislead the Soviet regime and the American public. Somewhere, totally concealed, there must be a *real* CIA, it is thought, for who could believe on the basis of such goings-on that this CIA is the real thing? When I offered an expanded version of the present study to a New York publisher not long ago, I was told, somewhat along the same lines, that though my evidence is "scandalous," "public hearings and statements do not necessarily represent the true thoughts of our leaders and Congressmen—just as they don't represent those in Russia." My answer is that American society *cannot* be equated with the totalitarian war-machine of Russia, and even if it is imagined that there exists a fake CIA and a real CIA, such double arrangements, perfectly natural and effective in the Soviet regime, would, in the context of American society, lead to nothing but a disastrous super-Watergate. In American society there can be only one CIA, as there can be only one Congress. And if this one and only CIA fails to become sophisticated in its understanding of closed societies, the United States will be the victim, along with the entire nontotalitarian world.

22 CIA estimate, 1976, p. 108.
23 *Ibid.*
24 CIA estimate, 1976, p. 107.

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Son of "Gen Ed"

Kenneth S. Lynn

THE recent decision of the Harvard Faculty of Arts and Sciences to replace its General Education courses with a more structured core curriculum is the first significant result of a remarkable letter on undergraduate education that the dean of the faculty, Henry Rosovsky, sent to his colleagues in October 1974. In that letter, a high official of the nation's most prestigious university finally spoke with reasonably complete candor about the "inadequacies" of the undergraduate program at Harvard, and in a burst of feeling called upon the faculty not only to redefine its "collegiate purpose," but to seek through that effort "to recapture the spirit of its common enterprise."

Looking back across thirty years, Rosovsky traced the stupendous transformation of postwar Harvard. Between 1945 and 1974, the number of departments and degree-granting committees in arts and sciences had risen by almost a third. Since 1952, the size of the faculty had more than doubled; the graduate student population had jumped 45 per cent; and the combined Harvard-Radcliffe undergraduate body had grown 14 per cent. The most startling statistic of all, however, was that the proportion of courses in which undergraduates were enrolled had fallen 28 per cent. Membership in the faculty had soared from 300 (full-time equivalents) to 608 in twenty-two years, but the indication was that contact between undergraduates and professors had not increased proportionately.

For as the size of the faculty had risen, so had a faculty attitude that teaching undergraduates was not a worthwhile way to spend one's academic time. In the go-go years of Harvard growth, many professors had come to regard themselves as primarily if not exclusively concerned with training graduate students, while others had walled themselves off from the life of the college in castles of culture, wherein they pursued their esoteric interests. As a former chairman of a large department and now as dean, wrote Rosovsky, he knew "only too well" about this situation. More difficult for him to accept was the persistent charge by critics of postwar Harvard that even those professors who proclaimed their devotion to undergraduate teaching were not in fact as committed to it as they or their predecessors had been twenty-five years earlier. Specifically, these critics questioned whether there had not been an absolute decline in the number of hours per week professors spent in the classroom; in the amount of work demanded of students; and in the frequency with which quizzes were administered and papers assigned. Yet instead of emphasizing the difficulty of obtaining hard answers to such hard questions, Rosovsky firmly grasped the nettle. "We are attempting to obtain quantitative data on these points," he announced.

Prior to Rosovsky's letter, celebrants of Harvard *à go-go* had been wont to argue that a bigger university was better for everyone, including students in the college. One of their favorite talking points was that a number of undergraduate programs, including tutorial instruction and General Education, had significantly expanded in the postwar period. Rosovsky bluntly pointed out, however, that

> the instructional needs created by this development were largely met by teaching fellows. In 1952, the ratio of teaching fellow full-time equivalents to junior faculty was 59 per cent; by 1974 the ratio climbed to 96 per cent. In recent years, TF's have taken over much introductory course instruction in areas such as mathematics and languages; they commonly staff the sections of General Education and middle-group courses; they play an overwhelming role in the tutorial program. . . . Over the years, teaching fellowships have come to be viewed in some departments primarily as a form of financial aid to graduate students; there are not always systematic efforts to train and develop students as teachers, nor is there reassuring evidence that teaching interest or ability weighs heavily in TF appointments. Undergraduates may understandably assert that the benefits of expanded programs are not worth the costs.

That the tutorial program now depended so heavily on teaching fellows was particularly disturbing to Rosovsky. In the literature distributed to pro-

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spective Harvard undergraduates, the dean reminded his faculty, tutorial was described as "the intellectual acme of the curriculum, as an important means of contact with professors, and as a link with departments that 'allows students and faculty members to become acquainted as friends and fellow scholars.'" Moreover, students who came to Harvard often spent as much as 25 per cent of their time in tutorials after their freshman year. The faculty's awareness of the latter fact had prompted it to vote in 1961 that "As a target, at least 30 per cent of the tutoring in each department shall be done by officers of faculty rank, and not more than 30 per cent . . . by teaching fellows." In quoting this language back to the faculty, Rosovsky in effect told those departments which allowed their tutorial programs to be largely run by graduate students that they were not only cheating the undergraduates, but were violating the spirit of a professorial agreement.

In the months following the issuance of his letter, Rosovsky set up seven committees—which in a regrettable lapse into the language of Admiral Nimitz he called "task forces"—to study various aspects of the Harvard College program. The task force on the core curriculum, under the leadership of Professor James Q. Wilson, was asked to develop recommendations for a new set of "common denominator" courses to replace the General Education offerings in the natural sciences, the social sciences, and the humanities which were supposed to be supplying Harvard students with a basis for intellectual discourse with one another but which patently were not. The decision by Rosovsky and President Derek C. Bok to dismantle "Gen Ed," if the faculty would let them, was long overdue, because their predecessors had not wanted to face the fact that the program had failed. Unfortunately, Rosovsky and Bok seem not to have explored the question of why "Gen Ed" has been so much more successful at Columbia and Chicago than at Harvard, for I believe that if they had, they either would have given the core committee far more ambitious instructions about a replacement, or commissioned it only as a demolition team.

GENERAL Education in the modern American university began in 1919 with the introduction of a course in Contemporary Civilization at Columbia College. This innovation was no mere curricular reform, but a fundamental act of institutional reassertion. It represented an effort on the part of a group of professors and deans who believed in the liberal-arts ideal to provide the college with a secure identity as an institution devoted to the educational needs of undergraduates. Unlike the sacrosanct undergraduate colleges at Harvard, Yale, and Princeton, the integrity of Columbia College had been threatened for years by extremely powerful administrators, who in their enthusiasm for Germanic professional scholarship had endeavored to reduce the college to an appendage of graduate training. The political scientist John W. Burgess, architect of Columbia's first graduate school and close adviser of the university's president, Frederick Barnard, derided the college almost from the moment of his arrival on Morningside Heights in 1876. It was nothing but "a school for teaching Latin, Greek, and mathematics and a little metaphysics and a very little natural science." What was needed was a *Gymnasium*-style curriculum that would provide students with the research skills they would need in graduate school. Nicholas Murray Butler, who became president of the university in 1902, made no secret of his belief that four years was far too long a time for students to remain in college. By 1905, he was able to announce the "Columbia plan," which enabled students to go on to one of the university's professional schools after only two years of undergraduate work. Having delivered this smashing blow, Butler looked forward to the withering away of Columbia College, as traditionally conceived.

Consequently, when Contemporary Civilization was introduced after World War I, the course carried with it the hopes of everyone at Columbia who wished to see the liberal-arts principle triumph in the teeth of Butler's hostility. For a required freshman course dealing with the issues of citizenship in a democratic society obviously was intended to have a general rather than a narrowly pre-professional appeal. In deciding to introduce such a course, the professors in charge were swayed by three considerations, apart from their overriding desire to vindicate the collegiate ideal. They believed first of all that the involvement of the United States in World War I had produced a new self-consciousness about the meaning of American life which needed to be discussed in the classroom. They also were concerned about the fragmentation of knowledge and belief in the modern world; *The Education of Henry Adams,* posthumously published in 1918, was only the latest testament to the appalling complexity of 20th-century culture. In the midst of multiplicity, it made sense to give Columbia freshmen a common intellectual experience. Finally, the designers of Contemporary Civilization were motivated by a more parochial concern. The Columbia student body had traditionally been dominated by prep-school graduates, most of whom were the scions of "Old New York" families. But with the abolition of the Latin entrance requirement in 1916, students from the public high schools in the city, where Latin tended to be taught badly if at all, began to trek northward to Morningside Heights in rapidly growing numbers. By the end of the teens Columbia was culturally split to a greater degree than any other Ivy League school. The requirement that all freshmen take Contemporary Civilization was thus

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an attempt to bring unity to a divided campus.

In the judgment of Professor Justus Buchler, "the year 1919 can be justly regarded as marking the actual birth of the new Columbia College," and the enormous success of Contemporary Civilization among Columbia's polyglot students was the major academic event of that landmark year. The course met five—later four—times a week in groups of no more than twenty-five. There was no flak from jealous departments, and no problem about persuading distinguished professors to teach the sections; the entire faculty understood that "CC" not only stood for a course, but for a college.

"CC" was lengthened into a two-year sequence in 1929, with the first year devoted to intellectual and institutional developments in Western society and the second to social and economic problems of the 20th century. A required freshman course on great works of literature and philosophy was introduced in 1937, and a required sophomore course on music and the fine arts was attached to it a decade later. As Professor Daniel Bell has remarked, there has been a strong inbreeding of Columbia College graduates in the humanities faculty ever since the 1920's; having been raised on "CC," these men were determined to make the new offerings a worthy complement to the old, and they succeeded. A science requirement was also added in 1934. Yet even though the science program has attracted such notable teachers as the Nobel laureate Polykarp Kusch, it has been the humanities and "CC" sequences which have given General Education at Columbia its enduring mystique. Despite a decline in the quality of the program in recent years, Columbia students continue to be instructed in a common body of knowledge, to their incalculable benefit. When Lionel Trilling would say to a class of juniors and seniors, "You of course have read Montaigne," he knew that they had, no matter whether they were physics majors or English majors. Moreoever, they had read Montaigne and discussed him in a small class that met four times a week.

MANY factors, as I have tried to indicate, are responsible for this academic success story, but the most important is the combination of two that we find at its very beginning: extraordinary pressure from the president of the university, resulting in the faculty's realization that the fate of the college was linked to the fate of General Education. What makes this statement doubly significant is that it also applies to the University of Chicago.

Whatever Robert Maynard Hutchins wanted, he was determined to get, and what he wanted most fervently was General Education. Of all the American university leaders of this century, Hutchins is the only one who ranks in intellectual boldness, strength of will, and guileful charm with the three greatest university builders of the late 19th century: Charles William Eliot of Harvard, Daniel Coit Gilman of Johns Hopkins, and William Rainey Harper of Chicago. The most impressive of the builders was Eliot. Gilman and Harper brilliantly brought new universities into being, but Eliot faced the tougher task of reconstituting a renowned institution. Using the free-elective system —the very antithesis of General Education—as a Schumpeterian instrument of creative destruction, he modernized the curriculum, professionalized the faculty, and transformed Harvard College into Harvard University. Although the two men could not have been more opposed philosophically, Hutchins's administrative record is nevertheless reminiscent of Eliot's, in the sense that he, too, had to impose his vision on an entrenched faculty.

In his inaugural address in 1929, Hutchins said he was aware that influential members of the faculty had called for an end to undergraduate work at Chicago, or at least to the first two years of it, but that he himself had no interest in such notions. Only one out of five American college students went on to graduate study. For the other four, college was the final educational experience of their lives. The most imperative task facing Chicago, and indeed all institutions of higher learning in America, was how to improve that experience. The question was difficult, and it turned on the even more difficult question of the relation of the "first two years of college to the high school on the one hand, and to the senior college on the other." In that sentence Hutchins gave his faculty its first glimpse of the radical nature of his thinking. The American high school was paralyzed with confusion, in his opinion, unable to make up its mind whether it was preparing students for life or for college. The college of liberal arts was equally befuddled. As Hutchins would write in his acerb little book, *The Higher Learning in America* (1936):

> The college of liberal arts is partly high school, partly university, partly general, partly special. Frequently it looks like a teacher-training institution. Frequently it looks like nothing at all. The degree it offers seems to certify that the student has passed an uneventful period without violating any local, state, or federal law, and that he has a fair, if temporary, recollection of what his teachers have said to him.

The first step in bringing order out of chaos was to combine the last two years of high school and the first two years of college into a four-year B.A.-granting institution totally devoted to General Education.

It took Hutchins eight years to gain a partial victory over his opponents. A two-year sequence in General Education was established in the meantime, but not until 1937 did the university accept the basic principle of a four-year sequence. Five more years passed before the identity of the Col-

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lege of the University of Chicago finally became coextensive with General Education. Thereafter, the "ideal" student entered after his sophomore year in high school and embarked upon a uniform curriculum of fourteen year-long courses, spread over four years, in the three basic areas of learning. There were no electives and no majors. Increasingly the courses were taught by an autonomous college faculty, specially recruited for the purpose. For Hutchins scorned the idea that the existing cadre of Chicago professors possessed the desire, or in some cases the ability, to synthesize materials that ranged from Aristotle to Einstein, or to classify the controlling principles of entire disciplines. Hutchins had respect for research-minded professors, but he also shared Ortega y Gasset's low opinion of the "peculiar brutality and aggressive stupidity with which a man comports himself when he knows a great deal about one thing and is totally ignorant of the rest." Autonomy also had the political advantage of allowing the college to make appointments to its teaching staff, including permanent appointments, without having to reckon with the wishes of the university's departments and divisions.

Hutchins's risk-taking plan immediately sank into difficulty. After all, 1942 was a year of global conflict which respected no university's plans. In time, other difficulties arose. Many universities refused to recognize the Chicago B.A., and required holders of it to do more undergraduate work before admitting them to their graduate schools. Following World War II, Chicago was deluged with veterans who had high-school diplomas and now wanted four years of college. The number of high-school sophomores interested in immediately going on to college remained disappointingly small. After Hutchins stepped down in 1950, the college announced that its four-year program was primarily intended for high-school graduates. Even this modification proved insufficient, however. No longer was only one out of five college students opting to go to graduate school; at Chicago in the 1950's, nearly four out of five made that decision. The college therefore trimmed the length of its "Gen Ed" sequences to three years, in order to permit students to get started on the specializations they intended to pursue in graduate school. ("My successors," Hutchins is reputed to have said, "do not have the courage of my convictions.")

Yet in spite of all vicissitudes, the college that was launched in the darkness of 1942 illuminated the possibilities of General Education in a way that no other large university ever has. Both in its four-year and three-year incarnations, the Chicago program demonstrated that it was possible to offer broad learning in depth. Thanks, too, to Hutchins's identification of the college with the teaching of General Education, the commitment of the faculty to the curriculum was unquestionable. Many courses met four times a week and were divided equally between lectures to large audiences and small discussion groups. Staff members in charge of a particular course took turns lecturing, but all were regular leaders of the small groups. As in the great days at Columbia, General Education was labor-intensive work for officers of the faculty. Daniel Bell, who taught at Chicago in the 1950's, has said that the extraordinarily high-caliber lectures by staff members were "given more to impress each other in the barnyard competition"; nevertheless, these strutting professors were also willing to teach sections, because they knew that in doing so they defined the basic meaning of the institution they worked for.

In the 1960's, the Chicago program fell on hard times, comparatively speaking. The brilliance of the college's faculty declined, as its most gifted minds were attracted by offers from elsewhere that involved graduate teaching and research. And at the recommendation of Chancellor Levi, the number of required core courses was further reduced. It is hard to destroy a great tradition, however, and the General Education curriculum continues to be conscientiously taught at a college which once taught nothing else.

One of the authors of the Harvard report on *General Education in a Free Society* (1945), familiarly known as the Redbook, once described it in my presence as "a B-plus job." He always was an easy grader. In characterizing contemporary America as "a centrifugal culture in extreme need of unifying forces," the Redbook authors merely echoed the ideas and appropriated the imagery of Henry Adams's *Education*. Their judgment that the American high school, insofar as it is preparatory, "prepares not for college, but for life," was a variation on Hutchins's *Higher Learning* without the wit. That our involvement in a major world war necessitated a new investigation by educators into the meaning of American democracy was the same belief that had inspired the creation of Contemporary Civilization at Columbia. The specific proposal that every Harvard and Radcliffe student take a social-science course in "Western Thought and Institutions," a humanities course in "Great Texts in Literature," and one of two courses in the physical and biological sciences was not only based upon the common-core concept of the Columbia and Chicago programs, but recommended specific courses that strikingly resembled listings in the Columbia and Chicago catalogues.

The postwar Harvard faculty shared the cultural concerns expressed in the Redbook. The proponents of General Education, however, did not benefit from anything like the sense of institutional crisis that had attended the debut of "CC" at Columbia and the establishment of the new College of General Education at Chicago. The

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Harvard faculty never came to feel that the Redbook proposals were of fundamental importance to the future of Harvard College. The watered-down legislation that was approved in 1949 reflected this fact.

By a decisive margin, the faculty voted down the Redbook recommendation of a prescribed curriculum and provided instead for a variety of courses in each of the three major areas of knowledge. While this decision utterly destroyed the rationale of a shared intellectual experience for the students, it made sense to a faculty that saw no compelling reason not to let professors stage their own shows as usual. The faculty also manifested very little enthusiasm for the idea that professors should teach "Gen Ed" in sections, even though a report out of Columbia, entitled *A College Program in Action* (1946), had recently affirmed that

> the test of experience in teaching . . . [General Education] courses at Columbia College strengthens our belief that they are not the place for the display of personality in the form of lectures to student audiences large enough to fill a theater. For many years we have given in Columbia College no required courses of the pontifical type, in part because the students know the defects of the type, but principally because the man-to-man effectiveness of . . . [an instructor] with a small group—usually twenty or twenty-five—has had much to do with active undergraduate interest in the introductory work, and with the easy and steady improvement of the courses themselves.

The lack of Harvard interest in the information that professors at Columbia and Chicago had found it advisable to devote four hours a week to teaching "Gen Ed" courses, rather than the standard two or three, was even more profound. Finally, the faculty saw fit to endorse the Redbook proposal that "Gen Ed" offer a smorgasbord of independent "upper-level" courses, despite the fact that experience at Columbia, and especially at Chicago, had demonstrated that coordinated sequences of learning from year to year gave students a sense of coherent forward movement. "It is not the mere addition to our knowledge that is the illumination," Cardinal Newman observed in *The Idea of a University*, "but the locomotion, the movement onwards, of that mental center, to which both what we know, and what we are learning, the accumulating mass of our requirements gravitates."

IN SUM, the faculty placed its faith not in a philosophically thought-out, pedagogically meticulous program, but in a congeries of courses to be taught for the most part in the usual manner. The distinction of "Gen Ed" at Harvard, the faculty kept telling itself, was that so many of its great men had consented to teach in it. That this faith in great men was actually a confession of how weak "Gen Ed" was could have been ascertained from a superbly sardonic passage in Hutchins's *Higher Learning*, but as in all its deliberations on general education, the Harvard faculty was indifferent to the advice of outsiders, even when it came from the outstanding university president of the day. "The great-man theory of education," Hutchins wrote,

> is a variant of the nauseating anecdote about Mark Hopkins on one end of the log and the student on the other. Under any conditions that are likely to exist in this country the log is too long and there are too many people sitting on both ends of it to make the anecdote apposite. Of course we should try to get great men into education, and each president should try to get as many of them as he can for his own faculty. But he can never hope to get very many, even if he knows one when he sees one. If a president succeeds in finding a few great men, he cannot hope to make them useful in an organization that ties them hand and foot and in a course of study that is going off in all directions at the same time and particularly in those opposite to the ones in which the great men are going. The fact is that the great-man theory is an excuse, an alibi, a vacuous reply to the charge that we have no intelligent program for the higher learning. It amounts to saying that we do not need one; we could give you one if we wanted to. But if you will only accept the great-man theory you will spare us the trouble of thinking.

Perry Miller, I. A. Richards, and other great men taught for a time in "Gen Ed," and the courses they offered were memorable. But in the long run these luminaries felt confined by a course of study that was not going in their direction, or indeed in any direction at all, and they dropped out. The appeal that "Gen Ed" retained after their departure was mainly supplied by a group of charismatic lecturers like Samuel H. Beer and John Finley, whose courses on "Western Thought and Institutions" and "The Epic" gave the undergraduates who took them the same sort of grand perspective that had once been supplied by the legendary History 1, in which Roger B. Merriman—and later Michael Karpovitch—had chronicled the history of Western Europe from the fall of Rome to the present. Yet as good as these courses were, they were no better than scores of others that were offered by departments. Why should undergraduates be forced to pick from the "Gen Ed" list, especially when the list was so uneven in quality? Departments thought this was a very good question and began to chip away at "Gen Ed's" power, while students in their boredom became extraordinarily adept at thinking up reasons for noncompliance with its regulations.

But perhaps the most telling sign of the experiment's failure to win the respect of the Harvard community was the adoption in the 1950's of a rule exempting students who entered Harvard

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with sophomore standing from two of the three elementary "Gen Ed" courses. A faculty committee pointed out that inasmuch as no effective changes were made in the rules pertaining to the requirements these students faced in their majors, "this disparity would seem to suggest that General Education was something that, after a certain minimum achievement, could be dispensed with. . . ." By the time it was ten years old, "Gen Ed" was being attacked as hidebound, restrictive, and insufficiently serious.

What was insufficiently serious in the 1950's and early 1960's occasionally dipped into farce in the late 1960's and afterward. Stung by the accusations of its critics, "Gen Ed" let all sorts of "innovative" courses bloom. "The Scandinavian Cinema." "Classical Music of India, Pakistan, and Bangla Desh." "The American City in the 70's—Cambridge." With few exceptions, such courses were academic boutiques, into which trendy shoppers were enticed to browse. If high grades for little work are an educational bargain, the goods on display were a marvelous buy.

With the issuance of Dean Rosovsky's letter to the faculty in 1974, the Harvard administration at last took up the task of overhauling the undergraduate curriculum. Yet Bok and Rosovsky did not conceive of the job as requiring that they themselves propose a whole new conception of collegiate education, in the grand manner of President Eliot and Chancellor Hutchins. Rather, they thought in terms of patchwork reforms, of which the first would deal with the problem of a replacement for General Education.

That the faculty was going to be even less interested in establishing a genuine program of General Education than it was when it broke the hearts of the Redbook authors a generation ago became apparent as soon as Rosovsky convened his task force. In 1941, the Redbook spelled out a series of proposals for a prescribed "lower-level" curriculum. The proposals may have been derivative, but they were specific, and they made possible an intelligent if ultimately disappointing faculty debate. When Rosovsky, however, asked the core-curriculum committee to design or designate a new set of courses, the committee refused, on the grounds that "it would be inappropriate, and possibly counterproductive, for us to prescribe details of course content and organization." ("Counterproductive." Perhaps this is as good a place as any to note that the ten-page introductory section to the core-curriculum report is the dreariest piece of important Harvard prose I have ever read. Even though a number of able writers worked on the report—as is evident in the sections dealing with their own areas of expertise—they speak as a group in unvarnished bureaucratese. Unfortunately, such clichés as "counterproductive" and "to implement this directive" do not merely define a collective failure of style; they are the symbols as well of intellectual breakdown. The committee that would not accept the challenge of cooperatively designing a curriculum was not bound together by a unity of interest and intention that would have permitted such an undertaking. The planning group must be small, wrote Alexander Meiklejohn in *The Experimental College,* and the members should have "genuine and intimate intellectual acquaintance with one another." The representatives of the largest and most disparate Harvard faculty in history fatally lacked that kind of rapport.)

Having emptied its discussion of intellectual content, the committee proceeded to deal with the question of what an educated young man or woman ought to know in terms of abstract rules. It established a new set of nonconcentration requirements, divided more or less equally among the major areas of intellectual interest in the faculty. At first, the committee thought in terms of eight areas, but when the faculty balked at the cumbersomeness of the scheme, the number was arbitrarily reduced to five. Continued opposition from turf-defending scientists subsequently necessitated two more modifications—a "by-pass" option permitting a substitution of certain departmental courses for core requirements, and a "floater" option allowing students to shift one requirement from one area of the core to another. The supervisory committee also has the power to suspend requirements in one or more core areas for up to four years, and will almost surely be forced to invoke it. Having been born as a piece of machinery, the core is apt to be in and out of the shop for adjustments and repairs for the duration of its mechanical life.

At the moment, the regulations are slated to become fully effective in 1982. Incoming freshmen will be formally required to take ten semester-long courses, three in Literature and the Arts, two in History, two in Social and Philosophical Analysis, two in Science and Mathematics, and one in Foreign Languages and Cultures. In practice, though, students will have to take only seven or eight courses, thanks to exemptions in the area of their major and the option of taking a course that qualifies both in the Foreign Languages and Cultures area and in one of the other four. The expectation is that students will be able to choose from a list of 80 to 100 offerings, many of which will be specially designed for the core by specialized subcommittees working in conjunction with individual professors. According to an optimistic associate dean who serves on the core committee: "We don't want to create a program of departmental courses, only under a different name." A number of existing departmental courses, however, will be designated as "appropriate" to the core, and in at least one category on the list the offerings will consist en-

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tirely of courses normally offered by a department.

THUS Harvard has once again rejected the idea of a prescribed curriculum. Yet the faculty has not been content, as it was in 1949, simply to club together a bunch of courses and call it a program. The core committee did not find it politically or intellectually possible to establish a single shelf of Great Books; nevertheless, the committee declares, there was a rationale for what it did. "The underlying conception of the core curriculum is a minimum acceptable standard of individual education focusing on how we gain knowledge and understanding of the universe, of society, and of ourselves." *Approaches* to learning are the keys to the kingdom. The fivefold curriculum will be made one by the common question of what knowledge and understanding are and how they are acquired. And within each area of the core, coherence is apparently going to be achieved through common methods of study or the study of common sorts of problems.

The statement has much merit as a general summation of what one might learn from a General Education program. But when one reads the details of the report, the statement loses much of its credibility. In the area of Literature and the Arts, for example, students will be required to take a course in a category called "Contexts of Culture." Courses in this category will be unified by an advanced methodology. Not only will they connect art with literature, they will "emphasize" the social and historical context of artistic expression. "Thus these courses will be interdisciplinary."

That final adjective is one of the buzz words of our time, of course, but can Harvard deliver on it? In an effort to answer this question, I recently asked Scorpio, the computer terminal at the Library of Congress, to give me a rundown of all scholarly books published by all tenured professors in the literature and arts departments at Harvard in the last ten years, minus the work of those professors who will have reached retirement age by 1982. My reading list proved to be much less formidable than it may sound because of the startlingly large number of cases in which Scorpio had nothing to report. Of the volumes brought to my attention, I found only a handful, by a total of three authors, which could be described as interdisciplinary in any genuine sense of the term.

Another way of measuring Harvard's pedagogical capacity to teach "Contexts of Culture" is to look at the current condition of the university's oldest field of undergraduate concentration, History and Literature. This past winter a senior professor at Harvard privately described the interdisciplinary major as "a terrible mess." It "lacks direction or leadership and may survive on paper but has lost its reason for being." The declining number of applicants to the field indicates that the undergraduates agree with the professor's assessment. This past year, fewer than a hundred students, out of a class of 1,600, asked to be admitted. If humanities professors at Harvard are really interested in interdisciplinary teaching, why have they not shown it by maintaining the esprit of a program already in being? In the light of all these depressing facts, I am disinclined to believe that "Contexts of Culture" will be methodologically united. The greater likelihood is that offerings in this area will simply replicate the various single-discipline approaches of departmental courses.

President Bok has called attention to a possibly analogous situation in Social and Philosophical Analysis. The core requirement will compel students to come to grips with particular questions of choice and value. "They are to learn that it is possible to think systematically about such issues as justice, obligation, personal responsibililty, citizenship, friendship." Yet as Bok admits in his latest report to the Harvard Overseers, the problem "is to find enough professors who are trained to teach such courses and willing to make the attempt." In his next breath he suggests that it will be possible, after all, to staff the core courses with properly trained professors, but the doubt he raises is not so easily dismissed. While ethical inquiry is an important topic, in post-Vietnam, post-Watergate America it is also a fashionable one. The danger is that some of the teachers who will express an interest in moving in on the subject will be of the same ilk as those who sent "Gen Ed" down the road toward Boutiqueville. At a debased level, the unifying experience of studying common sorts of problems is not worth having.

The most dubious recommendations of the core committee have to do with basic skills in languages and mathematics. The Foreign Languages and Cultures requirement suggests that students will not be able to get through the core without demonstrating proficiency in a foreign language by the successful completion of a semester course involving untranslated texts or lectures. But in fact even this modest requirement can be evaded. Passing a semester course "devoted to the study of other major cultures where, in view of the difficulty of the languages, texts would be read in translation" will also satisfiy the requirement. Foreign Languages and Cultures is an inflated public-relations title that does not really mean what it implies. The committee's recommendation that a required course in expository English be established in specific relation to various core courses comes even closer to hokum. In the middle 1960's, a distinguished faculty committee headed by Professor Paul Doty noted that an unfortunate side effect of offering several alternative courses in "Gen Ed" in lieu of a prescribed curriculum "has been to make it impractical for General Education Ahf, the course in composition that replaced English A, to keep any direct contact with the General Education program." The impracticality has not less-

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ened with the years, and the core committee is doing a disservice to the university to pretend otherwise. The members of the committee also neglected to point out to their professorial colleagues that the only expository writing courses which have succeeded in American colleges and universities since World War II—I think, for instance, of English 1-2 at Amherst in the 1950's and 1960's—have been absolutely dependent upon the intense involvement of full professors.

In the area of mathematics skills, the new regulations require incoming freshmen to take a placement examination; if a satisfactory score is not achieved, students must take a course. Inasmuch as 35 per cent of all Harvard freshmen in 1977 failed to achieve a score of 50 per cent on a placement test covering arithemetic, algebra, and basic precalculus mathematics, it looks as if a good many freshmen in future years will be taking a course. The requirement strikes me as an intolerable imposition. If a third of the highly selected freshmen at Harvard do not have a grasp of basic mathematics, then it is time for college deans and presidents—and the task forces that report to them—to rethink the entire relationship between high school and college, as Hutchins once did. Making eighteen-year-olds do the work of sixteen-year-olds is no way to solve the problem.

THE Harvard faculty has now replaced an old set of distribution requirements with a new set so similar in curricular implication that the core might as well be called "Son of Gen Ed." Harvard, it is clear twice over, does not wish to commit itself to a prescribed curriculum; at the same time, the university apparently cannot bear to forswear the General Education ideal altogether and try something new and different. One has to wonder why. A lack of fresh educational ideas is an obvious answer, but only a partial one, for it does not call attention to the strong current of emotion running through the proceedings. What we are witnessing at Harvard today, and at hundreds of other institutions across the country where talk of a core curriculum has suddenly become fashionable, is the triumph of an enormous nostalgia. The do-your-own-thing anarchy of the 1960's left us exhausted and a little frightened; it has made us yearn for recognizable forms, meaningful connections, hierarchy. Within every intellectual discipline the business of research continues to become more and more specialized, but the old dream of liberal-arts teaching promises professors that they can break through atomistic limits into a larger world. Indeed, Dean Rosovsky believes that through planning and teaching the core curriculum the Harvard faculty might well recapture the lost spirit of its common enterprise. This is one of those cases, however, in which grace enables good works, not the other way around. A spirit of common enterprise among its teachers is the *sine qua non* of successful General Education, as the examples of Columbia and Chicago attest.

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Africa for the Africans?

W. Scott Thompson

In the summer of 1976, just a few months after Cuban soldiers had won the Angolan civil war for a minority faction of dedicated Marxists, a conference of scholars, soldiers, and bureaucrats was held in Washington. In a panel on Third World issues, the lack of any relationship of that conflict to "cold-war" concerns (as opposed to the local and historic causes) was self-evident to almost everyone permitted to speak. An African scholar's persistent attempts to contribute were thrice cut off with assurances that in *this* particular group, it was clearly understood that the Angolan civil war was an *African* issue; that the Soviet-Cuban involvement was irrelevant; and that, therefore, he did not *need* to speak. He finally interrupted those who wished to think for him with an excited gesture, a wetted finger in the air determining the direction of the wind: "We Africans have been conquered and reconquered for five hundred years. If there is one thing we have learned in this period it is *who is winning and who is losing.* It's the only way we can survive . . . and the primary lesson of the Angolan civil war for Africans is that the West is losing and the East is winning."

Since that time, those who saw no danger from Angola have either had to generalize their argument into a theory rationalizing the ever wider scale of Soviet activity on the African continent, or to admit that they had been wrong, and to join those opposing Communist expansion in an area hitherto composed of Western friends occupying the lands proximate to the supply lines vital for our economy. This latter group, though rapidly expanding even within the upper ranks of the government, is still dwarfed in intellectual circles, and also in Washington, by those who blame the United States for "bringing the cold war to Africa," who say "So what?" to every Soviet-Cuban move.

Something of a public encyclical has been issued on this matter by Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., in a widely read essay in the *Wall Street Journal*; its thesis parallels the one put forth in numerous government studies of the last year, and states in more concise terms the doctrine on which Ambassador Andrew Young and Secretary of State Vance have appeared to base their Africa policy.

Mr. Schlesinger, whose scholarly achievements in the study of American politics are better known than his work on Africa, argues that Communist experience, like Western experience, is irrelevant to Africa, just as it was in the 30's when Evelyn Waugh—whom he cites approvingly—wrote his "African" novels, *Scoop* and *Black Mischief*. Even the slogan worn out in the 60's, that Africans are not eager to exchange one set of masters for another, is trotted out. The Soviets will trip themselves up, Mr. Schlesinger says, sink in their own quagmire, having learned no lessons from our—or their own—misadventures. Africans are merely fighting their own "Wars of the Roses," and we should leave them to it, regardless of whether the Soviets also leave them alone.

Mr. Schlesinger goes on, twitting us strategists for rushing and dashing to one purportedly significant "exotic" locale after another, as if dealing with threats as and where they occur somehow demonstrates a lack of good sense. First it was Angola, then the "Horn of Africa! Who among us had ever heard of the Horn of Africa six months ago?" he asks. Leaving aside the regrettable echo that statement evokes of Neville Chamberlain's notorious remark about Czechoslovakia, the fact is that many of us not only had heard of the Horn "six months ago," but even as far back as six years ago were trying to educate the informed public as to its strategic significance. And three years ago some of us were involved in bureaucratic struggles in Washington (which for our part were designed to avert the sort of crisis that eventually was to occur there) when a chance to lessen Somalia's dependence on Moscow first arose.

For those interested in geostrategic relationships, the Horn's proximity to the source of a growing proportion of our oil was (and is) a highly pertinent fact; in this regard, the massive Soviet build-up there can hardly seem fortuitous, especially given the persistent discussion—almost obsession—in the Soviet press about American and European dependence on that oil and that region.

The Schlesinger type of argument invariably means taking the position that Soviet experience in Africa has always led to, and thus always will lead to, failure: the Soviets have been kicked out of several countries (Schlesinger names Guinea, Somalia, Egypt, and Ghana). But do these examples yield the "lesson" Schlesinger and so many others derive from the Russian experience?

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1. *Guinea.* The Soviet ambassador was asked to take a vacation of indefinite duration in 1961 when he and his embassy mixed themselves up in a plot against Sekou Touré's Marxist regime. This was the first major Soviet reversal in Africa. But Russians, unlike Americans, persist in the face of failure. And they learn. They returned to Guinea, heads hung low but in fact indifferent to their humiliation, waiting for the turn of the wheel. In 1970 a group of Portuguese commandants and mercenaries invaded Conakry, the Guinean capital, and almost overthrew the regime; it certainly scared President Sekou Touré. Now the Soviets had their chance, and when Touré requested Soviet assistance in guarding his port, they were happy to comply—on condition that they be able to use it for their own strategic purposes.

Hitherto our navy had had free reign in those adjacent waters, a fact of no small importance. An underwater ridge of mountains off the West African coast had made that area an excellent "hiding" place for U.S. submarines. With Soviet anti-submarine planes able to conduct their missions out of Conakry, our navy lost this advantage. Moreover, from Conakry the Soviets refuel supply missions for their other adventures in Africa, thus extending their basing system as a whole; and it is well to remember that an international basing system is greater than the sum of its parts. Recently there have been reports that President Touré is again eager to restore a semblance of nonalignment, and might cut back Soviet privileges of a strategic nature. But for the moment, Guinea is a Soviet client.

2. *Somalia.* A Soviet strategic presence was ended in stages in 1977-78, as the Soviets heavily armed the Somalis' Ethiopian enemies. A bit of background is in order. Moscow saw the opportunity which American aid to Ethiopia, and Somali irredentism in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia, presented. Starting in 1962 the Soviets armed the Somalis heavily and trained their officer corps, who threw out an elected president in 1969. In the early 70's, the Soviets began downgrading their bases in Egypt and developed more strategically critical ones in Somalia, as the importance of protecting their sea lines to eastern Russia increased and as the importance of the Persian Gulf also became more and more obvious. Part of the price was an expulsion from Egypt, a price the Soviets were willing to pay in the new strategic environment.

By 1977, the "revolution" that had slowly toppled Emperor Haile Selassie in Ethiopia was gathering momentum. To the Soviet Politburo, as it now appears, the attraction of Ethiopia, with a supposed Marxist leader, ruthless in the Leninist manner in murdering the imperial family and in crushing the church and nobility, was plainly greater than that of an Islamic state a tenth its size. For it had long since become plain that the Somalis were more interested in reuniting their people than in Marxism-Leninism and "scientific socialism." Colonel Mengistu in Addis Ababa is no doubt also opportunistic in his socialism, but that did not and does not change the strategic facts of his present position—one of almost total dependence on Russian, East German, and Cuban force.

There is evidence that the Soviet military (and particularly the navy) sought to maintain its facilities in Somalia, a bird in the hand; it was the Politburo which decisively opted for the Ethiopian "solution." While spokesmen for the Carter administration in 1977 derided the Soviets for their choice and openly relished the prospects of a Soviet *enlisement* similar to our own in Vietnam, by early 1978 the administration had come to realize that the Soviets with their game of musical chairs had gained the upper strategic hand in the entire Horn. Whether the Somali regime, once it was defeated in the Ogaden in the most devastating military thrust in Africa since Rommel, could survive against the developed Soviet-Cuban force next door, was unclear.

Meanwhile the Soviets were poised to help the Ethiopians crush the revolutionary movement in the country's northernmost province, Eritrea, which experts considered they could do with or without Cuban forces (and which they are now in fact successfully doing—without the Cubans). Though the Ethiopian forces will probably not be able to achieve a position outside the cities and strategic high points of Eritrea, the Soviets will still be well-placed to command the Red Sea and its egress, through their rapidly growing influence in South Yemen next door.

Thus, to say merely that the Soviets were "pushed out" of Somalia is to leave rather a lot unsaid.

3. In *Egypt*, the "so-what?" school does have a point. The Soviet Union was expelled from invaluable bases, and was humiliated. But how good a point is this? The fact that the Soviets lost much does not cancel the leverage gained during fifteen years of intimate involvement in Egypt. And how far away did they go? They simply relocated their facilities in nearby Libya, Syria, and Iraq.

4. Finally, in *Ghana*, the Soviets were indeed kicked out, unceremoniously and embarrassingly; though relations were not broken and there has been a certain refurbishment of the old tie, it remains true that the Soviets lost out in what once had been a bellwether state for Africa.

But the point here is that the Soviets also used that experience to advantage. They had in fact become aware of the shortcomings of Kwame Nkrumah's pseudo-socialist regime a year before his overthrow in 1966 and sought to ameliorate the conditions which they correctly identified as undermining the regime. They were overcommitted and got caught. Their subsequent behavior shows how well they learned the lesson. And what had they lost? Ghana's importance was skidding rapidly anyway; the Russians were turning their attention to Nigeria, a state which really mattered, and where they have maintained substantial influence ever since, supplying its arsenal for the civil war there.

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In short, the Soviets have learned from their "failures," and are unlikely to make the same mistakes again. They have also learned from *our* failures. Why do writers like Arthur Schlesinger think the Soviets use surrogates, if not precisely to avoid the problems of foreign involvement which, Moscow observed, plagued us in Vietnam? Are Schlesinger and those who share his views unaware of the significant doctrinal debate in Moscow on precisely these issues that took place in the early 70's? The Soviet world mission "will not allow it or . . . require it to maintain a military presence in remote regions of the world," a Soviet theorist wrote in 1972 after his argument had won the day.

Inevitably a discussion of this kind comes back to Vietnam. As one who opposed our involvement there in a period when so many latter-day liberals, including Mr. Schlesinger, served the government which got us into that conflict, I have no hesitation in saying that although we lost for an abundance of reasons, in the end we lost because we pulled the plug on our ally while the Soviets were doubling, then redoubling, their aid to Hanoi.

Is the result not plain to see? To the new isolationists—among whom Mr. Schlesinger is perhaps now to be numbered—it is simply that Indochina states are warring among themselves. But to Thai leaders, the result is that five Soviet-equipped Vietnamese divisions are in Laos on their own border, and that at least five guerrilla-training camps are pumping terrorists into their system. And in the new Indochinese war, who is winning? No one will regret the passing of Pol Pot's regime based somewhere in Cambodia, but will Hanoi's puppet, whose installation seems only a matter of time, not enhance the pressure on Thailand in particular, and also on other Southeast Asian states? In Laos, there are now Vietnamese "advisers" in every department of every ministry, much like the French *conseiller-technique* of an earlier era; perhaps the same will soon be true of Cambodia.

And beyond Southeast Asia, what were the results of the fall of South Vietnam? It was followed by dramatic gains for (and an attempted coup by) the Portuguese Communist party, happily contained; by gains for Communist parties in Europe and elsewhere; and by an emboldened Soviet strategy in Angola which paid off. Then came the "conversion" to the Soviet persuasion of the one-time admirers of Mao in Mozambique. They signed a treaty of friendship with Moscow after seeing who it was who could and would intervene in the Third World. We thus come to the dramatic events in that "exotic" place, the Horn. There, a brilliant Cuban-Ethiopian blitzkrieg across the Ogaden, directed by a deputy commander of the Soviet armed forces, and using tanks airlifted in by helicopter, turned the tide against the Soviets' erstwhile ally, the Somalis.

What comes next? Presumably Rhodesia. But will military force be necessary for the Soviets to gobble it up? Or will just a little saber-rattling be sufficient this time? Mr. Vance is running around the world trying to get the multiracial leadership in Rhodesia to do precisely what the Soviets want—to include their man, Joshua Nkomo, and his guerrilla forces, in the new government. It is instructive to note that the Soviets and Cubans signed a communiqué committing themselves to stoke up the revolutionary fires of Africa only hours after Mr. Vance's plane had left Moscow in April.

MR. SCHLESINGER tells us that "we should not try to pretend that we know better than [the Africans] do where their own interests lie." But the Africans—or many of the ones with whom America has traditionally associated—have been telling us something different. In the aftermath of the Angolan civil war, while in the bureaucracy myself, I kept track of messages coming in from our embassies around Africa, reporting how local leaders had spoken to our ambassadors of their fears that they might be next on the Soviet-Cuban hit list.

Those fears have now grown, and spread well beyond the list of pro-Western leaders like Senghor of Senegal and Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast. President Kaunda of Zambia changed sides in reaction to Soviet advances, feeling he no longer had a choice once the rout in Angola was complete; and the Soviet enterprises in Southern Africa are now orchestrated from his capital. Even so, he is known to fear that he may be the victim of a Soviet-backed coup. Other leaders, including leftists who fail to conspire directly with Moscow, are also known to fear that, once the Soviets "settle" the Eritrean problem, they will start eliminating the remaining "uncooperative" leaderships.

To assume that Africans are incapable of seeing how the international winds are blowing is to denigrate gratuitously the African capability of gaining advantage from the tides of fortune. As Soviet conventional and strategic power continues to outstrip us in area after area, Africans will be able to conclude with whom they must cooperate for the development of a new world order.

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Fiction

Family Affairs

Pearl K. Bell

Some cultural theorists believe, though it may be self-serving, that novelists, like swallows before the storm or Noah's dove, are harbingers of the future. To the rebel like Rimbaud the poet is *prévoyant*, and to a conservative like Ortega writers are a sample of one whose imagination prefigures the future. This view may in fact be little more than a conceit, but it is a tantalizing one. It is therefore intriguing to find three unusually arresting novels, published within the past few months, that seem to mark a break with recent literary fashion. In these books—Mary Gordon's *Final Payments*,* John Irving's *The World According to Garp*,† and Tova Reich's *Mara*** —there is a notable absence of apocalyptic fever and narcissistic lamentation, except as targets of the novelists' mordant sense of comedy. The writers hold themselves coolly aloof from modish invocations of entropy and alienation, from the orgiastic nihilism and eschatological prophecies of universal malevolence that have obsessed Thomas Pynchon, Kurt Vonnegut, William Burroughs. The disorder and suffering that absorb Mary Gordon and John Irving and Tova Reich are individual and domestic. Though they can be remorseless in their mockery of vulgarity and fanaticism, they are keenly intelligent and compassionate. Their imaginations turn inward, away from political anxiety and conflict to the ethical tensions of personal behavior. Impatient with abstract simplicities about liberation and self-fulfillment, they write out of a meticulously honest awareness of the way in which religious and ideological zealotry is confounded by human nature and unpredictable human experience.

At the core of each of these novels is a tenacious belief in the importance—not always benign—of the family. The most protective and unconditionally loving parents can inflict the most appalling wounds on their children—in *The World According to Garp*, the paradox is made sickeningly literal—and children like Mara, the rabbi's daughter, can break their parents' spirit with the kind of spiteful irresponsibility that has the sting, if not the conscious malice, of cruelty. Different as these books are in tone and scope, in the dissimilar ways that the novelists absorb experience, judge it and use it, they are linked in their unsentimental obsession with the family as the inescapable requisite of survival. And yet this agency of nurture and love is sown with ugly seeds of betrayal, pain, and disgrace; with the best of intentions, parents can maim their children and drive them mad.

In *Final Payments*, Mary Gordon takes a necessarily ambiguous view of the filial duty that has molded the young womanhood of Isabel Moore, the daughter of a sternly pious Irish Catholic father and a forgotten mother who died when Isabel was two. Though the novel begins with his funeral, Isabel's overpowering father is the domineering figure in the story, a fire-breathing Savonarola without portfolio, possessed of a faith so unyielding in its absolutism that he seriously believed "the refusal of anyone in the 20th century to become part of the Catholic Church was not pitiable; it was malicious and willful. . . . His faith had the appeal of war, and the horror. . . . He and God were fellow soldiers." Unlike the other fathers in their working-class Queens neighborhood, who work for the Transit Authority or the telephone company, Moore teaches medieval literature in a third-rate Catholic college.

In the face of his brutally militant certainty, Isabel does not stand a chance. There is nothing and no one to soften and diffuse the righteous, gladiatorial possessiveness of his love for her, which exacts her totally unquestioning dedication. When Isabel is nineteen, and her father is felled by a stroke, the question of choice simply does not occur. Despite the intellectual arrogance that her father has always encouraged in her, Isabel welcomes the shutters of self-abnegation that close around her life as, for the next eleven years, she remains incarcerated in her daughterly devotion. Though he raised her to be a Mary, not a Martha, after the funeral she remembers that the day her father became helpless "was of my whole life the day I felt most purely alive. . . . Certainty was mine, and purity; I was encased in meaning like crystal." This crystal shatters with her father's death, and Isabel at thirty, rising uneasily from the altar of self-sacrifice, steps into a strange world like Rip Van Winkle, blinded by the glare of change. She feels that "my past was the most interesting thing about me. What I came from was far more compelling than what I was.

Pearl K. Bell *reviews fiction regularly in these pages.*

* Random House, 297 pp., $8.95.

† Henry Robbins/Dutton, 437 pp., $10.95.

** Farrar Straus & Giroux, 250 pp., $8.95.

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. . ." Like a homing pigeon, Isabel finds a job investigating different households where old people are boarded like foster children, and each visit is a superbly observed set-piece. Miss Gordon not only renders the misery and courageous dignity of the aged lingerers with a wealth of scrupulously unmawkish feeling, she cannily discerns the comedy of survival without ever lapsing into vulgarity.

When this perfect job, and a guilty love affair with a married man, come to an end, the dutiful Catholic daughter feels she must atone for her presumptuous, if short-lived, confidence that life's pleasures are a hard-won just reward for the saintly years of renunciation. Wallowing in a penitential "goodness" that is indistinguishable from self-hatred, she moves in with the bitchy spinster who was once her father's housekeeper, ostensibly to care for the crippled old woman but in fact to bury herself in a degrading armature of fat and humiliation. But her determination to love the unlovable soon reveals itself to Isabel for the sick and cowardly indulgence it is: life may be monstrous "but it was life I wanted." In a sudden access of courage and self-regard, she flees from the mean house of guilt and the atrocious housekeeper to pursue "the rewards of a reasonable life," on her own terms.

Unfortunately this dramatic change of heart is not convincing. As the worm turns, Miss Gordon depends almost entirely on rhetoric —powerfully affecting, to be sure, but the verbal shocks of self-recognition seem too fragile and conventional a means of describing Isabel's abrupt shift from moral torpor to the annealing triumph of the will. Since *Final Payments* is austerely realistic, relying on the seen world, the knowable connections of plausibility, and Miss Gordon clearly feels at ease within this frame of recognizable and coherent experience, Isabel's lightning conversion from being her own worst enemy to becoming her own best friend is dubious—the novelist's faltering hand clutching at arbitrary straws of resolution. But it is no small thing, at twenty-nine, to write with Mary Gordon's phenomenal assurance and metaphoric authority.

In *Mara*, Tova Reich is also concerned with the burden that orthodoxy inflicts on the daughter of a man whose piety is stern and inviolable. But the father in this case is not an intransigent right-wing Catholic but an Orthodox rabbi, and his eighteen-year-old daughter Mara is a defiant sloven, a self-absorbed tramp whose every breath, not to mention her Israeli bum of a husband, is a knife in her father's heart. Nor is the rabbi quite the pillar of virtue and sanctity that he appears to be. No ordinary rabbi, Leon Lieb is not the religious leader of a congregation but a wily businessman who owns a prosperous chain of shoddy nursing homes for aged Jews. A master at the devious art of manipulating politicians, health inspectors, meddlesome buttinskies sniffing around the kitchens and toilets, the financial records, even the linen closets of his empire, Leon stuffs the pockets of his rabbinical black suits with fat wads of $20 bills, like decks of marked cards, which he deftly slips into the greedy palms of potential troublemakers.

Everything in the rabbi's comfortable world, it seems, is geared to do his bidding and enrich his self-made, hard-working life of unstinting devotion to God and family. His spineless son Herzl, also a rabbi, knocks down a huge salary as "religious counselor and coordinator" of the Lieb nursing homes. His wife Rose, overweight and chronically depressed, is enshrined in her husband's business records as "dietitian." A powerful and respected *macher* in the New York Jewish community, Leon would be at ease in Zion—if it weren't for the pesky *nudnicks* investigating his business tricks, and the exasperating Mara and her husband, Sudah, a no-talent artist, a grifter, liar, thief.

Tova Reich is a brazenly funny writer, and if she had chosen to stick with the broad comedy that, in the beginning, *Mara* seems to be aiming for, the novel would not have such a strangely disoriented air. She has a maliciously acerbic eye for righteous and vulgar excess, and when she is writing about the *rebbetsin*'s pathological gluttony, Mrs. Reich rises to inspired lunacy. In the most horrifyingly demented episode, the rabbi's gloomy wife checks into the Parklawn Nursing Home for a rest cure, trailed by her husband's loyal sexton "pushing a dolly piled high with cartons of prepared foods." It happens to be the day of Yom Kippur, and without thinking she swallows a jumbo assortment of her favorite anti-depression pills. "If I've broken my fast," she shrugs, "I might as well go all the way," and the debauch begins:

> She ate very quickly, slurping cold chicken soup out of its plastic container and letting it spill down her chin. The noodles hung over her lips like worms. She made loud, smacking noises as she ate, chewing with her mouth wide open, occasionally raising a hand mirror to her face to enjoy the spectacle of the food being processed by her tongue and teeth. She tore whole chickens apart . . . stuck her hand deep into the bowels of the golden crusty challa. . . . She consumed whole potato kugels . . . and held them up to her face like a harmonica, devouring the instrument as she played . . .

There has not been an eating binge on this scale in an American novel since Bernard Malamud's ballplaying trencherman in *The Natural*, and it is the sickeningly unforgettable high point of *Mara*.

Yet the trouble with the book as a whole stems from Mrs. Reich's curiously ambivalent point of view. It never becomes clear whether the feckless and hopelessly dishevelled rabbi's daughter, drifting like an abandoned boat on a sea of perpetual distraction, is finally getting her own back for the severities of an Orthodox childhood ("I've had more than my share of sermons in my lifetime," Mara remarks in a rare moment of lucidity), or whether Mrs. Reich regards her, satirically, as one of nature's slatterns, doomed to the parasitic chaos of indulgence whatever her

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father might be. Like her pseudo-artist husband, Mara is a would-be writer, given to trance-like bursts at the typewriter, where she taps out listless installments of an opus called "How I Lost My Virginity." Except for a spooky fantasy about incest—but what it is meant to convey about the troubled girl is obscure, and no help in unriddling the general confusion—Mara's literary efforts are as ephemeral and gross as the chopped liver at her catered wedding, "molded into the form of a hen with three chicks." We can never be certain whether Mrs. Reich is soliciting ridicule or pity for this addled creature, whether we are meant to feel that she matters.

Mara has a fatally irresolute air because, in contrast to the stark clarity of *Final Payments*, Mrs. Reich slights the crucial connections between the rabbi's greedy, angry love and his daughter's derelict emptiness. Only once does Mara bitterly reflect: "Other children, Gentiles in particular, did not have to put up with their father's humid, fetid, suffocating environment." But this is all we are offered about Mara's attitude toward the *Jewish* particularities of her upbringing, which is otherwise suggested so elliptically as to seem unconsidered.

It is even more puzzling that Mrs. Reich fails to meet the challenge of Leon Lieb's ethical ambiguity: since he truly believes he has done no wrong, even when he is finally indicted for stealing huge sums from the government and violating public-health laws, what accounts for his unshakable claim to impunity? Does he feel absolved by a strain in the Orthodox mentality which allows, since the world *is* corrupt, that supposedly venal acts are merely a means of getting along in a truly immoral universe? To be immoral, in this wholly secular sense, is the rabbi's form of survival—and he remains inculpable as long as his sacred commitments are fulfilled. Like many gifted satirists, Mrs. Reich invests so much of her literary energy in the objects of her sharp, aggressive wit that she runs out of steam too quickly; the experience that cannot be funny is given short shrift in a kind of breathless, exhausted shorthand. Thus the novel in the end seems at odds with itself: the scathing mockery of greed and vulgarity—Leon is chronically angry, and the idiom of his anger is always scatological—obliterates the pity we might be tempted to feel for the daughter hounded by her father's hectoring love. Ridicule is all they deserve, perhaps, but it seems inadequate to the long, dark shadows Mrs. Reich allows them to cast.

NEITHER *Mara* nor *Final Payments* gives us the satisfying density of character and circumstance, the thickly textured imaginative reality that is one of the triumphs of John Irving's *The World According to Garp*. It is a book conceived on an audaciously ambitious scale, at once realistic and full of reckless exaggeration, mingling the credible and the fantastic with panache. But Irving is at his best when dealing with such common and accessible matters as the responsibility of parents, the vulnerability of children, the courage of unconventional people, the unpredictability of death.

The World According to Garp is a novel about the short and violently eventful life of a novelist named T. S. Garp. As in all fictional portraits of the artist, Irving has a great deal to say about the art of fiction and the *work* of a writer, as though axiomatic reflection will somehow call the right words into being. Not all of this epigrammatic commentary is as wise as Irving's tone implies, but when Garp declares that "a writer's job is to imagine everything so personally that the fiction is as vivid as our personal memories," he is pointing to a vitally important difference between memory and craft, autobiography and the writer's *use* of the past, absurdity and originality—a difference that has been of little consequence to most American novelists today. Not that Irving always keeps the difference in mind, since he indulges in elaborate games of allusion to his own life and career, as though taunting the reader to guess what has been made up, what taken whole from life. A little of this can be useful and funny, but Irving tends to let it go on too long, and the peekaboo can become much too coy. Garp loves to defend the superiority of pure imagination over autobiographical memory, and his first published work, an enchanting story included in the text of the novel, *is* an ideal act of imaginative invention. But Garp's life, despite Irving's solemn disclaimers in various interviews, does indeed parallel John Irving's—he grew up in Exeter and graduated from its famous prep school, was a champion wrestler, studied in Vienna, is the father of two sons, and so on. Not only are Garp's novels manic parodies of John Irving's, but one of his titles, *The Second Wind of the Cuckold*, comes straight out of the last line of Irving's *The 158-Pound Marriage*. In rather short order, all this fooling around with actuality and invention begins to sound like awfully self-conscious window-dressing, as though Irving felt that unless he flashed his modernist credentials he would not be taken seriously.

What does matter about *The World According to Garp* is the captivating originality of the characters, the closely drawn entirety of the life that Irving bestows upon them, and the infectious love he feels for these emanations of his head. We have become so accustomed to modish fiction of outrage, disgust, and contempt that a novelist who is unashamedly fond of his characters seems suspect—a sentimentalist insensible to the degradation and horror of modern life. But Irving's vision is too inventively comic for sentimentality. As Garp writes to an outraged reader who accuses him of laughing at misfortune: "It is simply a truthful contradiction to me that people's problems are often funny and that the people are often and nonetheless sad. . . . I have nothing but sympathy for how people behave—and nothing but laughter to console them with."

The story of Garp's life is as strange as the manner of his death, but Irving's command of the narrative gives it the incontestable shape of truth. Garp's mother, Jenny

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Fields, is a tough-minded heiress who at an early age rejects her stodgy family's expectations of married propriety and becomes a nurse. During the war, Jenny decides she wants a baby without the bother of a husband, and finds a dying gunner in the hospital whose last gasp implements her plan. She raises Garp in the infirmary annex of the Steering School, where she is the head nurse (a resourceful mother, she tries out all the courses beforehand on her son's behalf). In Vienna, where Garp and his mother settle for a year while he slowly enters into "a writer's long-sought trance, wherein the world falls under one embracing tone of voice," Jenny doggedly hammers out the iconoclastic autobiography, *A Sexual Suspect*, that becomes a feminist bible and makes her a heroine-*cum*-den-mother of the women's movement.

Feminism and reversed sex roles are important to Irving's story, but his views conform to no conventionally radical attitudes. Scornful of fanaticism and impatient with cant, he is strongly committed to the sensible logic of Garp's uncommon domestic arrangements. Garp's wife is a professor of literature who loves her work; if he is willing to take care of the babies, she is willing to have them. Given the kind of man he is, Garp feels neither degraded nor oppressed by this division of labor, and he "often joked that the reason his first novel was written with so many short chapters was because of . . . feedings and naps and changes of diapers. . . . As long as Garp's novel progressed, no routine, however mindless, could upset him." What would not suit a different sort of man works enviably well for him.

The principled grimness of zealotry, Irving is saying, is fatally unresponsive to human variety, and he invents a group of ideological maenads, called the Ellen Jamesians, who hack off their tongues in demented homage to a young girl whose tongue was cut out after she was raped. These true believers in the power of symbolic castration are eventually responsible for Garp's murder at the age of thirty-three—exactly the right age to die, of course, for this child of "an almost virgin birth." But long before then violence and disaster have become Garp's Job-like intimates: his mother is assassinated and, in a freakish but horribly plausible accident, this anxiously protective father, who worries inordinately about his children's vulnerability in a perilous world, and would like the entire world to be padded top bottom and sides, like a wrestling room, has caused the death of one small son and a blind eye in the other.

Remarkably, none of the slaughter and mayhem that erupt with such bloody frequency in *The World According to Garp* seems sensationalistic or even melodramatic. Irving has taken a capacious and demanding view of his task as a storyteller, and carried it out with sober compassion, adventurous ingenuity, and great intelligence. He never loses his grasp of the contradictions in Garp's world —he is as wholeheartedly attentive to joy and good fortune as he is to pain and disaster. Without any maudlin falsity, he compels us to care about his imaginary creatures with a warmth that neither Tova Reich nor Mary Gordon can manage to make us feel. So confident is he that we *do* care that John Irving usurps a godly prerogative, in his old-fashioned epilogue, and spells out the eventual destinies of his surviving characters to their inexorable end. He is one of the few novelists alive who could get away with such a grandly omniscient gesture, because he has engaged us so fiercely in the reality of his characters that nothing about them can in fairness be held back.

WHAT John Irving and Mary Gordon and Tova Reich share is their passionate respect for the power of personal history. They remind us that in the novel, the most concretely human of literary forms, the themes of obligation and sacrifice, devotion and obsession, care and indifference are enacted through the struggles for domination between the self and others which engulf us all.

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Books in Review

Taxes & Civilization

THE WAY THE WORLD WORKS. By JUDE WANNISKI. *Basic Books. 319 pp. $12.95.*

Reviewed by ROGER STARR

JUDE WANNISKI, until recently associate editor of the editorial page of the *Wall Street Journal*, announces at the start of this book that it was inspired by what he has "come to call the Laffer curve." "Laffer" is Arthur B. Laffer, who teaches business and finance at the University of Southern California. Readers who have been permanently frightened by early mishaps in analytical geometry should be relieved to learn that Laffer's "curve" is no more technical than an aphorism. It might be paraphrased thus: there are two ways in which a government can collect the same amount of taxes—one way is to set high tax rates, which should produce higher revenues but does not, because high tax rates discourage taxable economic activity; the other way is to set tax rates low, which should produce lower revenues but does not, because low tax rates encourage taxable economic activity.

Implicit in this formulation is the existence, somewhere, of an ideal tax rate, neither too high nor too low, but capable of encouraging the maximum taxable activity and yielding the greatest tax revenue with the least pain. But, alas, Professor Laffer himself cannot plot on his "curve" the coordinates of the optimum tax rate. Nor can he disclose to anyone—not even to the Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee—whether the rates being charged an any given moment are below or above the ideal.

On the slender hypothesis that such a Laffer point exists, Wanniski, with the resourcefulness of a magician drawing an American flag from his empty fist, constructs a political program, sketches a new political economy based on the sociology of the American family, and presents a vivid explanation of events as complex and various as the Dark Ages, the 1929 crash, and the 19th-century prosperity of Britain.

Wanniski's thesis is that the government "wedge" of taxes, regulation, and legal constraint compresses and diverts productive effort, blunts initiative, and causes depressions and wars. The "wedge" thus cripples the economy, and the gullible are led to propose new false cures to solve the problems the "wedge" itself has created.

This charge is about as old as the Industrial Revolution itself, but Wanniski makes it sound new. His timing also helps. He has published this book just when the economics of production once again have begun to claim public attention, after several decades in which economists fastened their attention on the problems of underconsumption. Wanniski's discussions of the Laffer curve concentrate on the relationship between the level of tax rates and the productivity of the economy. Claiming that the right level of tax rates is the crucial stimulant of economic growth and strength, Wanniski admits that he too is unable to stipulate what the right rate is. He nevertheless offers a definition of "rightness" which opens the door to his discussion of history and politics.

The right tax rate, Wanniski tells us, is the rate the public will support in an election during which it has been given a proper choice. This answer eliminates columns of dreary statistics and graphs, and brings us to the essence of Wanniski's political economy: the people know best, and Wanniski can tell us what they know and how they found it out. This proposition —which explains everything and nothing simultaneously—applies not only to nations in which the ballot lives; it applies to the whole world because the unschooled "global electorate" is as infallible as the university-trained Fabians of Bloomsbury. Even though the global electorate does not go to the polls, its members express themselves in the following ways: by emigration from countries whose policies ignore the Laffer curve; by allowing agricultural production to decline in countries which insufficiently reward the farmer; by assassination and bloody revolution in states whose policies make extreme measures necessary.

While the imputation of infallibility to the Many is scarcely more credible than imputing it to the One, Wanniski fashions out of this concept an effective device for asking the basic economic question: how is production possible? Why should anyone risk what he already owns in an untried enterprise? Why should anyone choose work over indolence? Or accept authority and direction, often from people he hates? And even welcome without much question the superior ingenuity of others?

These difficult psychological accommodations are needed to make production possible, and if it is to continue growing, the attitudes must persist far beyond the point at which the immediate needs of the producers themselves are satisfied. Wanniski's answer to this problem is that people will continue to produce as long as they feel the system augments their contribution to it. They make this judgment on the basis of their understanding of complex economic concepts which they learned while they were growing up.

To explain economic expansion and the deadening effect of progressive tax rates, Wanniski relies on man's natural grasp of marginal economics. Many economic writers believe that the lay public assumes that the marginal cost of the last unit produced is practically nothing, and that the entrepreneur derives an excessive reward for selling this unit at the same price as all the other units. Wanniski believes, to the contrary, that every-

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one instinctively understands that the cost of the marginal unit must include part of all the costs attributable to producing the units that preceded it in production.

Children, he tells us, learn the truth about marginal costs by observing parents in the act of losing their tempers, and by developing the art of wheedling and thus learning how to measure the effort needed to induce parents to opt for peace by giving candy. The child, he writes, comes to see that father loses his temper not because of a single childish outburst; the marginal cost—the last straw—is defined by all the other events that occurred previously to prepare the father to erupt. As children understand that what happened between Mom and Dad last night (or at work the previous day) is part of the cause of Dad's outburst, so they understand that the cost on the margin of production cannot be measured in isolation from the train of costs encountered earlier.

Wanniski follows this demonstration with a note to the effect that economists and politicians promptly forget their own learning and (as he says elsewhere) apply progressive tax rates to income. In fact, however, the steep rates charged on marginal income offend the taxpayer's understanding of the efforts necessary to produce it. This sense of injustice then stimulates large-scale evasion among those who recognize that their marginal income is what they had expected as a reward for the effort that produced the base income below the margin.

Wanniski culls additional evidence from history as proof of the ineffectiveness of high tax rates. He finds the historical process, like parent-child relations, less murky than it has heretofore appeared to others. The Roman empire flourished because Julius Caesar and Augustus installed lower tax rates, thus reducing the government "wedge"; the empire declined not because of Christianity but because of overtaxation. Napoleon's contribution to European economic development was a reduction in the government "wedge" which he brought about by lowering taxes and rationalizing laws and customs.



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Harding was elected President because the electorate understood that in calling for a return to normalcy, he was advocating lower income taxes. The debates in Congress over the Smoot-Hawley tariff precipitated fluctuations in the New York Stock Exchange and led directly to Black Tuesday, October 29, 1929. High income-tax rates, steeply progressive, explain Puerto Rico's poverty. Etc., etc.

One can be as skeptical of Wanniski's history as of his sociology, but the effectiveness of his work does not depend either on the depth of his analysis or on the appeal of his single-cause explanations. His ability to persuade comes from the growing feeling that other economic analyses have not solved the problems of inflation, under-utilization of plant, and continuing structural unemployment. The monetarist theory that the government can control the economy simply by adjusting the money supply has been no more successful than the Keynesian reliance on budgetary deficits when necessary to stimulate the economy. In this atmosphere, the doctors of economics look more and more like astrologers, while advocates of a new turn seem more convincing every day.

BUT, finally, in urging the propriety of tax cuts, Wanniski offers no protection against the risks his program entails. In the interim between tax reduction and economic revival (assuming his hunch is right), how shall the costs of government be covered? Wanniski makes the correct argument that inflation of incomes subject to progressive tax rates brings government a greatly augmented flow of revenue. But it is also true that government's needs grow even faster. And are not these needs equally the expression of the will of the infallible electorate?

What Wanniski has missed is that the growth of government's compass is at least as important a fact of modern political life as the resistance to higher taxes. This suggests that tax levels alone cannot account for the loss of productivity. In fact no single cause is responsible for a turn of events that probably reflects the attitudinal changes that follow the aging of a civilization. In the Britain and America of a hundred years ago, for example, public attitudes supported the steps necessary to favor economic development over the goals which are now being trumpeted by the elites: egalitarianism, anti-authoritarianism, conservation.

Thus Wanniski's work leaves his reader with less than a full understanding of what has happened to the modern economy. But the reader has nevertheless been helped to glimpse the choices that must be made if public policy is to foster economic growth. Other writers on public policy, who try to combine the advocacy of material prosperity for the poor with the renunciation of the steps needed to achieve and maintain that prosperity, have not yet seen the problem as clearly as Wanniski. If the Laffer curve helped his understanding, there may be more to it than there seems to be.

Jews in America

THE LAND THAT I SHOW YOU: THREE CENTURIES OF JEWISH LIFE IN AMERICA. By STANLEY FELDSTEIN. *Anchor Press/Doubleday. 512 pp. $12.95.*

Reviewed by JULIUS WEINBERG

WRITING concerned with the history of the Jews in the United States is at an interesting and significant juncture. A number of developments, particularly the enfranchisement and homogenization of American Jewry in the decades after the end of World War II, have outmoded the frame of reference that served as the basic structure for previous historians of American Jews. The assumptions of those historians—that patterns of immigration were central to the American Jewish experience, and that the institutions, values, and behavior of American Jewry could best be understood within the context of immigrational "waves" (the so-called Sephardic, German, and Russian)—led them to place great stress on the *divisions* among the various elements in the community: reformers vs. traditionalists, religionists vs. secularists, Sephardim vs. Germans, Germans vs. East Europeans.

These divisions, meaningful until the end of the 1930's, came to have little relevance in an era in which the grandchildren and the great-grandchildren of immigrants no longer remembered whether their forebears came from Unsleben, Bavaria, or Lomza, Poland; whether they were members of the Mizrachi or the Arbeiter Ring; or whether the prayer books in their grandfather's synagogue were in the Ashkenazi or Sephardi mode. Time and the process of Americanization thus rendered archaic the two most widely used works in American Jewish history, both of which had employed the "tri-immigrational" thesis as their controlling assumption: *A History of the Jews in America* by Peter Wiernik and *A History of the Jews in the United States* by Lee J. Levinger.

The very developments that made obsolete the narratives of Wiernik and Levinger served as the basis for the historiography of American Jews that emerged in the 1950's, roughly at the same time as the three-hundredth anniversary celebration of the first Jewish settlement, in 1654, on the North American continent. The decline of anti-Semitism in the United States, the defeat of Nazi Germany abroad, the formative role played by American Jewry in securing the establishment of the state of Israel, the speed with which the Russo-Polish descendants of immigrants had made their way in the academic, artistic, professional, and business worlds—these triumphs of the postwar years provided the backdrop for interpretations that stressed the sense of maturity, unity, and responsibility of American Jewry, the community's socio-economic mobility, and the security of its position in American society as a whole. In *The Jews in America: A History* (1954), Zionist-minded Rufus Learsi (Israel

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

On American Jews: "For the first time in American history, American Jews feel secure enough in their Jewishness and in their Americanism to challenge major aspects of this country's foreign policy." Stephen Isaacs.

On Soviet Jews: "The historic turning-point was the trial in 1970 of eleven foolish, naive young people who hoped to steal a small airplane and fly to freedom in Scandinavia." Murray Seeger.

On searching for roots in Eastern Europe: "Where was my mother's home? Where was the path she must have walked to the Narew River she had told me about? Where was the synagogue and where was the market place?" Sigmund Diamond.

On Jerusalem: "No place on earth offers so many delights to the eye, the ear and the mind as Kollek's Jerusalem, but one must find the time to stand and stare." Chaim Bermant.

On renewed interest in Judaica among young Americans: "The young people perceived themselves as survivors of the failures of Jewish education and the false values of America." Sylvia Rothchild.

On Israel's Nature Reserves: "It may be that General Yoffe's animals will somehow lead the people of the Middle East to peace one day. But the tanks were in the mountains, waiting. The real beast in the desert was still man." Robert Spero.

On being a Jewish poet: "The truest Jewish poetry will be written out of the inward preoccupations of people who happen to be Jews." M. L. Rosenthal.

On the Persian Gulf arms race: "The ramifications of what is happening... extend from the Caspian Sea to the Suez Canal and from the African Coast to Pakistan." Tad Szulc.

On Israel's Arab intellectuals: "I am an Israeli but I cannot be a Jew." Naomi Shepherd.

On American foreign policy: "American companies, which for so long we have considered 'our companies,' have in fact become the policing agents of the Arabs' boycott against the U.S." Paul Dickson.

On South Africa: "To live with such a system of laws, with certificates of racial purity, with leaders who admired Hitler, to live in South Africa as a Jew and to be silent and happy takes some special skills." Rose Moss.

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Goldberg) wrote that Zionists no longer stood alone but shared with all Americans, Jews and non-Jews alike, a pride in the achievements of the state of Israel; Nathan Glazer, in a slender but thoughtfully conceived volume on *American Judaism* (1957), wrote of American Jews' achieving a "most-favored-religion" status and becoming an equal in the triad of American faith; and Oscar Handlin, encapsulating the tercentenary spirit, called his chronicle of the successful encounter between Jews and America *Adventure in Freedom* (1954).

The tercentenary spirit in American Jewish historiography began to pall by the mid-60's. In *Children of the Gilded Ghetto* (1961), the sociologists Seymour Leventman and Judith R. Kramer presciently noted the generational differences that were about to disrupt the ideological and institutional stasis created by American Jewry in the postwar era. Also disturbing were the findings of scholars who, digging into the archives of World War II, began to question widely held assumptions concerning the beneficent actions taken—or not taken—by Franklin Delano Roosevelt, the State Department, and Winston Churchill to help the victims of Nazi Germany, both prior to and during World War II. By 1970, several monographs had appeared, pointing if not to the complicity then to the acquiescence of these wartime leaders in the fate of Europe's Jews, and to the ineffectiveness as well of American Jewish leadership in those years.

Other developments, too, shattered the serenity of the tercentenary spirit: the disproportionate representation of Jewish youth in the "counterculture" and the New Left; the asssault, led by the federal government, on the meritocratic norms through which the socioeconomic mobility of the Jew in the United States had been made possible; the rift between American Jews and American blacks; the growing hostility of the United Nations to the state of Israel and to Zionism—this, from the same organization which had recognized and admitted the state of Israel in 1948, and for which thousands of Jewish children, under instructions from Danny Kaye, had avidly gathered UNICEF contributions in the 1950's; the increasing power of the Arab oil sheiks on the international scene and, seemingly, over American foreign policy as well. By the 1970's, sufficient evidence was available to question both the future quality of American Jewish life at home and the secure position of world Jewry—particularly Israel—abroad. In an epilogue written for the second edition of his *American Judaism* in 1972, Nathan Glazer tempered the tercentenary spirit of his first edition thus: " 'survival,' which had for so long been criticized by Jewish religious thinkers and theologians as quite inadequate as a basis for Judaism and which had been regularly denounced as *'mere* survival,' began to seem quite enough after 1967."

FALLING into the post-tercentenary period of American Jewish historiography is Stanley Feldstein's *The Land That I Show You: Three Centuries of Jewish Life in America.* Feldstein's is a full-scale treatment of his subject, a handsome publication, well-researched, and written with a good deal of verve and narrative strength. For those aspects of the American Jewish experience that the author chooses to cover, he demonstrates a command of the literature in the field, while sharing with his readers —in many instances obtrusively so —choice passages from both the primary documents and from the secondary sources he has employed for his study. Another refreshing aspect of Feldstein's volume is the emphasis he places on the last century of American Jewish life, treating in more detail than previous historians the men and events since 1881, the year of the beginning of the main migration of Eastern European Jews to the United States. Indeed, more than four-fifths of Feldstein's five-hundred page narrative is focused on the immigrants from Eastern Europe and what happened to them and their descendants once they got here.

Nevertheless, despite these and other strengths—including an extensive treatment of the sweatshops, the Jewish labor movement which grew from them, its leadership and ideological underpinnings; a moving account of the refugee problem of the 1930's; and a graphic portrait of the impact of World War II on American Jews —*The Land That I Show You* contains a number of fundamental flaws. Feldstein is either unfamiliar with, or uninterested in sharing with his readers, a number of religious and cultural aspects of Jewish life in the United States; his narrative consequently ignores those men, movements, and institutions that continued to cherish and to build upon the scholarship, the learning—and the piety—that characterized a good portion of Eastern European Jewry.

The Land That I Show You is overflowing with varieties of Jewish radicalism—once again we are led through the alcoves of City College and the cafeterias of 14th Street where student radicals gathered to talk and plot in the 1930's; with the film moguls of Hollywood and the comedians of Broadway; and with Jewish criminal types—"Bugsy" Siegel, "Lepke" Buchalter, and Abe Reles ("Kid Twist"). But Feldstein totally ignores the career of so remarkable—and durable—a figure on the Jewish cultural scene as Maurice Samuel, who through the printed and spoken word brought to thousands of his admirers scattered across the land a deeper understanding of the Zionist experience, the evolution of Yiddish literature, the books of the Bible, and the anti-Semitic historiography of Arnold Toynbee.

Feldstein is equally silent on the amalgam of traditionalism and modernity that was the hallmark of the scholarship generated by the faculty of the Jewish Theological Seminary, the varieties of American Orthodox thought and practice—from Williamsburg to Washington Heights—and the transformation of Reform theology and ritual in the decades before and after World War II. Unmentioned are American luminaries of Jewish scholarship—Harry A. Wolfson of Harvard or Salo W. Baron of Columbia—or the men, Dr. Samson Benderly and his disciples among them, who transformed the character of

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Jewish education through a fusion of cultural nationalism and pedagogic progressivism in the period just prior to and after World War I.

ONE possible explanation for Feldstein's anti-cultural bias—or at least that level of culture above what he defines as *"Yiddishkeit"* (namely, George Jessel singing *"A Chazan oyf Shabbes"* at the Paradise Theater in the Bronx)—may lie in the neo-proletarian bias he brings to his narrative, an identification with the downtrodden and the aggrieved of society and a thinly disguised hostility toward those who have achieved a measure of responsibility and respectability —or worse still, affluence—in the Jewish community in particular or on the American scene generally. This para-radicalism prompts Feldstein to dwell on the nativistic and anti-Semitic tendencies in American life, to deal gently and in great detail with the Jewish Left, and to take cheap shots at the ever vulnerable Jewish middle class.

Thus, Feldstein's survey of the 1920's and 30's consists of a substantial monograph on all that was bigoted in American life: the 1919 Red Scare; the anti-Semitism of Henry Ford and his Dearborn *Independent*; the 1924 Immigation Restriction Act; the lynching of Leo Frank; the discrimination against Jews in the professions and in colleges and universities; and the anti-Semitic fulminations of Father Charles E. Coughlin, Fritz Kuhn, and Gerald L. K. Smith. Yet to conclude, as Feldstein does, that these developments represented "a home-grown anti-Semitism [that] was threatening Jewish survival" is more than historical melodrama; it is a distorted reading of the historical record. In retrospect, and despite the presence of anti-Semitism, it is clear that the interwar decades provided the socioeconomic foundations for the mobility and the influence that characterized American Jewry in the years following the end of World War II.

Feldstein's ideological bias colors his account of the postwar era as well: hence his view of the second Red Scare—the McCarthy era—as an extension of pre-war anti-Semitism; his characterization of Jewish philanthropy as a projection of Jewish "vanity,"; and his portrait of a Bronx Jewish housewife conducting a "slave market" for her domestic help. In his brief account of the trial and execution of Ethel and Julius Rosenberg in 1953 for espionage on behalf of Soviet Russia during World War II, Feldstein appears more critical of "the Jewish establishment" for failing to defend or save the Rosenbergs than he is of those tragic and ideologically myopic *apparatchiks* of the Communist party.

The anti-middle-class bias reaches its climax in Feldstein's assault on the suburban way of life of American Jews. Long a whipping boy of the novelist and film-maker, the suburban Jew now fares no better at the hands of the histo-

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rian; the Jewish suburbanite is denounced here for the delicatessen food he enjoys, the synagogue he worships in, the music lessons he gives to his children, the green grass he tries to grow, and the *Consumer Reports* to which he faithfully subscribes. Feldstein credits Jews with being "a mainstay of the nation's cultural audience," then proceeds to register his chagrin at the shrubbery alongside their driveways, the slate patios in their back yards, and the "bacchanalian paraphernalias" in their "'finished basements.'" Philip Roth, whom Feldstein quotes extensively, did this kind of thing first—and better. A more balanced portrait of the second-generation Jewish suburbanite would have discovered a direct relationship between his own search for material comfort and the trade-union struggle which Feldstein extols. An as yet unwritten chronicle, to be called, perhaps, *The World of Their Children*, would reveal a far more idealistic and compassionate figure who labored hard both on behalf of Jewish communal needs and on behalf of the deprived segments of American society.

STILL, the distortions produced by Feldstein's ideological predispositions should not obscure the genuine problem that now confronts the historian seeking a consistent and unified frame of reference through which to view the American Jewish experience. And that problem, in turn, is but a reflection of the disquiet which now afflicts American Jews—a concern over the future quality of American Jewish life, and over the role and the influence of American Jewry on the American scene as a whole.

The defeat recently suffered by Israel and its supporters over the Carter administration's plane "package" is only the most recent, and most visible, sign of the current—and, some fear, recurring—weakness of the Jewish community in the political arena. And as for the internal condition of the community, despite the successful annual fund-raising efforts of the federations and welfare funds, despite the growth of the day-school movement and of Jewish-studies programs in the universities, and despite courses on the Holocaust on the high-school and college level, observers of the Jewish scene remain concerned about climbing intermarriage rates, declining memberships in synagogues and other organizations needed to foster Jewish identity and vitality, and an erosion of elan in the ideologically-oriented movements that once provided so fertile and rich an infrastructure for Jewish community leaders to look to and depend upon. Until these and other issues concerning the future of American Jewry are set to rest, American Jewish historiography will continue to be in a state of flux.

Notes for a Life

SAMUEL BECKETT: A BIOGRAPHY BY DEIRDRE BAIR. *Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. 736 pp. $19.95.*

Reviewed by C. DAVID HEYMANN

IN a time when art has become synonymous with godliness, and the artist is an instant celebrity, Samuel Beckett has managed to remain aloof and insular. Through the years, the author has made news only with the piecemeal publication and performance of his works, and with such occasional events as his Nobel Prize for Literature in 1969, his late-in-life marriage to his "friend" Suzanne Dumesnil, and his rare attempts to stage and direct his own plays and film scripts. Otherwise he has kept his respectful distance, completely isolated from the world at large. He does not answer letters, sign autographs, or meet with outsiders. He grants no interviews, does not speak at book-club functions, will not lecture on the college literary circuit. For the most part, he ignores his neighbors and has few, if any, close friends. Unusually shy and afraid of crowds, he has never attended any of his opening nights. He rarely, in fact, leaves his Paris apartment (overlooking the exercise yard of the Santé prison).

Given the facts of Beckett's hermetic existence, it seems remarkable that a biographer has succeeded, to any meaningful degree, in recording his life story. Yet for better or worse the details of Beckett's life are all here, gleaned by Deirdre Bair from correspondence, interviews, journals, and diaries, many never before published. Beckett's biographer (his first) has left few stones unturned in recreating a day-by-day, moment-by-moment account of Beckett's ominous comings and goings, his whereabouts and activities, his relationships and writings. The welter of details and the reconstruction of daily doings are in one respect breathtaking, in another an ordeal to peruse. But it would not be unfair to suggest that Miss Bair, a teacher of English literature at the University of Pennsylvania, has in reality laid only the foundation for a life study of Samuel Beckett, accumulating drafts and fragments of his strange existence rather than anything that can be construed as final or definitive.

Born in 1906 into a middle-class Irish Protestant family at Foxrock, near Dublin, Samuel Beckett was educated at Portora Royal School and Trinity College, receiving his A.B. in 1927. While still at Trinity, he visited Paris and met his fellow countryman, James Joyce; encouraged by Joyce, Beckett wrote a glowing essay on *Finnegans Wake*, at the time still *Work in Progress*. After two years as an instructor at the Ecole Normale Supérieure in Paris, an additional term as assistant professor of French at Trinity, two grim years of unsuccessful psychotherapy and writing in London, and a quick tour of Europe, Beckett expatriated to Paris in 1936.

DESPITE a suffocating love-hate relationship with his mother, Beckett's childhood was not the brutal and suffering period that one might suppose from reading his novels, poems, and plays. Characterizing his youth, he once wrote: "You might say I had a happy childhood.... My parents did everything they could to make a child happy." Those looking for a facile link between his life and his work will find themselves confronted by

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C. DAVID HEYMANN, *a new contributor, is the author of* Ezra Pound: The Last Rower *and* The Quiet Hours, *a book of poems.*

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a blank wall. Beckett lived to write, and what grieved him more than any event or chain of events was the stultifying silence that for decades greeted his most formidable literary endeavors. *Whoroscope, Echo's Bones,* and *More Pricks than Kicks,* his early collections of poems and short fiction, appeared and disappeared without a ripple. A critical study of Proust, described by Beckett as an examination of "that double-headed monster of damnation and salvation—Time!," likewise went unnoticed. Out of these formative efforts emerged something approximating a philosophy. Time, the unendurable act of waiting for time to pass, the relationship between language and reality, and the search for an ultimate Self were among the major literary themes that haunted Beckett's subsequent works, forming the bedrock of the author's nether world, his earthly inferno.

In desperation, and in search of a workable genre, he turned to the novel, producing a satiric, semi-autobiographical fable entitled *Murphy* about a young, well-educated Irishman down on his luck in London. The opening sentence announced the arrival of a unique artistic sensibility: "The sun shone, having no alternative, on the nothing new." This was startlingly new, although the search for a publisher proved as futile as Murphy's desultory life and as disheartening as Watt's—the title character of Beckett's second novel, which he completed during World War II. In Paris when the war broke out, Beckett joined the French Resistance and escaped to Southern France shortly before the Nazis ransacked his living quarters; for his work in the Underground he was later awarded the Croix de Guerre.

From 1945 to 1950, Beckett enjoyed his most sustained burst of creative energy, producing a dozen major works, including the masterpieces *Waiting for Godot* and the fictional *Trilogy (Molloy, Malone Dies,* and *The Unnamable),* written not in English but in French, which he believed the more precise of the two languages. Inspired by a flotilla of artistic predecessors (Dante, Virgil, Descartes, Racine, Schopenhauer, Wittgenstein, Eisenstein, Charlie Chaplin, Laurel and Hardy), but especially by Swift and Joyce, the poet-philsopher created a species of international literary metaphor, a transfer of inherited meanings from French and English, Spanish and German, setting up a series of analogies, confrontations, and appositions between myth and reality, Cartesian rationalism and existential absurdity. Fusing comic astringency with visual images of eloquent grotesqueness, Beckett's tramp-clown protagonists silently struggle toward forms of being that are suddenly disclosed by a fleeting gesture or a passing phrase. Often described by a frigidly detached narrative voice, his characters stumble through a stodgy limbo, out of

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life but not quite into death, "without the courage to end or the strength to go on." Roughly expressed, the overriding theme of Beckett's postwar *oeuvre* might be, "I do not find—I search!" which is the reverse of Picasso's famous utterance, "To search means nothing—to find is the thing!"

DEIRDRE BAIR dutifully traces the chronological progression of Beckett's work without placing it in any critical or intellectual context, dealing with it on a literal rather than a literary level. Thus *Waiting for Godot*, written between novels as a means of passing time, is for her precisely "about the abstract idea of waiting for time to pass and for something important to happen." The play, which ironically afforded Beckett the international reputation he presently enjoys, strives "all the time to avoid definition, and as always, attention should be given to Beckett's words." Miss Bair's approach follows closely Beckett's own proscription: "I feel the only line is to refuse to be involved in exegesis of any kind. And to insist on the extreme simplicity of dramatic situation and issue. . . . My world is a matter of fundamental sounds (no joke intended) made as fully as possible, and I accept responsibility for nothing else."

Despite this stern admonition, most of Beckett's critics have insisted on burying him beneath an avalanche of analysis and erudition, searching for hidden meanings and inferences where none may exist. It is to his biographer's credit that she refrains from the kind of academic exfoliation that has made Beckett a virtual enemy of the people while insuring his continued popularity in universities, "where endless seminars debate his symbolism, mythology, and meaning." But on the other side, the present biography courses with psychoanalytic theorizing, the likes of which have not been witnessed since Freud's cento on Leonardo da Vinci. Unlike Freud on da Vinci, however, Bair on Beckett is nothing more than pure vagary, a layman hiding behind a fake shingle.

Much is made, for example, of Beckett's association with his mother and its literary significance in terms of Beckett's work. The *Trilogy* is considered Beckett's attempt to cleanse himself of all guilt in connection with that relationship. The story line, claims the biographer, speaks for itself: "Molloy sets out to look for his mother, Moran to look for Molloy, while Malone, bedridden, waits for death, and the Unnamable, without arms or legs, manages a scorching, disembodied monologue based on his past: 'I'm looking for my mother to kill her, I should have thought of that a bit earlier, before being born.' " In *Endgame*, with its barren setting, Hamm's parents reside in trashbins so that Nell, the mother, expires unseen on stage. In real life, we are told, Beckett's mother was the main reason he left Ireland for Paris. She was also the source of a slew of psychosomatic ailments suffered by Beckett—including boils, cysts, and pleurisy—and it was she who caused him to become an alcoholic neurotic, subject to mental breakdowns, insomnia, and spells of prolonged misanthropy. Attempting to infuse the story with a touch of psychogenic sexuality, the author notes that "Beckett's mother, his wife, and other women who have been important to him are all tall, gaunt, and androgynous, with a preference for mannishly tailored clothes." Beckett's essential loneliness, his unhappiness, his womb fixation and fascination with cloacal functions are similarly (according to the author) the result of that ill-fated affiliation.

Although she wisely eschews any academic interpretation of his work, Miss Bair tends at the same time to oversimplify Beckett's creative method, attributing the composition of his plays and novels to isolated "bursts of unconscious creativity." There is a certain irritating breeziness in the assumption that Beckett writes off the top of his head, without recourse to the refined tools of the stylist. Nor does the author seem to notice (or care) that from book to book, plot, character, and setting are gradually reduced. The endless plains, the empty seashore, the rooms, the jars, the boxes, the muck and ruin—all point to a world rapidly running its downward course. The music-hall repartee of *Waiting for Godot* is reduced to benign banter in *Happy Days* and utter incoherence in *Play*, as three characters in glass jars (funeral urns) prattle senselessly from one curtain to the next. Having reached a final plateau of nothingness, Beckett then went on to create two productions in mime (*Act Without Words* I & II) as an ultimate postscript to all his other theatrical presentations.

In short, this biography is voluminous but light, the author too inclined toward the kind of fashionable jargonizing that dates quickly. There are long junkets into the lives of men and women who were associated with Beckett (such as Rogers Blin and Thomas McGreevy), a needlessly detailed excursus on the family life of James Joyce, and other digressions that do not reveal conscientiousness so much as the currently fashionable practice of incorporating every fascicle of research, whether endemic to the subject or not. The reclusive and distinguished artist whom the author has gone to such lengths to portray remains essentially as undisclosed as ever.

Home Truths

ELEANOR MARX. Volume I: FAMILY LIFE, 1855-1883; Volume II: THE CROWDED YEARS, 1884-1898. By YVONNE KAPP. *Pantheon. Vol. I: 319 pp. $10.00; Vol. II: 775 pp. $17.95.*

Reviewed by SIDNEY HOOK

THERE are many virtues in this comprehensive and scholarly biography of the most likable member of Karl Marx's family and the only one who did not renounce her Jewish heritage. Through her sympathetic account of Eleanor Marx's life and letters, Yvonne Kapp succeeds in vivifying all of the Marxes, as well as the large cir-

SIDNEY HOOK, *Senior Research Fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford, is the author of many books, including* The Hero in History, From Hegel to Marx, *and* Pragmatism and the Tragic Sense of Life.

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cle of their friends, personal and political. Everyone is humanized when seen through Eleanor Marx's loving and compassionate eyes—except, strangely enough, Edward Aveling, her common-law husband, whose actions drove her to a tragic death by suicide at the age of forty-three under mysterious circumstances that to this day have not been cleared up. At the same time, we are provided with a veritable encyclopedia of information about relevant and irrelevant details of the working-class movement in Western Europe, especially England.

Nonetheless, for all its virtues, it is hard to understand the chorus of unqualified critical praise this book has received. For as a biography it seems to me to leave more questions unanswered than answered, especially when it comes to Edward Aveling. In 1929 I met the socialist leader Eduard Bernstein in Berlin. Bernstein was approaching senility at the time, but the mention of two names roused him to passionate outbursts of lucid denunciation. The first was that of David Riazanov, the head of the Marx-Engels Institute of Moscow, whom Bernstein accused of stealing manuscripts from the Social Democratic archives. The second was Edward Aveling. To Bernstein's mind, Aveling was an unmitigated scoundrel, accused not merely of leaving Eleanor but by implication of doing away with her.

Yet the only thing that was indisputably established about Aveling was his infidelity—an old story in those rather unconventional circles. Aveling himself was a paragon of political orthodoxy in the inner group of Marxist socialists, someone who had sacrificed a distinguished professional career for the uncertain life of a labor educator and organizer, with an unsavory reputation that was a result partly of factional hostility among socialists and anarchists opposed to parliamentary action, and partly of insinuations by Eleanor's friends about his life as a Lothario despite his unprepossessing appearance and his persistent ill health. Aveling was in fact a man of admirable intellectual courage, not only a "dangerous" socialist but a militant atheist at a time when persons of his outspoken views were liable to be jailed for blasphemy.

Despite his background, his wide learning, and his oratorical gifts, Yvonne Kapp portrays Aveling as little better than a fraud and a dead beat, "a gasbag whom time has rudely deflated . . . so far as posterity is concerned a thundering bore." Perhaps; but this makes it all the more incumbent upon a biographer to explain why such a man could profoundly move contemporary audiences. A tough English labor veteran acclaimed him as "one of the greatest orators this country ever heard." The more one accepts the author's assessment of Aveling's personality and intellectual legacy—"his voice is not merely without character: it is muted, dead. Nothing rings through the words. Nothing at all"—the more puzzling is the fascination he exerted over the vibrant, loving, yet level-headed Eleanor, who slavishly devoted herself to him. "My last word to you," reads the farewell note she penned in the moments before her death, "is the same that I have said during all these long, sad years—love." There must have been something about Aveling to account for a love so prolonged, profound, and desperate. We must conclude that the biographer who has not found it has not understood something central in Eleanor Marx's life.

EVEN more surprising in a book which is to a considerable extent a biography of Marx himself is the absence of any intellectual analysis of Marx's leading ideas, or of the criticisms made of them. Miss Kapp's own Marxism is orthodox Old Left and theoretically primitive. She believes that Marx had a "scientific philosophy" that explains "the processes by which societies develop, applicable at all times and in all places," and scornfully says of the Fabian society that it "had no more earthly chance to supersede Marx than to reverse the laws of gravity." What we would like to know is whether Eleanor Marx, whose orthodoxy was as unquestioning as that of Engels, ever confronted the challenges to Marx's ideas. Miss Kapp's account

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

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pictures her primarily as a tireless and effective popular propagandist. Her letters concerning Eduard Bernstein's first tentative steps toward revisionism, which now seems scientifically more justified than the traditional orthodox view, reveal pious horror but little understanding.

More regrettably, Miss Kapp has missed a golden opportunity to explore and evaluate Marx's treatment of the "Jewish question," although she does devote a few pages to Eleanor Marx's gallant identification of herself as a Jew despite the fact that she was born of a Christian mother and a baptized Jewish father. "I am the only one of my family," she remarked to Max Beer, the historian of the socialist movement, "who felt drawn to the Jewish people." This came about as a result of her observing the grinding poverty under which immigrant Jewish workers lived and the birth of socialist consciousness among them; it also arose out of her characteristic impulse to identify with the insulted and injured, and probably too out of a sense of personal guilt over the thoughtless anti-Semitism endemic to the early socialist and labor movement in Europe.

IT MUST be remembered that the concept of a Jewish proletariat was quite foreign to Europeans of the day, who associated Jews with commerce and huckstering. (As late as 1928, German students were incredulous about the existence of a Jewish proletariat in the United States.) Miss Kapp believes that Eleanor Marx's declaration, "I am a Jewess," at the time of the Dreyfus affair undid "in four words her paternal grandfather's years of cogitation and eventual baptism." If so, only in her own case. It did not undo the effects of her father's treatment of the Jewish question, of whose drift she could hardly have been unaware. Eleanor idolized her father: there is no evidence that she questioned any of his views about anything.

This is not the place to consider in detail Marx's discussion of the Jewish question. In the light of what happened to European Jewry after Marx's time, his views strike one not only as extremely biased but as horrendous. Yet a certain injustice has been done to him in downplaying the fact that his writings on the subject do argue for the extension of all political rights to observant Jews—this, before the era of Jewish political emancipation, and despite his identification of Judaism with money-grubbing, rapacious usury and the worship of Mammon. One of the current translations of Marx's *Zur Judenfrage* is entitled *A World Without Jews.* This is a distortion that borders on falsification. It would have been more truthful to entitle it, *A World Without Jews and Christians.* For its animus is more against religion as such than against Judaism. It sins against both the historical approach of Hegel and the univeralistic humanism of Feuerbach. And worst of all, it fails to apply to the Jewish question what is sound in the theory of historical materialism toward which Marx himself was groping at the time. It did not require any esoteric scholarship to recognize that the objectionable aspects of the vocational activities of the Jews had been forced upon them by Christian communities. And although the essay belongs to Marx's younger years, there were ample opportunities to modify his judgment subsequently. The Czarist pogroms had begun before he died, and anti-Semitic literature was not uncommon. Yet scurrilous references to Jews not only persist in his personal correspondence but are echoed in the letters of his daughters.

It is hardly a mitigation of Marx's insensitivity to the plight of the European Jews that anti-Semitism was rife in almost all varieties of socialism, and that insulting references to his own Jewish origins occasionally appeared in the polemical writings of socialist sects. The man who could sympathize with the exploited masses of India and China, whose compassion was aroused by the sufferings of English workers and Irish peasants, whose imagination was stirred by the heroic resistance of the Poles, seemed utterly indifferent to the periodic excesses against his own people. No one knew better than this omnivorous reader of the annals of the past that his kinsmen had for centuries lived on sufferance beyond the protection of the laws, victims both of arbitrary spoliation by oppressive rulers and of the popular fury of their subjects, the perpetual outsiders and scapegoats whose present condition could not be understood or judged without reference to their fateful legacy. Marx's utopian internationalism and universal outlook had not blinded him to the realities of European national struggles in their concrete historical contexts. Why had they obscured his vision where the Jews were concerned?

It was certainly not out of moral cowardice or a desire to ingratiate himself with others or to avoid polemical attacks. At the time of the Paris Commune, Marx had braved the obloquy of an outraged European public opinion. We can only guess at the unconscious psychological motivations that underlay his thoughtless and harsh judgments concerning the Jews and Judaism and that inhibited him from reacting as Eleanor did to the pathetic plight of those harried by persecution and living in large part on the margins of society.

AT ANY rate, no man is all of a piece. Those not already familiar with some of the incidents in Marx's life that seem to diminish his stature as a human being will find them here as they relate to Eleanor and other members of his family. Some of them have their amusing sides. Miss Kapp reproduces Marx's letter to Paul Lafargue, who was paying court to his daughter Laura, in which Marx appears in the role of a heavy-handed Victorian father protesting Lafargue's unseemly public displays of ardor and warning him off the premises if in his daughter's presence he is unable "to love her in a manner that conforms with the latitude of London."

More important and self-revealing was Marx's demand that Lafargue offer some guarantees of his economic prospects; and—since "as regards your family, I know nothing"—that he furnish information about his parents' social and economic status. Fear of poverty

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and a bad conscience over having imposed poverty on his wife accounted for Marx's concern. "You know that I have sacrificed my whole fortune to the revolutionary struggle. I do not regret it. On the contrary. Had I my career to start again, I should do the same. But I would not marry. As far as lies in my power, I intend to save my daughter from the reefs on which her mother's life has been wrecked." Marx refused to give his daughters the freedom to make their own choice. He succeeded in breaking up Eleanor's engagement to Lissageray, one of the heroes of the Paris Commune, despite Eleanor's deep emotional attachment to him. In all likelihood, despite "the shortcomings of French husbands," on which all the members of the Marx household seem to have been agreed, had Eleanor married Lissageray she would have escaped her tragic entanglement with Aveling.

Other incongruities between the social ideals of Marx, his family, and his intimate circle and their social behavior are observed by Miss Kapp with a suppressed inquietude. Their attitude toward servants, for example, was hardly different from that of their unenlightened English neighbors. And although one cannot expect socialists to abolish or even to modify the institutions under which they have been brought up, still one does expect them to exhibit a certain fraternity of spirit in relation to their fellow humans regardless of station or birth.

There was something positively feudal in the Marxes' relationship to Helene Demuth, Mrs. Marx's old family retainer, who did indeed become a member of the family, so to speak, as did so many old servants at the time who had no life of their own. The fact that Helene Demuth bore an illegitimate son to Marx is not as significant as the way in which the child, and necessarily the mother, were treated. The child never crossed the threshold of the Marx domicile after he was sent out to foster parents, never met Marx, saw his mother only clandestinely, and enjoyed none of the cultural advantages of the other Marx children. He had a rather rough time growing up and

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was treated with aversion by Engels even after Helene Demuth became Engels's housekeeper upon Marx's death. He became friendly only with Eleanor, from whom the knowledge that he was her illegitimate half-brother was kept until shortly before Engels died.

It is not altogether clear whether Mrs. Marx was aware of all the facts, although it is difficult to believe that the situation could have escaped her notice. Here, too, what may be shrugged off as customary behavior when ordinary mortals are involved, seems odd and unseemly on the part of those heralding a new era in human relationships. One cannot but sympathize with Eleanor Marx's shock and incredulity when apprised of Freddie Demuth's parentage, not because her father was involved, but because of the ignorance in which she had been kept and the cowardly truckling to the cruel social conventions of the time by those who, like Marx himself on many occasions, had denounced the hypocrisies of bourgeois morality.

ELEANOR MARX herself seems in every way to have been an admirable person, capable only of small spites and jealousies, and overburdened by too great a piety toward her father and his work. The world was too much for her partly because she approached it with the oversimple determinism derived from the Marxist tradition. Moral evil appeared to her to be no more than a physiological defect remediable perhaps by medical and social means. Shortly before her death she wrote to Freddie Demuth:

> In some a certain *moral* sense is wanting just as some are deaf or have bad sight or are otherwise unhealthy. And I begin to understand that one has no more right to blame the one disease than the other. We must try and cure and if no cure is possible, do our best. I have learned this through long suffering.

Such a view makes the concepts of moral good and evil unintelligible, and the quest for social justice the pursuit of a chimera. It fails to do justice to what inspired Karl Marx and his followers as well as to the life of Eleanor Marx herself.

Pride & Prejudice

A PRETTY GOOD CLUB. THE FOUNDING FATHERS OF THE U.S. FOREIGN SERVICE. By MARTIN WEIL. *Norton. 313 pp. $12.95.*

Reviewed by STEPHEN A. SCHUKER

DURING most of the 19th century the United States had few pressing concerns outside its borders. Representing this country abroad was a prosaic business, generally carried out by well-connected amateurs seeking a temporary respite from the hustle-bustle of commerce and industry. The nation's emergence as a great power transformed the diplomat's role and led to increasing professionalization of the Foreign Service. Earlier historians have celebrated that development as a triumph of merit and expertise. Martin Weil examines the darker side of the bureaucratic edifice constructed by the diplomats. In this vivid social history, he scrutinizes the principles and political predilections of a small group of "Christian gentlemen" with large purses and narrow minds who dominated the Foreign Service from the 1920's through the early years of the cold war.

The diplomats had embraced the Progressive era reformers' belief in the virtues of scientific management. Through training and specialization they endeavored to win public sanction of their craft as a recognized career. At the same time, as scions of the Eastern upper class, they fought to preserve their social privileges. Three-quarters of them had attended New England preparatory schools (notably St. Paul's and Groton), where they were imbued with stern ideals of public service and of their own high calling to provide it. It was perhaps less significant that two-thirds graduated from Harvard, Yale, or Princeton than that they belonged while there to the proper clubs. They looked on the diplomatic service too, as one key insider put it, as "a pretty good club"; and

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they tried to maintain its exclusive character after passage of the 1924 Rogers Act—the administrative charter of the new Foreign Service—by resisting amalgamation with the consular corps.

The diplomats lost that particular skirmish, but won the bureaucratic war. The aristocrats specializing in European affairs who helped formulate the Rogers Act—chief among them Joseph Grew, William Phillips, Hugh Gibson, and Hugh Wilson—set the tone for a generation. Younger men of similar background whom they favored and promoted—J. Pierrepont Moffat, Ray Atherton, and Arthur Bliss Lane—perpetuated their standards and views. Occasionally a talented officer of lesser breeding managed to assimilate. (For example, James C. Dunn, the son of a Newark construction boss who married a meat-packing heiress and became Secretary Hull's protégé, emerged during World War II as the traditionalists' chief defender.) But such individuals succeeded only by adopting with particular fervor the aristocrats' outlook on the world.

In the late 1920's several budding Russian experts joined the department. George Kennan, Loy Henderson, Charles Bohlen, and their fellow recruits shared the Europeanists' social background, even though they possessed a more intellectual bent. Despite differences in style, both groups, according to Weil, developed a phobia regarding the Soviet Union. The Europeanists' distaste for Communism followed logically from their conservative upbringing and tendency to associate abroad with reactionary social elites; the Kremlinologists came to their views as a result of professional training among White Russian émigrés. Anti-Communist passion, Weil asserts, lay at the root of a widespread regret among State Department regulars that Great Britain did not carry appeasement further in the 1930's. It also explains, he believes, why the experts rigidly adhered to their pessimistic appraisal of Soviet intentions during World War II and failed to join in the spirit of the anti-fascist coalition.

President Roosevelt had little use for the professional diplomats: shortly after Pearl Harbor he remarked jocularly that the "State Department was neutral in this war and that he hoped it would at least remain that way." The President sought to break the power of the hard-liners through successive reorganization plans; owing largely to the bureaucratic skills of Jimmy Dunn, he failed. Weil is at his best in showing how the professionals lodged in the Office of European Affairs managed to stave off challenges to their authority. New Dealers led by Dean Acheson, UN enthusiasts and academic economists on temporary service, and China hands who dissented from a Eurocentric view of the world all tried to place a more liberal imprint on postwar planning. Nevertheless, Roosevelt's death in 1945 found the Europeanists still controlling the cable traffic and memo-drafting process. Weil contends that the diplomats who had all along frowned on cooperation with Russia now fed one-sided information about events in Eastern Europe to the White House, misled the impressionable Harry Truman, and helped bring about the cold war.

THE vignettes of individuals in *A Pretty Good Club* are masterful; the argument lacks plausibility. In the circles where Weil completed his political-science training, it is fashionable to study intra-agency conflicts in order to determine why decisions turn out as they do. In academic jargon this is called substituting the bureaucratic-politics paradigm for the rational-actor model of decision-making. Weil burdens his account with none of the jargon, but the model itself distorts his focus. Substantive reasons for policy decisions pass him by unnoticed.

Weil portrays a titanic struggle between State Department conservatives and White House accommodationists. The former, he declares, framed the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe as a means of provoking a confrontation with Russia, yet opposed free elections for colonial peoples in Southeast Asia. The latter, he claims, favored conceding to Russia an untrammeled sphere of influence in East-

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

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



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ern Europe, but in Asia held out for self-determination. Roosevelt, he suggests, stood squarely with the latter group, and was just looking for an excuse to sell out the Poles.

The dichotomy here is far too sharp, and Roosevelt's own views are probably misconstrued. But what appears not at all in this bureaucratic analysis is any discussion of Soviet policy. Was it not the relentless expansionism of the Soviet state and the mounting evidence of Communist subversion that attenuated earlier differences within the American government? Ardent New Dealers undoubtedly found it painful to concede that a George Kennan—who as late as 1941 had flaunted his friendship with Junker aristocrats and faithfully echoed their views about Germany's mission in the East—might now prove right about Russia. That was part of the drama of the postwar political realignment. Moreover, the foreign-affairs constituency broadened at this time. Several new agencies concerned with national security (as well as outside pressure groups) began to affect policy formation. President Truman and his host of advisers, the Congress, and the American people perceived themselves drawn into a cold war because of the march of events—not as the result of a diplomatic cabal.

YET if the diplomats could exert but a marginal influence on questions of vital national import, they retained some latitude in handling subsidiary matters. The fate of Jews fleeing Hitler's Europe and the future of the remnant that survived at war's end figure as a case in point. Weil treats the issue in this book as incidental to his principal theme. All the same, his probing of State Department sentiment toward the Jews remains his most durable contribution. It has long been known that anti-Semitism motivated certain diplomats, but the depth of their feeling was hard to gauge. Some historians have eschewed distasteful revelations. Although the unmistakable aroma of anti-Semitism wafts from every volume of Joseph Grew's unpublished diary, his biographer, Waldo Heinrichs, Jr., never mentions the subject. Robert Schulzinger alludes to "an attitude of genteel anti-Semitism" among service officers in *The Making of the Diplomatic Mind*, but nimbly goes on to praise them for elucidating immigration restrictions without giving offense. Weil, by contrast, avoids circumlocutions.

The leading diplomats between the wars did not simply share the mild prejudice common to their class; for many, hatred of the Jews became an obsession. Anti-Communism and anti-Semitism often went together. In 1937, Loy Henderson drew a fine distinction: although Jews might not dominate the Soviet Union, nevertheless world Jewry figured as "an important supporter of it in international affairs." A decade earlier it was fashionable to paint in bolder colors. Under Secretary Phillips described his opposite number in Moscow as "a perfect little rat of a Jew, born in Buffalo, and utterly vile." Ambassador Gibson in Warsaw called his Soviet counterpart "a slinking little rat . . . said to be an Armenian Jew of a sect that feeds chiefly on the Old Testament." His second secretary, Moffat, who in the 1930's would head the Western European Division and thus influence refugee policy directly, was particularly wrought up against the Jews during his Polish tour. Moffat's letters home warned of the multiple dangers that they posed to the United States; along with Gibson, he sought ways to discourage immigration ("a very severe enforcement of delousing," he concluded, "including shaving of beards and heads, would help a little"). Such attitudes, Weil makes clear, were not limited to eccentrics. William R. Castle of the Western European Division titillated a wide circle of his service correspondents with stories from Washington about Jewish vulgarity and the Jews' "appalling power in business and finance."

The New Deal changed the atmosphere. Gibson's intimates might still complain about politicians "truckling to the Jews." For that very reason, however, discretion become obligatory. When Hitler's crony, Putzi Hanfstaengl, scheduled an official appearance at a Harvard graduation and Jewish organizations protested, Moffat and Phillips rose to the defense of "freedom of opinion in American universities." Gibson objected to remonstrations by the U.S. government against Nazi treatment of Jews on the ground that such protests would constitute meddling in German internal affairs. Kennan, on duty in Berlin, invoked the separation of powers to explain why Congressmen shouldn't tell the State Department what to do. After the war, Ambassador Arthur Bliss Lane circumspectly declined comment on a Polish pogrom of concentration-camp survivors—he merely referred reporters to the Roman Catholic primate, who explained how the Jews had brought it on themselves.

The evidence amassed by Weil permits us to evaluate the real meaning of such high-minded expressions of principle. This study also provides a benchmark by which to measure the achievement of those who broadened recruitment policies and democratized the Foreign Service during the 1950's and 1960's. Perhaps it will give pause to officials who have recently deemphasized the competitive-examination system and begun again to select some Foreign Service officers according to subjective criteria.

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

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